Ines Menchaoui and Chaima Hssouna
This study aims to analyze the relationship between a firm’s use of aggressive tax planning and board of directors (independence and size) and audit committee characteristics…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to analyze the relationship between a firm’s use of aggressive tax planning and board of directors (independence and size) and audit committee characteristics (independence and expertise).
Design/methodology/approach
This study used archival data from 35 non-financial firms’ French firms listed on the CAC 40 over a period of 5 years (2013–2018).
Findings
This study shows that measures of board size are negatively related to tax aggressiveness. A broader board helps reduce tax aggressiveness, as having more members can improve board performance. Indeed, more members can contribute to a better assessment of tax risks and detect risky tax strategies.
Research limitations/implications
The main limitation of this study is the small sample. The authors limited the observations to 2018 because the corporate tax rate in France changed in 2019. Such a time window casts homogeneity on the current study. Examining universal registration documents, it has been noted that companies have only recently become interested in disclosure of tax risk.
Practical implications
Knowing the characteristics of the board and audit committees can give a signal to stakeholders about the potential risk bearing on aggressive tax planning. This study provides evidence that could help the board governance committees integrate the right profiles and to raise awareness among the members of the board of directors and the audit committee to play their role (monitoring function or advisory function) about tax risk management.
Originality/value
According to the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence regarding the effect of the board of directors and audit committee characteristics on tax aggressiveness.
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Dorra Talbi and Ines Menchaoui
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board attributes and managerial ownership on cash holdings.
Design/methodology/approach
The present study examines a sample of 70 listed firms in Saudi Arabia observed during the period stretching from 2006 to 2016. To test the hypotheses, the authors used generalized method of moments and quantile regressions.
Findings
The empirical results reveal that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are inefficient in the Saudi context. In fact, the authors found that board size, board independence, duality and managerial ownership impact positively and significantly cash holdings. Additionally, quantile regressions confirm the results that at certain thresholds, CG mechanisms are not efficient in protecting shareholders’ interests. Shariah compliance is found to moderate negatively and significantly the studied relationship.
Originality/value
This study helps to not only clarify and help decision-makers to see the importance of corporate cash management but also to identify the limits of the CG mechanisms put in place.