Adoption of a separate capital budget in local governments receives little attention in the literature. It is important to look at various capital budgeting practices in local…
Abstract
Adoption of a separate capital budget in local governments receives little attention in the literature. It is important to look at various capital budgeting practices in local governments since a separate capital budget as different budget format and structure affects budgetary decisions, thus leading to different levels of investment in public infrastructure. This paper examines factors that facilitate or impede adoption of a separate capital budget by using time series data. Results show that local governments are more likely to adopt a separate capital budget in order to reflect local demands such as growth rate in capital spending.
After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the…
Abstract
After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” Until the late 1980s, politics in South Korea was far from democratic. South Korea had five direct presidential elections (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) and six national assembly elections (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) after the democratic transition of 1987. In 1992, a civilian candidate, Young Sam Kim, was elected president. Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) prosecuted and punished former generals turned presidents Doo Hwan Chun (1980–1988) and Tae Woo Roh (1988–1993) for corruption, mutiny and treason in 1995. Dae Jung Kim (1998–2003) was elected president in 1997. For the first time in South Korean political history, regime change occurred between a ruling party and an opposition party.
In this chapter, the change and continuity of civil–military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea is examined. A positive consolidation of democratic reform is one that, while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Civilian supremacy should be institutionalized not only by preventing military intervention in civilian politics but also by ensuring civilian control over the formation and implementation of national defense policy.
In sum, despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized. Although significant changes in civil-military relations did occur after the democratic transition, they were not initiated by elected leaders with the intention of establishing a firm institutional footing for civilian supremacy. South Korea's political leaders have not crafted durable regulations and institutions that will sustain civilian control over the military.
More than six decades, Korea is still divided. The most highly militarized zone in the world lies along the demilitarized zone. How to draw the line prudently between seeking national security and promoting democracy shall be the most delicate task facing all the civilian regimes to come in South Korea. That mission will remain challenging not only for civilian politicians but also for military leaders.
The Hanbo (meaning Korean treasure) scandal or “Hanbogate” occurred on January 23, 1997, with the bankruptcy of Hanbo Iron and Steel Company, the second largest steel company and…
Abstract
The Hanbo (meaning Korean treasure) scandal or “Hanbogate” occurred on January 23, 1997, with the bankruptcy of Hanbo Iron and Steel Company, the second largest steel company and 14th largest conglomerate in South Korea, as its debt had accumulated to US$5.6 billion. Hanbo's bankruptcy triggered an investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office that resulted in the imprisonment for 15 years of Hanbo's founder, Chung Tae-Soo, for bribing politicians and bankers to pressure banks to extend hugh bank loans to Hanbo. Nine other persons were also convicted including Chung's son, who was jailed for three years for bribery and embezzlement, and Kim Hyun-Chol, the second son of President Kim Young-Sam, who was sentenced to three years jail and fined US$1.5 million (New York Times, 1997).
The purpose of this paper is to identify the cause how the student movement in South Korea enjoyed the golden age in the 1970–1990s and could not be revived since the late 1990s…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to identify the cause how the student movement in South Korea enjoyed the golden age in the 1970–1990s and could not be revived since the late 1990s and cannot be played a pivotal role again.
Design/methodology/approach
This study adopts historical analysis as primary methodology, traced the historical evolution of South Korean student activism in the 1970–1990s through analyzing secondary Korean literature and newspaper on the particular struggle cases in the period.
Findings
Social solidarity between society and student had played a pivotal role in the South Korean students' long activism in the struggle of the 1970–1990s. In the 1970–1980s, democratic election and constitutional reform set in the main purpose of struggle that attracted wide support from society and enjoyed maintaining a new member supply and their commitment despite authoritarian government's persistent oppression. When the sixth constitution was passed in 1987 with Democratization, the student decided to choose continuing struggle and set social cooperation with North Korea as the new goal, the sensitive issue in South Korea that confronted fierce criticism. Society chose to withdraw their support to the activism in the Yonsei University incident of 1996, rung a knell of long struggle since the 1970s.
Originality/value
The research identified the cause how South Korean students in university could persist long strike without particular internal resource production during three decades and ended the long struggle in the late 1990s; the existence of social solidarity between student and society was the main reason of continued new member supply and their commitment in the battle.
Details
Keywords
Prodemocracy protest in South Korea in the 1980s can be described in terms of two waves of sustained activism between 1979 and 1987. One wave was brutally repressed in the Gwangju…
Abstract
Prodemocracy protest in South Korea in the 1980s can be described in terms of two waves of sustained activism between 1979 and 1987. One wave was brutally repressed in the Gwangju Uprising of May 1980, while the other succeeded in bringing in a transition to democracy in June 1987. How did activists recover from the repression in the first wave, and how did they create a viable movement in the second wave? This work focuses on the role of memory work about the Gwangju Uprising in the mobilization of the prodemocracy movement. Drawing on a wide assortment of documents collected from various archives in South Korea, the author demonstrates how memory work contributed to the movement dynamics. Cognitively, memory work radicalized movement participants such that they became completely disillusioned with the legitimacy of state power. Emotionally, memory work triggered a moral shock among recruits that motivated them to take the high risks associated with activism. Relationally, memory work provided a bonding experience for activists within a network. The findings also show a process through which memory work becomes a powerful social force: emergence of a challenger, proliferation of an alternative narrative, and then a full-blown contention between the state and a challenger. The process also means changes of the status of memory in terms of ownership, salience, and valence.