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I felt myself the recipient of a great honour when asked to read a paper on this subject before your Society. One difficulty, however, at once confronted me, and that was that what your society might regard as an act of sophistication of food, I might believe to be only a perfectly legitimate manufacturing improvement. I had no wish to masquerade before you as a wolf in sheep's clothing, and therefore stated my position to your secretary. As a result of some correspondence, I think that he, as your representative, and I, both felt that granted such differences of opinion, they themselves constituted one of the strongest arguments in favour of the formation of a Court of Reference. There are, no doubt, many processes which are considered by their inventors and users as of advantage in the manufacture of food, whereas others regard them with the greatest distrust and aversion. In most cases I believe the members of both these classes to be high‐minded and honourable men. That being so, it is submitted that the best method of arriving at the real facts is the establishment of an impartial, broad‐minded, and capable Court of Reference, to which such matters should be submitted for examination and decision.

The recent wave of protests on courts and fields all over the world has brought increased attention to the potential of sport to address social justice. Basketball in particular has been the subject of both celebration and outrage. Building off the theorizing of sport as a contested space, we examine the work of three artists/artist collectives; Abigail Smithson, Maria Molteni and New Craft Artists in Action, and Noah Cohan and John Early of Whereas Hoops, who have all directly engaged with the basketball court as a site filled with cultural meaning and struggle. All three of the respective bodies of work were developed in the past 10 years and emerge from the heightened social and racial tension of the time, as well as the increasingly apparent link between sports, politics, and race within our larger society. Examining the work reveals the importance of the basketball court as a site simultaneously of celebration, play, surveillance, policing, community, history, cultural exchange, and racialization. We explore the potential for artists to engage with and transform sport spaces through an edited group interview, giving the artists the chance to reflect on their practices as well as the limitations of working as an activist and artist in the realm of sports in their own words. Through conversation, the chapter focuses not just on finished pieces of art but also on the process of making the work in the ever familiar and culturally rich environment of the basketball court.

In this chapter, I examine stories that foster care youth tell to legislatures, courts, policymakers, and the public to influence policy decisions. The stories told by these children are analogized to victim truth testimony, analyzed as a therapeutic, procedural, and developmental process, and examined as a catalyst for systemic accountability and change. Youth stories take different forms and appear in different media: testimony in legislatures, courts, research surveys or studies; opinion editorials and interviews in newspapers or blog posts; digital stories on YouTube; and artistic expression. Lawyers often serve as conduits for youth storytelling, translating their clients’ stories to the public. Organized advocacy by youth also informs and animates policy development. One recent example fosters youth organizing to promote “normalcy” in child welfare practices in Florida, and in related federal legislation.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

July 17, 1972 Industrial Relations — Action in tort — High Court — Discretion and obligation to stay proceedings — Injurious acts complained of before Industrial Court — Interim order made by Industrial Court — Proceedings in High Court complaining of same acts — Whether acts prevented from being actionable in tort — Whether High Court should stay proceedings — Industrial Relations Act 1971 (c.72) ss. 61(1), 131(1), (2) and (3), 132(4).

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

This chapter provides a genealogy of the Gladue–Ipeelee principle of special consideration of Indigenous circumstances at sentencing. The principle is codified in the 1996 statutory requirement that “all available sanctions other than imprisonment … should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders” (s. 718.2e of the Criminal Code of Canada). Using the Foucaultian genealogy method to produce a “history of the present,” this chapter eschews normative questions of how s. 718.2e has “failed” to reduce Indigenous over-incarceration to instead focus on how practices of “special consideration” reproduce settler-state paternalism. This chapter addresses three key components of the Gladue–Ipeelee principle: the collection of circumstances information, the characterization of those circumstances, and finally their consideration at sentencing. Part one focuses on questions of legitimacy and authority and explicates how authority and responsibility to produce Indigenous circumstances knowledge was transferred from the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) to Indigenous Courtworker organizations in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Part two identifies how authority shapes problematization by examining the characterization of Indigenous circumstances in the two eras, finding that present-day Gladue reports articulate an Indigenous history and critique of colonialism as the root cause of Indigenous criminalization, whereas DIA reports prior to 1970 generally characterized this criminalization as a “failure to assimilate.” Part three focuses on the structural reproduction of power relations by exploring historical continuities in judicial and executive-branch consideration of Indigenous circumstances, suggesting that the Gladue–Ipeelee principle reinscribes a colonial “mercy” framework of diminished responsibility. The author discusses how the principle operates in the shadow of Indigenous over-incarceration as a form of state “recognition” and a technique of governance to encourage Indigenous participation in the settler justice system and suggests that the Gladue–Ipeelee principle produces a governing effect that reinforces settler-state authority by recirculating colonial practices and discourses of settler superiority.

Several recent statistical analyses provide overwhelming evidence for substantial injustice in immigration court decisions. Writers also explored the data for evidence of bias. Several ended with recommendations for more legal training for judges and more professional appellate review. These recommendations assume that the problem is in the interpretation of the law and conduct of the trial. My own experience has been that there is actually a greater problem in the interpretation of facts, at several levels. Courts provide for translators, but merely verbal translation is not enough. Cultural translation is required. In this chapter I illustrate what cultural translation is with instances from five different asylum cases that I have been involved in as an expert witness. I conclude with recommendations to support better use of this kind of information.