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This study aims to examine whether a switching decision between a family CEO and a non-family professional CEO has a different effect on firm performance and what determines such a decision by family firms.

This study uses multiple regressions, Probit and univariate analyses, based the sample of family-controlled Chaebol firms in Korea for the 11-year period from 2001 to 2011.

Evidence found was consistent with the family entrenchment hypothesis: firms experiencing declining Q value are more likely to replace family CEOs with non-family CEOs, and that these firms, having switched to non-family CEOs, exhibit an improvement in firm performance as measured by the change in Q value. On the other hand, for those firms that replace non-family CEOs with family member CEOs, no evidence was found that the switching decision either decreases or increases firm performance. The results of Probit and univariate analyses suggest that firms switching to family CEOs tend to be larger, stock-exchange listed and more “central”, with more cash flow rights held by the controlling families and with relatively more equity holdings in the other affiliated firms of the same Chaebol group. In contrast, firms switching to non-family CEOs tend to be smaller, unlisted and less “central”, with less equity holdings in the other affiliated firms of the same Chaebol group.

This study sheds light on the different value implications and determinants of a decision between “family CEO” and “non-family CEO”.

This paper, in face of the increasing interconnectivity between local and global, has attempted to retrospect the critical moment of Korean society under Tae‐woo Rho (1988–93) regime, in which Korea struggled for fundamental reforms of the earlier centrally controlled state system through economic rationalization and labor flexibilization. During that juncture of Korean history, neo‐liberalization under the influence of Fordian decline was a governing theme behind the Korean economy's policy formation as well as labor agenda. This reliance of government on the neo‐liberal pillar has made an impact on the subsequent leaderships under Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) and Dae Jung Kim (1998‐present). After briefly reviewing the major aspect of Korean economy and labor problems surrounding the financial crisis of East Asia around 1998, the international influence of Fordian decline and neo‐liberalization as a Korean alternative has been discussed.

This paper aims to explore the effect of interlocking directorates on agency conflicts and corporate performance in the shipping industry.

The authors use social network analysis to discover central nodes in the network of personal and corporate connections in an international sample of 110 listed shipping companies.

Assessing network structure, the authors find that the network of corporate leaders is denser than the network of shipping companies. The network of shipping companies is populated with many isolated nodes; the network of shipping executives and directors is populated with many cohesive groups in which the longest distance between two corporate leaders is two companies. The authors find that interlocking corporate leadership can help resolve agency conflicts in the shipping industry, bearing a negative effect on the magnitude of agency costs. The extent of leadership overlaps is associated with board size, financial leverage and profitability. The relationship between profits and interlocks is bidirectional, implying that interlocking directorates bear a positive effect on asset returns.

The authors map the relational structures in the social networks of companies and company leaders in the shipping industry and discover the cross-sectional determinants of interlocks in the shipping industry. The finding about the effect of interlocks on profitability and agency costs bears policy implications for the design of corporate governance in the shipping industry.