Bashar H. Malkawi and Hikmet O. Malkawi
The purpose of this paper is to examine the anti‐terrorist finance provisions in the Penal Law as well as the vulnerabilities in place that hamper more effective regime.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the anti‐terrorist finance provisions in the Penal Law as well as the vulnerabilities in place that hamper more effective regime.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper identifies the pre‐September 11 legal structure in Jordan regarding terrorist finance. Since, then the amended Penal Law, promulgated on October 8, 2001, has emerged as the principal tool in addressing terrorist finance activities. The paper is divided into five sections covering pre‐existing statutory provisions on terrorist finance, Jordan's counterterrorist financing regime including money laundering law and directives, the anti‐terrorist finance provisions in the Penal with its constituent elements, Jordan's accession to the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and finally the paper provides a set of conclusions.
Findings
There are still many loopholes to close in Jordan's anti‐terrorist finance initiatives. There is a need for greater enforcement of existing provisions with an eye to expanding the scope of article 147(2) of the Penal Law to include Islamic banks, hawala, charities, and zakat. A clear definition of the term “terrorist activity” should be supplied in article 147(2) and penalties for terrorist finance offense should be tightened.
Research limitations/implications
Lack of publications or research on the subject of terrorist finance in Jordan in Arabic.
Practical implications
This paper will be very helpful for any individual interested in the legal regime of anti‐terrorist financing as it exists in Jordan.
Originality/value
This paper meets a need for an understanding of the Jordanian legal regime as applied to anti‐terrorist financing and offers insights to lawyers and academics.
Details
Keywords
Nabil Mzoughi and Wafa M’Sallem
This research aims to describe three profile segments (postponers, opponents and rejectors) of non‐adopters of internet banking in Tunisia, and attempts to predict consumers’…
Abstract
Purpose
This research aims to describe three profile segments (postponers, opponents and rejectors) of non‐adopters of internet banking in Tunisia, and attempts to predict consumers’ willingness to adopt this new technology using a range of factors.
Design/methodology/approach
The theoretical background was mainly based on dispositional resistance to change theory, as well as previous literature on internet banking. A total of 595 surveys were collected via face‐to‐face interviews. In order to predict consumers’ intentions, selective factors were proposed (i.e. perceived usefulness, perceived risk, dispositional resistance to change, demographics). Data was assessed through multinomial logistic regression.
Findings
Significant differences were observed between the three segments (postponers, opponents and rejectors) on the basis of the proposed predictors. Moreover, dispositional resistance to change as a personality trait plays a significant role in behavioral intentions.
Originality/value
Dispositional resistance to change as a personality trait is still underdeveloped in marketing research studies. This paper provides managerial recommendations for Tunisian bank practitioners to better profile their targets.