Teodor Sommestad, Henrik Karlzén, Peter Nilsson and Jonas Hallberg
In methods and manuals, the product of an information security incident’s probability and severity is seen as a risk to manage. The purpose of the test described in this paper is…
Abstract
Purpose
In methods and manuals, the product of an information security incident’s probability and severity is seen as a risk to manage. The purpose of the test described in this paper is to investigate if information security risk is perceived in this way, if decision-making style influences the perceived relationship between the three variables and if the level of information security expertise influences the relationship between the three variables.
Design/methodology/approach
Ten respondents assessed 105 potential information security incidents. Ratings of the associated risks were obtained independently from ratings of the probability and severity of the incidents. Decision-making style was measured using a scale inspired from the Cognitive Style Index; information security expertise was self-reported. Regression analysis was used to test the relationship between variables.
Findings
The ten respondents did not assess risk as the product of probability and severity, regardless of experience, expertise and decision-making style. The mean variance explained in risk ratings using an additive term is 54.0 or 38.4 per cent, depending on how risk is measured. When a multiplicative term was added, the mean variance only increased by 1.5 or 2.4 per cent. For most of the respondents, the contribution of the multiplicative term is statistically insignificant.
Practical Implications
The inability or unwillingness to see risk as a product of probability and severity suggests that procedural support (e.g. risk matrices) has a role to play in the risk assessment processes.
Originality/value
This study is the first to test if information security risk is assessed as an interaction between probability and severity using suitable scales and a within-subject design.
Details
Keywords
Teodor Sommestad, Henrik Karlzén and Jonas Hallberg
This paper aims to challenge the assumption that the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) includes all constructs that explain information security policy compliance and investigates…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to challenge the assumption that the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) includes all constructs that explain information security policy compliance and investigates if anticipated regret or constructs from the protection motivation theory add explanatory power. The TPB is an established theory that has been found to predict compliance with information security policies well.
Design/methodology/approach
Responses from 306 respondents at a research organization were collected using a questionnaire-based survey. Extensions in terms of anticipated regret and constructs drawn from the protection motivation theory are tested using hierarchical regression analysis.
Findings
Adding anticipated regret and the threat appraisal process results in improvements of the predictions of intentions. The improvements are of sufficient magnitude to warrant adjustments of the model of the TPB when it is used in the area of information security policy compliance.
Originality/value
This study is the first test of anticipated regret as a predictor of information security policy compliance and the first to assess its influence in relation to the TPB and the protection motivation theory.
Details
Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to investigate relationships between workarounds (solutions to handling trade-offs between competing or misaligned goals and gaps in policies and…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate relationships between workarounds (solutions to handling trade-offs between competing or misaligned goals and gaps in policies and procedures), perceived trade-offs, information security (IS) policy compliance, IS expertise/knowledge and IS demands.
Design/methodology/approach
The research purpose is addressed using survey data from a nationwide sample of Swedish white-collar workers (N = 156).
Findings
Responses reinforce the notion that workarounds partly are something different from IS policy compliance and that workarounds-as-improvisations are used more frequently by employees that see more conflicts between IS and other goals (r = 0.351), and have more IS expertise/knowledge (r = 0.257). Workarounds-as-non-compliance are also used more frequently when IS trade-offs are perceived (r = 0.536). These trade-offs are perceived more by people working in organizations that handle information with high security demands (r = 0.265) and those who perform tasks with high IS demands (r = 0.178).
Originality/value
IS policies are an important part of IS governance. They describe the procedures that are supposed to provide IS. Researchers have primarily investigated how employees’ compliance with IS policies can be predicted and explained. There has been an increased interest in how tradeoffs and conflicts between following policies and other goals lead employees to make workarounds. Workarounds may leave management unaware of how work actually is done within the organization and may besides getting work done lead to new vulnerabilities. This study furthers the understanding of workarounds and trade-offs, which should be subject to further research.