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The debate over whether or not to allow the sale of human organs is compelling enough to warrant discussion. A literature review revealed much ethical discussion, but little discussion was found on economic outcomes related to donors and selling human organs. It was demonstrated in the literature how an increased organ supply will benefit recipients. If allowing the sale of organs is the way to increase the organ supply for the benefit of recipients, then, in order to demonstrate that donors will not be exploited, it must be demonstrated how, and if, such sales would benefit those donors. This study explores whether or not one should sell human organs. Using basic models, this study develops economic scenarios and outcomes related to the selling of human organs with particular focus on pricing and profitability in relation to donor benefit. Theoretical outcomes show that the donor will not benefit in the long run.

The purpose of this research is to correct the flawed analysis contained in a recent paper by Kolnsberg that appeared in this journal.

In her paper, Kolnsberg raises the extremely important question of whether we should allow the sale of human organs for transplantation. She concludes, mistakenly, that we should not allow such sales. The error that leads her to this incorrect conclusion is the application of a nonsensical criterion for determination of whether sales of a good should be allowed. Specifically, she argues that, if the suppliers of living donor organs will be unable to earn substantial economic profits in the long run, then such sales should be banned. This arbitrary (and erroneous) criterion ignores: the social welfare gains achievable through organ sales; the much greater promise offered by cadaveric donor payments; and the very real and tragic consequences of the current ban on such payments – over 6,000 lives lost unnecessarily each year in the US alone.

The principal finding of the corrected analysis is that, contrary to the conclusion reached by Kolnsberg, paying cadaveric organ donors would save both money and lives.

Given the compelling case for cadaveric donor payments, trials need to be conducted to reveal both the magnitude of compensation required to resolve the shortage and the most efficient payment mechanisms.

Given the historical failure of the current altruistic organ procurement policy, asserts that a revised system that incorporates organ donor payments is essential to a successful resolution of this shortage.