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1 – 2 of 2Hatem Mansali, Imen Derouiche and Karima Jemai
The purpose of this paper is to examine how information asymmetry driven by earnings quality affects corporate cash holdings. It also investigates the role that financial…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine how information asymmetry driven by earnings quality affects corporate cash holdings. It also investigates the role that financial constraints play in this effect.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper examines a large sample of 6,501 observations of 741 firms listed on Euronext Paris over the period 2000–2015. Earnings quality is computed using the Jones model performance-matched discretionary accruals developed by Kothari et al. (2005): the larger the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the lower the accruals quality.
Findings
The study finds that firms with poor accruals quality hold more cash and that cash holdings in firms of low reporting quality are higher under financial constraints. These results indicate that firms tend to increase their cash reserves in the presence of high information asymmetry which is notably driven by low accounting quality. The findings also suggest that information asymmetry associated with low reporting quality is greater when firms also have strong financial constraints. The study’s conclusions are consistent with the precautionary motive for cash holdings.
Practical implications
The results would enhance practitioners’ awareness of the importance of accounting choices in the management of cash policies. It would also give researchers an incentive to further explore how these policies are influenced by the precautionary behavior of managers.
Originality/value
This paper is the first work to investigate the effect of accruals quality on corporate cash holdings in the French equity market, which typically has a poor information environment resulting in high information asymmetry. Moreover, the role of financial constraints in this effect has not yet been explored.
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Keywords
Andreas G. Koutoupis, Leonidas G. Davidopoulos, Jamel Azibi, Abdelaziz Hakimi and Hatem Mansali
The authors examine the effect of greenhouse gas (ghg) assurance on cost of debt, and the effect of board gender diversity on cost of debt, for an international sample of listed…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors examine the effect of greenhouse gas (ghg) assurance on cost of debt, and the effect of board gender diversity on cost of debt, for an international sample of listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach
Utilizing firm-level data and a quantile regression approach, this study examines the effects of greenhouse gas assurance and board diversity on cost of debt by employing an international sample of firms during 2015–2021.
Findings
The authors find that in firms with a relatively low cost of debt the external assurance of greenhouse gas emissions and gender diversity could significantly contribute to a reduction of cost of debt. Furthermore, other measures of board diversity that are linked with independent directors and skilled directors seem to contribute to an increase of firms' cost of debt in the lower end of distribution. Drawing from the agency theory, the authors showcase the fact that ghg assurance reduces information asymmetry and therefore agency costs such as borrowing costs and signals to the stakeholders a long-term commitment to excellence.
Originality/value
This study is the first that provides insights on the relationship between ghg assurance, board diversity and cost of debt.
Details