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The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the audit committee (AC) independence, financial expertise, internal audit function, audit quality and ownership concentration on earnings quality (EQ) and, consequently, ascertain whether the AC’s independence and financial expertise has a moderating effect on the relationship between internal audit function and EQ.

The study sample is 508 firms listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the years 2009 to 2012. EQ was measured using two modified Jones models of discretionary accruals.

The findings reveal that the independence of AC and investment in internal audit function, as well as the Big4 audit firm, are related to greater EQ. Ownership concentration is found to be associated with lower EQ. The study provides evidence that AC’s independence moderates the relationship between internal audit function (investment in and sourcing arrangements of internal audit function) and EQ. It also shows that AC’s financial expertise moderates the relationship between sourcing arrangements of internal audit function and EQ.

This study extends the prior related literature by examining the AC’s independence and financial expertise as moderating variables on the relationship between internal audit function and EQ.

Policymakers might use the findings regarding EQ in relation to governance practices, to recognize the important roles played by the AC’s independence and financial expertise on the effectiveness of internal audit function with EQ.

This study uses the agency theory and resource dependence theory to provide empirical evidence on the impact of internal audit function and AC on EQ in the ownership concentration environment.

This study aims to investigate the monitoring role of internal audit function (IAF) on real earnings management (REM) practices. It examines the effect of investment in IAF (IIAF) and IAF sourcing arrangements on REM, unlike prior literature which has mainly examined the effects of IIAF on accrual-based earnings management.

This study uses a sample of 1,056 observations from an emerging market, Malaysia, between 2013 and 2016. Feasible generalised least square (FGLS) regression is used to analyse the data. To corroborate the results of this study, the authors use an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model with robust standard errors adjusted and also consider alternative REM measures.

The results of this study suggest that IIAF has a significant negative relationship with REM practices. Further, in-house IAF sourcing has a significant negative association with REM. The additional analysis supports the main results confirming the essential role of IAF in reducing REM in the Malaysian market.

The evidence relates to the important role of IAF in mitigating REM practices. High-quality of IAF impairs managers’ ability to manage earnings in their own interests. The findings may be useful in informing regulators, managers, shareholders and other investors, as well as researchers, about improving the role of IAF.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing the first evidence of the significant role of IIAF and IAF sourcing arrangements in mitigating REM in an emerging country.

The main aim of this study is to examine the effect of investment in outside governance monitoring (IOGM), through non-executive directors' remuneration (NEDR) and external audit fees (AFEE), on real earnings management (REM) in an emerging market in the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia.

The data comprises 1,056 observations from manufacturing companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the four-year period, 2013 to 2016. The study tests IOGM individually and aggregately with REM. Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression is used to test the hypotheses.

The results show that NEDR is negatively and significantly associated with REM. Likewise, AFEE is significantly associated with lower REM. Aggregate IOGM significantly mitigates REM. Additional tests conducted show consistent findings.

This evidence supports agency theory and signaling theory, that a high level of investment in governance monitoring signals a high demand for monitoring and fewer agency problems. It justifies more investment in outside scrutiny and monitoring to limit the existence of managers' opportunistic behavior in concentrated markets. This study relies on an aggregate measure of REM and focuses on manufacturing companies in Malaysia; thus, the results may not be the same using other measurements and samples.

The study, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, is the first to document evidence in an emerging market suggesting that higher NEDR and AFEE are individually and aggregately associated with lower REM. Policymakers, shareholders and researchers may consider investment in these two mechanisms as a proxy of high-quality monitoring that mitigates REM.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and board performance in monitoring roles.

A survey questionnaire was used to gather data on board performance, while annual reports were employed to gather data on internal corporate governance mechanisms. Data for board performance were based on 112 directors who represent the companies.

Factor analysis extracted two dimensions of monitoring roles: management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles. Non‐independent non‐executive directors and managerial ownership were found to be positively related to both dimensions of monitoring roles, while the multiple directorships of non‐executive directors were negatively related to management oversight roles.

The paper establishes the need for regulators to pay particular attention to multiple directorships, which are commonly practiced in public listed companies. The contribution of non‐independent non‐executive directors rather than independent directors in monitoring roles calls for further research. Regulators need to emphasize the performance evaluation roles of the board of directors (BOD), as much emphasis has been given to management oversight roles.

The study contributes to the literature concerning monitoring roles as it shows that management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles are differentiated. The findings provide an avenue for the contribution of non‐independent non‐executive directors and multiple directorships in monitoring roles.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between intellectual capital (IC) performance (value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC)) and company characteristics with IC disclosure (ICD) in Malaysian listed companies.

Sample of the study is 68 biggest Malaysian companies listed in Malaysian Stock Exchange based on market capitalization in year 2006. The paper follows the classification of ICD by Huang et al. (2007), with three broad IC categories in 45 items. Content analysis was used to collect the IC information from the annual reports. Regression analysis was conducted for VAIC and its components. Log linear analysis was also conducted to cater the possible misspecification in the model.

Results of the study show that VAIC is negatively related to ICD. Further classification of VAIC shows that intellectual capital efficiency and human capital efficiency are negatively related to ICD whilst structural capital efficiency is not related to ICD. Company size and leverage are found to be positively related to ICD.

Negative association between VAIC and ICD suggests that companies reduce ICD for competitive advantage reason which supports the proprietary cost theory. The findings of the study may provide some evidence to regulators to enhance the reporting practices of IC for the benefits of users of financial reporting in making relevant decisions. The focus should be given on the reporting of human capital items.

This is the first paper to use IC framework by Huang et al. (2007). Consistency of findings with other studies using different IC framework can be compared for the choice of IC framework in future studies.

The current research inspects the moderation role of ownership concentration on chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics and real earnings management (REM) relationship in Jordan.

Driscoll–Kraay regressions were run using data from 348 firm-year observations for companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 2013 and 2018.

Driscoll–Kraay regressions demonstrate that CEO experience, tenure and political connections improve REM practices. Ownership concentration diminishes and limits REM practices when combined with CEO experience, tenure and political connections, since all three have a negative and significant link with REM.

Initial constraints include the study’s lack of generalisability due to a small number of CEO-related parameters. Second, critics of the ideal model for judging EM have a foreseeable flaw. No generally accepted model is perfect.

This study’s conclusions are crucial for industry participants, including companies, policymakers, investors and the general public. These findings will help investors, practitioners and regulators understand that businesses with significant ownership concentrations and experienced CEOs have superior earnings and low REM practises.

The findings of this study have an optimistic impact on the existing body of knowledge. The current literature has yet to properly inspect the moderation role that ownership concentration has on the connotation between CEO characteristics and EM.

Despite several research studies in both developed and developing nations, ownership concentration has been almost virtually neglected. The current study could fill a hole in earlier research, rendering it a novel study.