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The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of hedge fund administrators, particularly in relation to valuing complex and/or illiquid financial instruments.

The paper proceeds by way of an analysis of key trends and developments within the hedge fund administration industry in relation to the regulatory challenges posed by complex and/or illiquid instruments.

The paper argues that, because of inherent problems over the attribution of value to complex and/or illiquid assets, emphasis on independent valuation by administrators is largely misplaced. Recent events concerning valuation difficulties in the subprime mortgage market illustrate these very concerns.

The paper questions the ability of independent hedge fund administrators to provide reliable valuations for complex and/or illiquid instruments. Independent valuation of such assets suggests a level of scrutiny that is in fact not present. Moreover, the financial market meltdown surrounding the collapse of the subprime mortgage market provides a timely and salutary reminder that independent valuations of complex and/or illiquid instruments are inherently unreliable.

The purpose of this article is to assess strategies available to recipient states for managing the putative risks posed by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the context of global, liberalized, and capital markets.

The paper employs a game theory analysis in assessing these risks. Four basic scenarios are outlined whereby recipient states may interact with SWFs: “unselfish recipient state – unselfish SWF” (Option 1); “unselfish recipient state – Selfish SWF” (Option 2); “Selfish Recipient State – unselfish SWF” (Option 3); and “Selfish Recipient State – Selfish SWF” (Option 4).

In the light of this analysis, and the balance of risks which the authors perceive recipient states are exposed to in practice, the authors claim that recipient states ought, rationally, to adopt a selfish regulatory strategy irrespective of the strategy which SWFs adopt in practice.

This claim does not deny the importance of voluntary international measures – such as the “Santiago principles” – in the way SWFs are regulated. Rather, it seeks to show that according to a game theory analysis, and an attempted application of that analysis in practice, undue reliance by recipient states on international “soft law” regulatory initiatives to regulate SWF activity (which constitutes the current international consensus) is strategically unwise.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the proliferation of scientific management and then to consider its effect on business and society. Our examination begins with a brief survey of various management approaches that emerged in the early twentieth century. We focus on Frederick Taylor, the originator of scientific management, as the person with the greatest influence on management scholarship. We assert that the propagation of scientific management in all sectors of business and society is so pervasive that is it ubiquitous, making it exceedingly difficult to consciously detect or question. We examine how core ideas from scientific management have facilitated the dehumanization of stakeholders in management scholarship and practice. We then discuss how dehumanizing tendencies — informed by the hidden ubiquity of scientific management — have permeated research in corporate social responsibility and management theory. We conclude with suggestions for integrating humanity into management theory.

Stakeholder capitalism has been proposed as an alternative way of thinking about business purpose and value creation. However, stakeholder capitalism can only work as an alternative model of business if all stakeholders and their interests are visible to and taken seriously by managers. The purpose of this paper is to untangle the challenges that invisible, marginalized and powerless stakeholders pose for theorizing about stakeholder capitalism.

This paper is conceptual. The authors first briefly outline the promise of stakeholder capitalism for addressing pressing questions about value creation and stakeholder welfare. The authors then conceptualize stakeholder invisibility as the outcome of a particular stakeholder being both powerless and marginal through the prism of moral intensity theory and one of its elements: proximity. This study discusses the ways in which managers can make invisible stakeholders more visible in their decision-making.

For managers truly to manage for stakeholders, as anticipated by stakeholder capitalism, all stakeholders and stakeholder interests must be visible to them. This study analyzes why sometimes they are not, how they can be made more visible and why stakeholder visibility matters for stakeholder capitalism. This study proffers three principles for business practice: ethical commitments to reduce stakeholder invisibility, analyses of business strategies to surface the contributions of marginalized and invisible stakeholders and taking rights seriously.

This study provides a new perspective on stakeholder capitalism by linking the challenge in operationalizing it to the problems of stakeholder invisibility and marginality.

This article aims to provide an analysis of the joint impact of the business network and the company's internal resources on the level of environmental management (EM) deployment.

Correlation, regression and cluster analyses of data gathered in 2005 in the Dutch food and drink (F&D) industry were carried out.

The deployment of managerial capabilities that support ecological modernization (such as supply chain cooperation and network information exchange, or product‐redesign) in the Dutch F&D industry is low. The results show that different company profiles are connected with specific drivers and barriers for environmental pro‐activeness. Prospector companies (a minority) are more pro‐active with respect to environmental capability building than defenders.

Comparative longitudinal studies of environmental management drivers in subsectors could improve the understanding of the factors that stimulate environmental performance.

Optimism that industry will enhance EM‐performance through radical market‐induced innovation is misplaced. Instead, a contingency approach is in place. Public environmental policy with respect to the F&D industry should be adjusted to discernable managerial patterns and categories of companies. Voluntary cooperation, self‐governance, and market‐induced environmental innovation are only effective with respect to a minority of the companies.

The research opposes the existing foundation of public environmental policy on generic attributes assigned to the whole F&D‐industry and, consequently, of generic policies to improve environmental management performance. A differentiation of public policy should be based on the understanding of the drivers of managerial behavior.