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The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the link between institutional ownership stability and dividend payout ratio.

First, the authors estimate the propensity of a firm to pay dividend. Next, the authors perform panel fixed-effect regressions of dividend payouts on institutional ownership stability variables. The authors also compare institutional ownership between dividend paying and non-dividend paying investee firms. The authors analyze the dividend preferences of different types of institutional owners. Finally, the authors examine the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of dividend payouts.

The authors find that stable and large institutional owners favor dividend paying companies. There also exists a positive association between ownership persistence and dividend payout. Conversely, firms that change their dividend payout frequently are associated with larger deviations in institutional ownership. Additionally, the presence of pressure-sensitive institutional investors (i.e. investors that also hold business ties with the investee firm) is significantly linked to dividend payout policy. Conversely, pressure-insensitive investors use alternative forms of monitoring instead of requiring investee firms to pay dividends, which serve to reduce agency conflicts.

This paper considers the preferences of long-term stable institutional investors in their selection of dividend paying firms.

This study aims to investigate the monitoring role of ownership structure (OWS) on real earnings management (REM) practices; previous studies primarily examined the effect of OWS on accrual-based earnings management.

The sample of this study is 490 companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange during the period 2013–2016 (1,960 company-year observations). The regression of a feasible generalized least square was used for data analysis. The authors use three regression models ordinary least squares, panel-corrected standard errors and Driscoll–Kraay standard errors to corroborate the findings and also examine alternative REM measures.

Analysis of the data shows that family, foreign and institutional ownership has a positive link with the quality of financial reporting and, to a large extent, is capable of alleviating REM. The findings also indicate that some form of OWS significantly affects REM, corroborating existing theories on corporate governance (CG) and the perspectives of practitioners.

The evidence concerns the significant role played by the OWS in reducing REM activities. The findings are useful in support of regulatory activities, particularly in the design of policies to regulate the OWS. The results may also provide useful insights to inform other policymakers, investors, shareholders and researchers about the active role of family, foreign and institutional investors in monitoring Malaysia's public listed companies (PLCs) to strengthen CG practices. This also leads to less REM and enhances the quality of financial reporting.

To the authors' knowledge, this work is pioneering research from a developing country, specifically from Malaysia, to investigate the manner in which all possible OWSs influence REM. More importantly, the study recommends that regulators and researchers do not envisage OWS as a holistic phenomenon.