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This paper examines whether board structure affects microfinance institutions' (MFIs) default risk in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The paper uses a pooled OLS and system generalized method of moments (GMM) model on unbalanced panel data from 214 MFIs in 26 SSA countries over 2005–2016 period. Default risk is measured using non-performing loans (loans overdue 30 and 90 days) and loans written-off ratios. Board size, proportion of independent and female directors are used as proxies for board structure.

The empirical results indicate that unregulated MFIs with larger and more independent boards tend to have a lower default risk. In addition, unregulated MFIs with a female director tend to lower default risk.

This research mainly focusses on SSA. Future research may consider a broader geographical area.

Poor loan portfolio quality is one of the major problems of MFIs operating in SSA. The findings of this study will contribute in emphasizing the role of an effective board structure in lowering MFI default risk.

This study is unique in terms of investigating whether board structure impacts default risk based on MFI regulation.

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of MFI-level governance on microfinance institutions' (MFIs’) risk in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The study uses data from a sample of 151 MFIs operating in 21 SSA countries during 2005–2014. The Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) regression model is applied to investigate the relationship between MFI level governance mechanisms and risk.

The study provides new evidence that board characteristics have differential effects on for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NFP) MFI risk. Board independence reduces credit risk of NFP MFIs. Foreign director presence increases MFI failure risk. Furthermore, greater female director representation reduces (increases) FP (NFP) financial risk whereas female CEOs are associated with higher (lower) FP (NFP) financial risk.

The paper contributes to existing literature on microfinance governance and risk, by exploring the impact of governance on MFI risk based on MFIs profit orientation. In addition, the study uses three different risk measures unlike previous microfinance studies.

This study investigates the relationship between CEO power and the risk profile (RP) of acquiring banks through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions.

The analysis is based on 214 transactions between 2010 and 2022 involving European Union-based acquirers. To assess the impact of M&A on the acquiring bank’s RP, we compare changes in the acquirer’s RP to control banks. We use linear regression with two-stage least squares instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) to examine the effect of CEO power on changes in merger-related risk.

The findings suggest that CEO power reduces the RP of the acquiring bank. Specifically, CEOs who hold both the CEO and board chair positions tend to take fewer risks. Additionally, CEOs with high ownership, CEO pay and extensive experience (measured by tenure and acquisition experience) decrease the RP. However, prestige power is positively correlated with an increase in RPs.

This research examines CEO influence on bank risk post-mergers, providing insights into governance, risk and strategic choices. The findings can guide banks in CEO selection and governance to mitigate M&A risks, improving risk management and decision-making in the financial sector.

This study is the first empirical investigation introducing diverse executive power metrics to analyze the link between executive power and risk-taking in the European banking sector, with a specific emphasis on the impact on M&A as critical investment choices.