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Culture is not new to the study of migration. It has lurked beneath the surface for some time, occasionally protruding openly into the discussion, usually under some pseudonym. The authors bring culture into the open. They are concerned with how culture manifests itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, those remaining in the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. The topics vary widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors behave differently, within a group there are economically important shared beliefs (customs, values, attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and identity play a central role in our understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon; but what about them matters? Properly, we should be looking at the determinants of identity and the determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly defined). But this is not what is done. Usually identity and culture appear in economics articles as a black box. Here we try to begin to break open the black box.

The purpose of this paper is to examine possible types of network formation among immigrants in the diaspora and between those immigrants and the locals in different countries. The authors present the model by considering different possible interactions between immigrants and the new society in their host country. Spread of migrants from the same origin in the diaspora may well increase international trade between the different countries, depending on the types of networks formed. The authors present possible applications of network structure on the country of origin, such as on international trade. The authors find that when the size of the diaspora is sufficiently large, the natives in the different countries will be willing to bear the linking cost with the immigrants because the possible benefits increase with increasing size of the diaspora.

Developing a theoretical approach for the formation of networks in the diaspora.

Those that immigrated first determine the outcome. Policy maker can affect the type of network formed by allocating resources to the first immigrants. They can approve subsidies and tax reductions for international trade. The type of network formed (assimilation, integration, separation or marginalization) affects the level of, and benefits from international trade worldwide, as well as the composition of the imported products. The authors show how leadership is established and how leadership increases over time. More immigrants from the same origin become established all over the world, and new linkages are created with the first immigrant, increasing the possibilities for global trade.

The research in this paper is original.

We introduce the idea that informational cascades can explain the observed regularity that emigrants from the same location tend to choose the same foreign location. Thus, informational cascades generate herd behavior. Herd behavior is compared with the network-externalities explanation of the same phenomenon of migration clustering.

In this chapter, we consider the interaction between local workers and migrants in the production process of a firm. Both local workers and migrants can invest effort in assimilation activities to increase the assimilation of the migrants into the firm and so increase their interaction and production activities. We consider the effect the relative size (in the firm) of each group and the cost of activities has on the assimilation process of the migrants.

Within immigrant society, different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multilayered and multidimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so, they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups' supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals.

This paper examines the connection between illegal migration, minimum wages, and enforcement policy. We first explore the employers’ decision regarding the employment of illegal migrants in the presence of an effective minimum wage. We show that the employers’ decision depends on the wage gap between those of the legal and illegal workers and on the penalty for employing illegal workers. We consider the effects a change in the minimum wage has on the employment of illegal immigrants and local workers. We conclude by considering the optimal migration policy taking into consideration social welfare issues.

We examine the determinants of a current migrant's location choice emphasizing the relative importance and interaction of migrant stocks and flows. We show that both stocks and flow have significant impacts on the migrant's decision of where to locate. The significance and size of the effects vary according to legal status and whether the migrant is a “new” or a “repeat” migrant.