Donijo Robbins and Gerald J. Miller
Local public officials rely on tax and non-tax incentive packages to develop their economies. No conclusive evidence supports the economic improvement incentives afford. We…
Abstract
Local public officials rely on tax and non-tax incentive packages to develop their economies. No conclusive evidence supports the economic improvement incentives afford. We investigate, with an experimental approach, the political reasons public officials use tax incentives. The experiment uses simulation gaming to model local economic development as an auction, in that way permitting us to compare the impact that motives, goals, and contexts have on outcomes. Our findings suggest that the majority of economic development competitors fall victim to the “winner’s curse”-overestimating and overbidding the potential payoff for business development.
Gerald J. Miller and Lyn Evers
This paper reviews the literature concerning when and in what way citizen participation can have an impact on budgeting. The first part of the paper conceptualizes, through the…
Abstract
This paper reviews the literature concerning when and in what way citizen participation can have an impact on budgeting. The first part of the paper conceptualizes, through the literature, five budgeting models, each having both problems and solutions for citizen involvement. The second section of the paper explores intervention designs that can be constructive in dealing with the larger problems connecting budgeting and citizen participation. The paper, therefore, seeks to determine where participation in budgeting can have an impact on citizen anger, estrangement, distrust and pessimism.
W. Bartley Hildreth, Samuel J. Yeager, Gerald J. Miller and Jack Rabin
This paper presents a model of government saving in order to examine several questions regarding the personal and professional saving preferences or inclinations of a national…
Abstract
This paper presents a model of government saving in order to examine several questions regarding the personal and professional saving preferences or inclinations of a national sample of local government finance managers. First, is personal propensity to save related to a preference for local government saving? Second, is personal propensity to spend related to the finance managers' opinions about their local government's spending? Third, what are the determinants of finance managers' propensity to save or spend, both personally and for their local government? Results confirm that finance managers have a personal propensity to save and a positive view toward local government saving. The opposite, propensity to spend, is also influenced by personal preference. Determinants of these behaviors are explored.
John F. Sacco and Gerard R. Busheé
This paper analyzes the impact of economic downturns on the revenue and expense sides of city financing for the period 2003 to 2009 using a convenience sample of the audited end…
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of economic downturns on the revenue and expense sides of city financing for the period 2003 to 2009 using a convenience sample of the audited end of year financial reports for thirty midsized US cities. The analysis focuses on whether and how quickly and how extensively revenue and spending directions from past years are altered by recessions. A seven year series of Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) data serves to explore whether citiesʼ revenues and spending, especially the traditional property tax and core functions such as public safety and infrastructure withstood the brief 2001 and the persistent 2007 recessions? The findings point to consumption (spending) over stability (revenue minus expense) for the recession of 2007, particularly in 2008 and 2009.