Search results

The common view of many regulators and practitioners is that the minimum risk maturity gap is equal to zero. However, because of the interest sensitivity of such non‐gap items as the average spread between asset and liability rates, lending activity, fee income and prepayments, the minimum risk gap could be significantly different from zero. We formulate and test a model for a sample of four hundred and twenty six thrift institutions. The results strongly suggest that the minimum risk maturity gap is positive for the average firm in the sample and that there is substantial cross‐sectional variability in the ratio of the minimum risk gap to assets. This suggests that attempts to regulate interest rate risk using a uniform gap as a benchmark are misdirected. Finally, we provide some evidence that there is, in fact, a positive cross‐sectional relationship between measured maturity gap positions and our estimates of the minimum risk maturity gap.

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the structure of banking in the nineteen separate countries comprising these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit‐insurance environment in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the regulatory environment that may help explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance is investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulations in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. Hence, an exploratory empirical analysis based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different “regulatory regimes” on the performance of individual banks, controlling for various bank‐specific and country‐specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compete prudently and profitability in a competitive and global financial marketplace. In the process of conducting such an assessment, the paper necessarily provides information as to whether the U.S. is “out‐of‐step” with banking developments in other industrial countries.

This paper presents issues arising from the enactment of legislation that changes the priority ordering of claims by uninsured depositors and the FDIC in the resolution of costly failed insured banks and thrifts. Under the legislation, uninsured domestic depositors and the FDIC receive preference in the payment of their claims in the resolutions of failed insured institutions over both foreign depositors and general creditors. As a result of the legislation, one can expect changes in the behavior of nonpreferred claimants.

The State of Delaware recently passed a new banking law that allows banks and bank affiliates chartered in Delaware to sell and underwrite insurance nationwide. The new laws provide two potential benefits to banks; (1) increased profits from selling insurance and (2) reduced interest rate risk exposure from underwriting insurance. We find support for increased profit potential to banks from the law, but we fail to find a reduction in the interest rate risk exposure of the banks.

Fair value issues remain central to the pace of convergence in international accounting standards. This article identifies a fundamental issue at the root of the fair value debate, places the issue in an international and historical context, and recommends that standard-setters work to rationalize principles of accounting for money.

The U.S. Census Bureau, health data providers, and credit bureaus are information organizations (IOs). They collect, store, and process large sets of sensitive data on individuals, households, and organizations. Storage, processing, and dissemination technologies that IOs employ have grown in capability, sophistication, and cost‐effectiveness. These technologies have outpaced the design and implementation of procedures for protecting data in transfer from primary data provider to IO and from IO to data user. On the one hand, it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of such data; on the other hand, it is necessary to protect the accessibility to the data by users, including researchers and analysts. Conflicts ensue in the two corresponding arenas: between the IO and data providers concerned with inadequate privacy and confidentiality protection; and between the IO and data users who find their access to data restricted. In this article third‐party mechanisms for managing disputes in the privacy and information area are both theoretically justified and their empirical manifestations examined The institutional mechanisms considered include privacy and information clearinghouses, a “Better Data Bureau,” a privacy information advocate, a data ombuds, a privacy mediator, an internal privacy review board, and a data and access protection commission. Under appropriate circumstances, these arrangements promise a more flexible and responsive resolution of the conflict between privacy/confidentiality and legitimate information access than is possible through legislative action and administrative rulings alone.

Recognizing fertile ground and preparing ground not yet ready is an essential skill of an effective intervenor. This sequence of diagnosis and action is studied in a theoretical framework in which mediators examine and alter four classes of disputants' perceptions. These classes are (1) the available set of actions, (2) the class of possible consequences, (3) the likelihoods of uncertain events and consequences of actions, and (4) preferences over consequences. Denver's increasing demand for water led to the Foothills environmental dispute in 1977. This dispute featured various forms of third party intervention. U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder's failure to mediate the Foothills conflict, and U.S. Representative Timothy Wirth's success, are compared in terms of the disputants' key beliefs affected by the two self‐appointed intervenors' actions. Using the technique of counterfactual case analysis, an exploration is made of a range of possible timing and ground preparation decisions. Although the particular circumstances of any dispute play a key role in its resolution, the proposed perspective extracts features that are general and therefore transferable to other contexts, thereby enabling mediators to belter develop, transmit, and apply intervention skills.

This paper surveys the contribution of economics and industrial relations (E/IR) to the development of the field of personnel/human resource management (P/HRM). A brief review of existing accounts of the evolution of the field reveals that they give little mention to the role of E/IR. A re‐examination of the early years of P/HRM suggests, however, that this is a serious omission. It is demonstrated, for example, that E/IR was in fact the principal disciplinary base for research and teaching in P/HRM in US universities into the 1940s and that for the first two decades of the field’s existence the most influential and authoritative academic‐based writers came from the ranks of economists and economics‐trained IR scholars. After describing the reasons for this close relationship, The centrifugal forces that caused a gradual split between E/IR and P/HRM are described. This split had roots in the 1920s, became increasingly visible in the 1950s and beyond, and by the late 1980s had reached a point where the two subject areas had little intellectual or organizational interaction. The paper ends with a brief review of recent developments that herald a modest rapprochement between E/IR and P/HRM.