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Institutional skill training—training in institutions organised for that purpose rather than on‐the‐job—was the first of the manpower programmes of the 1960s to be mandated by Congress and applied on a nationwide basis. Its overall goal has been to improve the skills, employability and income of the unemployed and under‐employed through the provision of vocational and related instruction in a formal classroom or laboratory setting. A corollary purpose of the programme has been to meet the needs of employers for workers in demand and/or “skills shortage” occupations. It differs from traditional vocational education in that its objective is to train workers for immediate employment in occupations which are currently in demand. Traditional vocational education, on the other hand, has a much broader objective: to prepare the student for a lifetime of work in a dynamic labour market. Institutional skill training, as it evolved in the sixties, is short‐term and intensive; traditional vocational education is longer in length and adapted to the less immediate needs of secondary and post‐secondary level students.

In an earlier issue of this journal we compared international experiences in manpower planning at the national level. We offered a matrix of planning approaches (Figure 1), a typology of the politico‐economic systems in which such planning has occurred (not repeated here) and a conceptual framework classifying the objectives and approaches of various countries by stage of economic development (Figure 2). We promised a subsequent article drawing lessons from planning experience which might contribute to improving the international manpower planning process. This, belatedly, is that follow‐up article. In it we review the status of manpower planning in developed, newly industrialising and labour‐short, less developed countries (LDCs). Then we report criticisms which have been levelled at national manpower planning in labour‐surplus LDCs, explain what we see to be the reasons for what has been criticised, identify lessons and make recommendations which we believe will skirt many of the problems identified.

This article¹ is offered up in the spirit of what the High Kings of Gondor might call a weregild.² That is, I hope, in this article, to clear a debt: a debt, long overdue, much like that owed by the Armies of the Dead to Isildur’s heir, Aragorn son of Arathorn. I reference The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King (Tolkien, 1994) because this article is, in the main, about Tolkien and his oeuvre as an astonishing instance of what might be called lex populi. But this article attempts more than just another cultural legal reading of a popular literary and cinematic phenomenon.³ What, in fact, it proposes is nothing less than a practical demonstration of what it means to read jurisprudentially. In so doing, I hope to repay some of the theoretical debt that jurisprudence (and law-and-literature) has incurred, and owes so clearly to literary criticism, cultural studies and Continental philosophy. For far too long jurisprudence has been content to absorb the lessons of these other disciplines’ versions of textual theory – of the play of the sign, the dissemination of meaning, the deconstruction of logos – without propounding its own topoi let alone interpretive paradigms. Such topoi, of course, jurisprudence has in abundance: in notions of a “higher justice”; in concepts of law’s connection with morality; and, especially, the law’s role in inaugurating “the social.”