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This paper extends the current understanding of the retrenchment-–turnaround relationship in declined companies by introducing a compensation gap view. It argues that the effectiveness of the retrenchment strategy is contingent on reducing the executive-employee compensation gap in the turnaround process.

Drawing from a two-stage turnaround model and insights from the literature on executive-employee compensation gap, we develop and test a theoretical model that explains how five attributes, which refer to executive-employee compensation gap, asset retrenchment, cost retrenchment, ownership and size, affect the outcome of the organizational turnaround. This paper uses the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) method and based on the samples of 112 listed companies that experience the decline between 2005 and 2013.

This paper concludes two valid causal paths and finds that small companies with small executive-employee compensation gap have a higher likelihood of successful turnaround when they implement cost or asset retrenchment actions. As for large state-owned companies, they should reduce the costs and maintain a small executive-employee compensation gap. An excessive compensation gap can be problematic, which could impair the organizational ability to cope with adversity and decline.

First, this paper taps the vital role of employees in the turnaround process besides the mainstream “organizational decline-layoffs” logic, which hints a new human resource management strategy when organizations are facing decline. Second, this paper reveals the theoretical linkage between pay dispersion, internal stakeholder and organizational resilience. Third, as a methodological contribution, we introduce fsQCA, overcoming the shortcomings of turnaround strategy research with case and regression analysis and breaking through the paradigm of “specific factor-turnaround.”

Organizational turnaround is a systematic process that constitutes multiple factors together. When organizations take the asset retrenchment to stop bleeding, reducing the executive-employee compensation gap will help enhance employee's cognition of organizational values and strategic goals, eliminate feelings of exploitation in retrenchment implementation and thus effectively promote turnaround. This paper also provides a basis for executive compensation restrictions and re-examines pay dispersion and economic inequality.

This study sheds some light on the importance of the executive-employee compensation gap in retrenchment strategy and contributes to both organizational turnaround and pay dispersion theories. Also, it reveals the theoretical linkage between internal stakeholders, organizational resilience and long-term orientation.

This study investigated the moderating role of democracy in the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment. The purpose of this study is to understand whether corruption has different effects on the location decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) depending on the regime type.

This study explored how institutional context influenced the impacts of corruption on the location decisions of MNEs, specifically using a sample of Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions between 2000 and 2020.

This study assessed the role of democracy in the relationship between corruption and the location decisions of Chinese MNEs. In general, this study found that Chinese MNEs were hindered by host country corruption, but that these detrimental effects were weaker in the presence of more effective democratic institutions.

This study contributes to the literature on institutional factors in international business through its simultaneous investigation of the effects of both democracy and corruption on the location decisions of MNEs. Moreover, there is a prevailing view that Chinese MNEs are willing to enter countries with high corruption, but the results of this study indicate that they are risk-averse in ways similar to their Western counterparts.

This paper aims to enhance the understanding of the role of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) policies for cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) by distinguishing between coercive and noncoercive OFDI policies.

The dependent variable is the count of completed M&A transactions, measured monthly. Due to the nature of the study’s data, the author performs a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression.

Separating between coercive and noncoercive policies, the author finds that the latter type shows a stronger supportive effect on the count of M&A deals. Considering firm ownership, the study’s results reveal that announcements of coercive policies have a weaker effect on cross-border M&A for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than that for private-owned enterprises (POEs). For local SOEs (LSOEs) and central SOEs (CSOEs), this difference becomes even larger with noncoercive policy announcements. The influence on M&A of both policy types gets partially replaced with increasing internationalization experience.

Combining institutional theory with policy change theory, the author argues that international business (IB) research on policy change needs to consider the integration of theoretical policy-level approaches to catch the effects of policy change on firm internationalization appropriately. The findings of the study support this argument by highlighting that the policy effect differs by policy type.