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This paper considers the brand awareness and anchor influence on consumers' live-streaming purchases, and explores the existence of “free-riding” behavior, the comparison of brand promotion effect and active live-streaming effect and the optimal strategic combination between the brand and the anchor. The authors investigate the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the bounded rational brand and anchor, and explore the conditions for the realization of the optimal strategy. Management suggestions for the development of live streaming commerce can be provided in this paper.

Two significant models are used in this paper. The Stackelberg model is used to study the “free-riding” behavior, the comparison of brand promotion effect and active live-streaming effect and the optimal strategic combination between the brand and the anchor. Using evolutionary game theory to get the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and analyze the binary equilibrium strategy of the bounded rational brand and anchor. In addition, relevant simulation analysis is conducted using realistic data to verify the conclusions and for further analysis, making the conclusions of the paper have realistic significance.

The study shows that “free-riding” behavior exists and the positive effect of brand promotion is greater than that of active live-streaming. The brand and the anchor take active actions as the optimal strategy. As the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to live-streaming effort and the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to brand promotion change, various evolutionary stabilization strategies will appear. When the two sensitivity coefficients are below a certain threshold, the game sides will reach the optimal strategic combination to obtain the maximum benefits. When they rise above this threshold, it is counterproductive instead. The system achieves the optimal strategic combination when the difference factor between effort cost and promotion cost must be higher than a certain value, but when it takes the smallest possible value, the game sides tend to take active actions. This study can provide management suggestions for the sustainable development of the live-streaming model.

This paper shows that under certain conditions, the brand and the anchor can evolve into the optimal strategy to maximize the profits of both parties, which has certain practical significance for the prosperous development of live streaming commerce. In future research, the authors will consider the regulatory role of the government and construct a more realistic game model to provide constructive suggestions for the sustainable prosperity of live streaming commerce. Meanwhile, there are also games between multiple brands and multiple anchors, as well as games among brands-anchors-the live streaming platforms, and the authors will conduct more in-depth research in the future.

So far, the co-impact of anchor influence and brand awareness has not been considered simultaneously in published articles. This paper provides theoretical guidance for the behavioral choices of the brand and the anchor under the live streaming commerce, which is conducive to the prosperous development of live streaming commerce.

Inventory pledge financing (IPF) serves as an effective means to address the financial constraints faced by supply chains. This study develops an IPF system involving a bank, SMEs and a third-party logistics provider (3PL) to explore the impact of varying cost structures and regulatory environments, specifically the strategic interactions within IPF system before and after the blockchain implementation. Also, provides theoretical foundations for improving the overall efficiency of financing and advancing the application of blockchain technology.

An evolutionary game framework is employed to analyze the dynamics of financing behaviors before and after the blockchain implementation. Simulation methods are utilized to examine how different factors, including concealing costs, penalty structures and disposal prices, influence decision-making processes within IPF system.

Under IPF, the interactions of participants are shaped by asset management capabilities, reinvestment returns and penalties for fraud. As concealing costs increase, the likelihood of reaching a (loose regulation, compliant pledge) equilibrium rises. Post-blockchain implementation (IPFB), the equilibrium is influenced by default losses and compliance gains. Blockchain technology enhances regulation, effectively reducing fraud risks.

This study bridges significant gaps by offering a dynamic and behavioral perspective on IPF in the context of blockchain technology. Using an evolutionary game framework, the study uncovers how blockchain reshapes decision-making processes, mitigates fraud risks and enhances regulatory efficiency. By integrating cost structures and compliance incentives, it offers novel insights into behavioral shifts and systemic improvements in financing ecosystems.