FAYEZ A. ELAYAN, JAMMY S.C. LAU and THOMAS O. MEYER
Incentive‐based executive compensation is regarded as a mechanism for alleviating agency problems between executives and shareholders. Seventy‐three New Zealand (NZ) listed…
Abstract
Incentive‐based executive compensation is regarded as a mechanism for alleviating agency problems between executives and shareholders. Seventy‐three New Zealand (NZ) listed companies are used to examine the relationship between executive incentive compensation schemes (ICS) and firm performance. The results suggest that neither compensation level nor adoption of an ICS are significantly related to returns to shareholders or ROA. However, there is a statistically significant relationship between Tobin's q and both CEO compensation and executive share ownership. Further, the evidence suggests the recent compensation disclosure requirements in NZ are not yet stringent enough to allow adequate analysis of the link between ICSs and corporate performance.
Kareen Brown, Fayez A. Elayan, Jingyu Li and Zhefeng Liu
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether US regulatory actions around reverse mergers (RM) have exerted any spillover effects on the Chinese firms listed in China and…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether US regulatory actions around reverse mergers (RM) have exerted any spillover effects on the Chinese firms listed in China and whether Chinese firms have exhibited lower financial reporting quality than their US counterparts.
Design/methodology/approach
To test the possible spillover effect, this paper calculates three-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) and the aggregate CAAR for a series of US regulatory actions in 2010 and 2011. The study then compares the accrual quality, conditional conservatism, and information content of accruals of Chinese firms and US firms.
Findings
The paper documents a spillover effect of US actions around RM on Chinese stocks listed in China. Overall results do not support the perception that Chinese firms have lower financial reporting quality than their US counterparts.
Research limitations/implications
While this study provides evidence consistent with investors perceiving poor financial reporting quality among Chinese firms, that perception is not justified by empirical evidence.
Practical implications
Investors need not be overly concerned about the financial reporting quality among the Chinese firms when they make asset allocation decisions.
Social implications
A reality check is important given that perceptions may be outdated, biased, misleading, and costly.
Originality/value
This study puts the financial reporting quality of Chinese firms into perspective helping global investors assess information risk for optimal resource allocation.
Details
Keywords
C. Edward Chang, Fayez A. Elayan and Chwo‐Ming Joseph Yu
This study provides a comparison of cost efficiency between foreign‐owned multinational banks operating in the U.S. and U.S.‐owned multinational banks in their production of…
Abstract
This study provides a comparison of cost efficiency between foreign‐owned multinational banks operating in the U.S. and U.S.‐owned multinational banks in their production of banking services from 1984 to 1989. The results indicate that foreign‐owned multinational banks operating in the U.S. did not have comparative cost advantage over U.S.‐owned multinational banks.
Ken Yook, William C. Hudson, Steven Cole and Partha Gangopadhyay
An examination of insider trading before and after the announcement of Credit Watch placements sheds new light on the study of both bond rating changes and insider trading. This…
Abstract
An examination of insider trading before and after the announcement of Credit Watch placements sheds new light on the study of both bond rating changes and insider trading. This paper utilizes Credit Watch placements classified by 11 indentifiable trigger events for the years 1981‐1990. We find significant insider purchases before positive implication placements, but no sales before negative implication placements. Among individual trigger events, we observe significant insider purchases before and after placements due to improved operating performance, bidding on a firm with a higher debt rating and firms increasing their debt‐to‐equity ratios. Significant insider purchases are found before placements due to purchasing assets. Significant insider sales are found before and after placements due to poor operating performance.