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The purpose of this paper is to analyse why Malta continues to show the highest level of turnout for European Parliament (EP) elections in a country where voting is not obligatory. By analysing the Maltese EP elections from 2004 to 2019, the paper seeks to understand why the Maltese engage with a second order election to the degree that they do.

The paper is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, first assessing the context of the 2019 elections, the historical trends and then the factors that help explain why the Maltese continue to engage with EP elections.

The paper finds that the Maltese political system, highly polarised and dominated by two parties, primarily galvanises people to engage with elections, that it is more about party leadership than actual engagement with Europe and that second order elections in Malta are often run as first order elections.

This paper is the only systematic evaluation of the 2019 EP elections in Malta, discusses categorically that EP elections are rarely about Europe while also showing clearly that political parties can make second-order elections appear as first-order elections should the stakes be high enough.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the debt and ownership structure of a sample of Italian-listed companies to measure the role assumed in the control and monitoring of agency costs.

This study examines a balanced panel data, using both a random effects model and a generalized method of moments model to better capture any problems related to the endogeneity of the variables in the model.

The results provide evidence of a positive relationship between debt and ownership concentration on the one hand and a negative relationship between debt and institutional investors on the other hand. The debt seems to assume both functions, i.e. the disciplinary role of substitute at low levels of ownership concentration and a complementary role at high levels of ownership concentration.

This study provides three practical implications. The first is that the complementarity between debt and ownership concentration provides evidence of the entrenchment effect and tends to weaken the company financially. Second, the results also provide useful prompts to policy-makers who should encourage the presence of institutional investors. Third, the policy-makers should also encourage the expansion of the stock market to enhance the protection of shareholders, reduce private control benefits and provide Italy the same opportunities as other common and civil law countries to collect risk capital, avoiding the abuse of debt.

The empirical results suggest that ownership concentration increases the degree of corporate debt, whereas institutional investors assume the disciplinary role of monitoring and controlling agency costs. The results provide evidence of both the entrenchment effect and the alignment-of-interests hypothesis and that the expropriation theory seems to prevail over the control and monitoring role.