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Article
Publication date: 1 March 1980

J.F. BALDWIN and N.C.F. GUILD

An established method of modelling a controller using a fuzzy relation is examined in the light of recent criticisms. An alternative formulation of the fuzzy relation is described…

71

Abstract

An established method of modelling a controller using a fuzzy relation is examined in the light of recent criticisms. An alternative formulation of the fuzzy relation is described and use of the fuzzy relation as a synthesis tool is discussed. A new approach to tuning such controllers is proposed.

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Kybernetes, vol. 9 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

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Article
Publication date: 1 January 2000

Fletcher N. Baldwin

The practice of civil in rem forfeiture has roots in ancient codes and commandments. It is found in the common law doctrine of deodand and in the laws of the nomadic agricultural…

100

Abstract

The practice of civil in rem forfeiture has roots in ancient codes and commandments. It is found in the common law doctrine of deodand and in the laws of the nomadic agricultural Israelites. In the second section of the Torah or Book of the Law known as the Book of Exodus there are three groups of laws: (1) the Ten Commandments or Decalogue; (2) Ritual Decalogue; and (3) the Book of the Covenant or the Covenant Code. The Covenant Code is thought to be the earliest lengthy codification of primitive law among the Hebrews; it contains detailed laws for all phases of ancient Israelite life: religious, moral, commercial and humanitarian and crime and penalties. Chapter 21 includes the lex talionis or law of retaliation, a stipulated legal punishment appropriate to the injury, and the assignment of in rem.

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Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 3 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1368-5201

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Article
Publication date: 1 January 1997

George J. Moscarino and Michael R. Shumaker

This decree by the Nazi Government in 1933 is probably the single most important event leading to the advent of bank secrecy laws as we know them today. This criminal provision…

156

Abstract

This decree by the Nazi Government in 1933 is probably the single most important event leading to the advent of bank secrecy laws as we know them today. This criminal provision was enacted to halt the German Jews' movement of assets out of Germany and into Swiss banks — a movement that was occasioned by the Government's attempt to seize the Jews' assets. Swiss banks were chosen because of their geographic proximity, but more so because of Switzerland's then unofficial policy of confidentiality over banking deposits and transactions.

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Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 1 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1368-5201

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Article
Publication date: 1 February 2001

Jon Mills

Since the end of the Second World War, American society has seen the emergence of technology promising to make life easier, better and longer lasting. The more recent explosion of…

494

Abstract

Since the end of the Second World War, American society has seen the emergence of technology promising to make life easier, better and longer lasting. The more recent explosion of the Internet is fulfilling the dreams of the high‐tech pundits as it provides global real‐time communication links and makes the world's knowledge universally available. Privacy concerns surrounding the development of the Internet have mounted, and in response, service providers and website operators have enabled Web users to conduct transactions in nearly complete anonymity. While anonymity respects individual privacy, it also facilitates criminal activities needing secrecy. One such activity is money laundering, which is now being facilitated by the emerging Internet casinos industry. These casinos can be physically located anywhere with websites available worldwide. Internet casinos were a target of legislation by the US Congress, but the legislation, the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, failed to pass. So, at the moment, Internet casinos are a virtually unregulated mechanism for laundering illegal funds.

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Journal of Financial Crime, vol. 8 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1359-0790

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Article
Publication date: 12 October 2010

F.N. Baldwin

The purpose of this paper is to explore organized crime on Wall Street and expose the lack of regulatory control thus impacting upon innocent investors in the money market…

778

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to explore organized crime on Wall Street and expose the lack of regulatory control thus impacting upon innocent investors in the money market. Organized crime has for many years reaped rewards from unsuspecting investors. This exploration, however, aims to turn away from organized and focus on organizational crime. Specifically, the “highly respected” investor Bernard Madoff.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper examines the impact upon innocent investors of the US Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) response to repeated efforts by a whistle blower to investigate an “alleged” out‐of‐control “Ponzi” scheme.

Findings

Bernard Madoff's multi‐billion dollar Ponzi scheme was never uncovered by the SEC. The fact is that the economic recession did the SEC's work. The SEC appeared to be willfully blind. Without the economic recession, some suggest that the Madoff Ponzi scheme might have involved close to 100 billion dollars.

Originality/value

The SEC's regulatory effectiveness in regulating the financial industry was found wanting for over ten years. No regulatory agency ever determined Madoff to be in serious violation of any laws, hence others within the financial industry continued to engage in similar illicit organizational activity. The question remains whether regulatory agencies have learned a lesson from the Madoff episode or is the organizational Ponzi scheme alive and well?

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Journal of Financial Crime, vol. 17 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1359-0790

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Article
Publication date: 1 October 2006

F.N. Baldwin

Since, at least 9/11 financial institutions and financial intermediaries are considered to be at the forefront in the international attempt to halt illicit money transfer. Most…

1099

Abstract

Purpose

Since, at least 9/11 financial institutions and financial intermediaries are considered to be at the forefront in the international attempt to halt illicit money transfer. Most financial institutions if involved at all play an unknowing or lax, but major role in dictating money laundering schemes. The purpose of this paper is to argue that to avoid sanctions including criminal liability, financial institutions and financial intermediaries must be better prepared and willing to assess prototypical money laundering typologies. To do otherwise will invite civil and criminal liability.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper examines legislative pronouncements in general and US caselaw in particular in order to assess compliance and liability: real or imagined.

Findings

There appears to be considerable agreement concerning at least one goal of terrorists attacks and that is to disrupt directly and indirectly economic global stability. Further, those charged with the task of identifying terrorist assets in a financial system and developing a profile of terrorist financial transactions has, at least according to unclassified documents, proved to be futile. Closer international investigation and co‐operation appears to be more a slogan than a reality.

Originality/value

Reviews examples of blatant illegal acts of money laundering within the banking community and examines the exploding real estate market and its transmigration into the world of laundering illicit money.

Details

Journal of Financial Crime, vol. 13 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1359-0790

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Article
Publication date: 6 June 2020

Eugene E. Mniwasa

This paper aims to examine the money laundering vulnerability of private legal practitioners in Tanzania, the involvement of these practitioners in money laundering activities and…

443

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine the money laundering vulnerability of private legal practitioners in Tanzania, the involvement of these practitioners in money laundering activities and their role in preventing, detecting and thwarting money laundering and its predicate crimes.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper applies the “black-letter” law research approach to describe, examine and analyze the anti-money laundering law in Tanzania. It also uses the “law-in-context” research approach to interrogate the anti-money laundering law and to provide an understanding of factors impacting on the efficacy and readiness of private legal practitioners in Tanzania to tackle money laundering. The review of literature and analysis of statutory instruments and case law, reports of the anti-money laundering authorities and agencies and media reports-generated data are used in this paper. This information was complemented by data from interviews of purposively selected private legal practitioners.

Findings

Private legal practitioners in Tanzania are vulnerable to money laundering. There is an emerging evidence that indicates the involvement of some private legal practitioners in the commission of money laundering and/or its predicate crimes. The law designates the legal practitioners as reporting persons and imposes on the obligation to fight against money laundering. Law-related factors and practical challenges undermine the capacity of the legal practitioners to curb money laundering. Additionally, certain hostile perceptions contribute to the legal practitioners’ unwillingness, indifference or opposition against the fight against money laundering.

Research limitations/implications

The paper underscores the need for Tanzania to reform its policy and legal frameworks to create enabling environment for anti-money laundering gatekeepers, including private legal practitioners to partake efficiently in the fight against money laundering. It also underlines the importance of incorporating the principles that govern the private legal practise to enable the practitioners to partake effectively in tackling money laundering.

Originality/value

This paper generates useful information to private legal practitioners, policy makers and academicians on issues relating to money laundering and its control in Tanzania and presents recommendations on possible policy and legal reforms that can be adopted and applied to augment the role of the legal practitioners in Tanzania to combat money laundering.

Details

Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 24 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1368-5201

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 1 February 1999

Paul Gully‐Hart

Switzerland is a traditional financial centre with an uninterrupted record of success so far. If the three main banking centres of the country (Zurich, Geneva and Lugano) were…

124

Abstract

Switzerland is a traditional financial centre with an uninterrupted record of success so far. If the three main banking centres of the country (Zurich, Geneva and Lugano) were pooled, Switzerland would appear as the third banking centre in the world after New York and London. A few years ago it was reckoned that between 5 and 8 per cent of the total world volume of foreign exchange transactions were handled by the Swiss financial market, mostly through inter‐bank transactions. According to an estimation made in 1989 by the Swiss Federal Customs Administration at the request of an inter‐ministry group of experts dealing with money‐laundering issues, it was reckoned that approximately CHF135m (approximately USS100m) poured into Switzerland every week.

Details

Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 2 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1368-5201

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Article
Publication date: 31 May 2024

Amidu Kalokoh

This paper aims to examine the association between money laundering (ML)/terrorist financing (TF) risks (hereafter, money laundering risks) and democratic governance across 117…

247

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine the association between money laundering (ML)/terrorist financing (TF) risks (hereafter, money laundering risks) and democratic governance across 117 countries.

Design/methodology/approach

A cross-sectional design was used to examine the association between ML risks and democratic governance by a quantitative approach. The findings are based on annual ratings of 117 countries on ML/TF risks and democracy while controlling for criminality and peace. The data was compiled from the Basel Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing Terrorism Risks Index, the Economic Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index), the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crimes (Criminality Index) and the Institute for Economics and Peace Index for 2020.

Findings

A multiple linear regression model found a statistically significant negative association between democratic governance and ML risks (B = −0.354, t = −7.454, p = <0.001) and a significant positive association between criminality and ML risks (B = 0.242, t = 2.692, p = 0.008).

Research limitations/implications

A cross-sectional design cannot determine causal inferences and generalization (Levin, 2006). The study only used a year to examine the hypothesis of a negative correlation between ML risks and democratic governance, thus making generalization difficult.

Originality/value

Extant literature examined ML, terrorism and AML diversely. There was a need to estimate the association between ML risks and democratic governance, especially globally, during a global crisis like COVID-19, when democratic principles, such as the rule of law, transparency and accountability, are challenged. Many personnel were laid off, thus limiting supervision for ML and TF. This study presents evidence of this association.

Details

Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 27 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1368-5201

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 9 January 2007

Mitch Van der Zahn, Mikhail I. Makarenko, Greg Tower, Alexander N. Kostyuk, Dulacha Barako, Yulia Chervoniaschaya, Alistair M. Brown and Helen Kostyuk

This paper seeks to provide a textual analysis of the anti money laundering practices of the central banks of Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)) and Ukraine (National…

1651

Abstract

Purpose

This paper seeks to provide a textual analysis of the anti money laundering practices of the central banks of Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)) and Ukraine (National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)).

Design/methodology/approach

The analysis is performed two ways by both calculating a disclosure index and through use of textual analysis.

Findings

The results show very low levels of anti money laundering disclosures by both NBU and RBA with NBU usually showing more. Textual analysis reveals that the NBU is prepared to internalise its discussion on anti‐money laundering discussing wide‐ranging topics. There appears to be a concerted communication effort by NBU to tackle the issues of money laundering head‐on. Textual analysis of the RBA's four annual reports show a clipped discourse on anti‐money laundering, treating it as if it were a distant concern. Over the four year period, there is little acknowledgement in the way of RBA textual discourse that Australia is a jurisdiction of primary concern.

Originality/value

The value of this paper is that, it emphasizes that, if the globalised activity of money laundering is to be crushed further energies are needed to woo central banks from varied backgrounds into exerting their considerable resources toward anti‐money laundering enforcement.

Details

Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 10 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1368-5201

Keywords

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