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This paper provides evidence from the Philippines that strong presidents (termed here as hyper-presidents) have failed to address systemic corruption despite their anti-corruption rhetoric and promises.

The paper uses a case study methodology to review how “strong presidents” have dealt with the problem of corruption in the Philippines and to examine their handling of grand corruption scandals. Data were collected from court decisions, congressional reports, news reports, journal articles, and other academic publications.

The paper has two major findings. First, none of the strong presidents were able to build the social and political foundations for anti-corruption reform. Second, in dealing with corruption scandals, the strong presidents observed selective persecution and particularistic concealment (cover-ups) instead of allowing the rule of law to prevail. These findings dismiss the idea of the sufficiency of strong presidents, some of whom project the possession of the political will necessary to combat corruption in the country.

While the need for strong leaders has been emphasized in the anti-corruption literature, this paper argues that such leaders do not necessarily add to the political commitment needed to fight systemic corruption or even lay the political, institutional, and social foundations for reform. Strong presidents in the weak Philippine state are powerless against the institutions and culture that encourage and tolerate grand corruption.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the weaknesses of governance institutions in constraining grand corruption arising from the government procurement of large foreign-funded infrastructure projects in the Philippines. The weaknesses are revealed in the description and analysis of two major scandals, namely, the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant during the Marcos era and the National Broadband Network project of the Arroyo presidency.

This research employs a historical and comparative case approach to explore patterns of grand corruption and their resolution. Primary and secondary data sources including court decisions, congressional records, journal articles and newspaper reports are used to construct the narratives for each case.

Top-level executive agreements that do not require competitive public bidding provide an opportunity for grand corruption. Such agreements encourage the formation of corrupt rent-seeking relationships involving the selling firm, brokers, politicians and top-level government executives. Closure of cases of grand corruption is a serious problem that involves an incoherent and politically vulnerable prosecutorial and justice system.

This paper aims to contribute to research on grand corruption involving the executive branch in the Philippines, particularly in the procurement of large, foreign-funded government projects. It examines allegations of improprieties in government project contracting and the politics of resolving corruption scandals through the justice system.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse police corruption in the Philippines and to assess measures to control it.

The paper identifies the causes of police corruption and assesses anti-corruption measures adopted by the Philippine National Police and other agencies. The paper utilizes surveys, interviews, reported cases and official documents to determine the extent of police corruption, identify its causes and assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.

Police corruption is systemic in the Philippines. Political and economic circumstances, both historical and contemporary, combined with weak internal controls and other inadequate anti-corruption measures perpetuate systemic police corruption.

The paper contributes to the academic literature on police corruption in the Philippines. It would be of interest to policymakers, scholars, as well as anti-corruption and development practitioners who are involved in institutional and governance reforms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the anti-corruption performance of the Philippine government, particularly under the leadership of President Benigno Aquino III.

The paper evaluates the anti-corruption measures as represented by pertinent laws as well as anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) under the Aquino administration.

The Aquino government has exercised remarkable political will in acting on high-profile cases involving former government officials, including former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. However, the government’s overall anti-corruption performance is hampered by outdated and conflicting laws, lack of compliance with anti-corruption laws and regulations by public officials and employees, poor ACA operational capacities, judicial inefficiency, deficient organizational systems and change-resistant government agencies, and selective and partial enforcement of anti-corruption laws. These problems are characteristic of Philippine political administrations and are arguably rooted in a system long characterized by fragile state institutions, strong oligarchic control, and weak citizenship.

The paper is intended to update scholars, policy makers, and anti-corruption practitioners interested in corruption, ACA performance, and political reform in the Philippines. It discusses corruption-related problems of public administration within the purview of political economy. Based on this perspective, it argues that the key to effective control of corruption is a change in the political system’s configuration rather than the mere change in leadership.

In his March 1986 article in Newsweek, Russell Watson exposed “Queen Imelda” Marcos's life of indulgence as the Philippines' First Lady in the opening paragraph:Three thousand pairs of shoes, size eight and a half. Five shelves of unused Gucci handbags, still stuffed with paper, price tags still attached. Five hundred bras, mostly black, and a trunk full of girdles, 40 and 42 inches around the hips. Huge bottles of perfume, vats of Christian Dior wrinkle cream, a walk-in-safe littered with dozens of empty jewelry cases. When the palace of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos was opened to the public as a museum last week, foreigners and Filipinos alike gawked at what the former First Lady had left behind. “It was the worst case of conspicuous consumption I have ever seen,” said an American visitor, Rep. Stephen Solarz. “Compared to her, Marie Antoinette was a bag lady.” (Watson, 1986, p. 14)

In this paper I explore how members of rural Maya households in central Quintana Roo (Mexico) interact with the wider social system and cope with long-term transformations in productive relations since c. 1840. Maya householders integrate elements of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. Through particular cultural forms they regulate internal uses of wealth and their relationships with the larger capitalist world. Social and economic stratification is a fundamental feature of life among Maya householders today as it was in the past. While disparities between wealth strata within the local context have increased, the community is far from disintegrating into antagonistic groups.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to ascertain the levels of effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in China, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan; second, to explain why some of these ACAs are more effective than others; and third, to suggest some policy recommendations for addressing their limitations.

This paper relies on three well-known international indicators to assess the perceived extent of corruption in the five countries. Similarly, their quality of governance is assessed by their total percentile rank on the World Bank’s six governance indicators in 2013.

Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is effective because of its government’s political will and favorable policy context. The Philippines and Taiwan rely on ineffective multiple ACAs, which are inadequately staffed and funded, and compete with each other for limited resources. China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is ineffective because corrupt party members are disciplined and not prosecuted, and the political leaders use corruption as a weapon against their opponents. Japan’s weak political will is reflected in its reluctance to address its structural corruption. This paper concludes with policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five countries.

The comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five Asian countries and the policy recommendations for addressing their limitations will be of interest to policy makers, scholars and anti-corruption practitioners.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the contextual differences and causes of police corruption in Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan and to assess their governments’ effectiveness in minimising this problem.

The paper begins by identifying the contextual differences in the five countries before analysing their major causes of police corruption and their governments’ effectiveness in minimising it.

Police corruption is a more serious problem in Indonesia and the Philippines because of their more difficult governance environments, low salaries of police officers, red tape, lack of meritocracy in recruitment and promotion, and lack of accountability of police officers. By contrast, the perceived extent of police corruption has declined in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in recent years because of the improvement in the salaries of their police officers and the implementation of various police reforms.

This comparative analysis of combating police corruption in five Asian countries will be of interest to policy makers and scholars concerned with minimising this problem.