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Globally, elderly populations are increasing at unprecedented rates. This has precipitated change in the way practitioners are thinking of delivering eldercare services, especially in the public sector. In Norway, innovation scholars, the Norwegian government, and most municipalities delivering eldercare services agree that they must innovate to meet upcoming demands. However, infrastructural impacts are not expected for 15 years. Thus, the more difficult question becomes when a change is so distant, when or with whom should you innovate? The purpose of this paper is to determine innovative readiness by looking at group climate.

The study will explore the differences between two groups within an organization: one group that participated (participant group) in formal innovation training and and the other group (nonparticipant group that did not participate in the training). The differences in each group’s climate will be explored using a t-test.

There exist two identifiable group climates within the same organization. The participant group’s climate indicated that their members are ready for innovative change by showing that they are task oriented (C2), engaged (S1), and have an overall positive attitude toward innovation (A1 and A2). On the contrary, the nonparticipant group’s climate indicates that their members are not ready for innovative change. This group has a dominant role of acceptance (D2), rather than pursuing ideas or causes they believe in, they accept those tasks given to them. Each group’s level of innovation understanding was relatively similar prior to any formal training.

This research shows that even though a manager within an organization is championing or encouraging innovative behavior, there can still exist two different group climates: a group that is genuinely interested in innovation and one that is not. Should participation in innovation training be mandatory or voluntary? This study showed the latter that the participant group’s climate indicated its members were more ready for innovative change, while the nonparticipant group’s climate indicated its members were not. This could be an important group dynamic for managers to consider when building a new innovative initiative, especially if that organization struggles with maintaining engagement and positivity for that change.

Officers in post-cold war military operations frequently encounter situations that are not easily handled through central control and chain of command, but demand a more flexible leadership style and the ability to yield some control to subordinates. This study aims to investigate what it takes to train military leaders to master such Maneuver Warfare skills in a culture that still, unconsciously, fosters a chain of command structure.

Using a quasi-experimental pre-post design, the authors studied 30 teams of naval cadets (n = 228) in three separate Leadership Development Programs, each of 12 months full time duration. In the three otherwise identical programs, the authors varied one of the major exercises (sailing) both in duration and degree of structure and challenge. Parameters of team interaction were measured using the Systematizing the Person-Group Relation method and summarized in a construct labeled synergy.

One of the cohorts showed a significant positive effect. This cohort sailed a barque for ten weeks, crossing the Atlantic during winter storms. Apart from the clear mission of sailing the ship safely back to its home haven, they received no further instructions or training. Although the duration and the challenge likely count for part of the result, the authors argue that the lack of initial structure combined with a shared mission were more important.

Because of the cost and time involved in each program, it was not possible to independently vary duration, structure and mission. As a result, conclusions as to the reason for the greater positive effect seen in one of the programs cannot be definitively determined.

The study contributes to the understanding of the effect of unstructured situations on building Maneuver Warfare skills.

Severe misunderstandings have been proved to cause significant delays and financial overruns in large engineering projects with teams consisting of people from Western and Asian cultures. The purpose of this study was to determine if differences in shared cognition may explain some of the crucial misunderstandings in intercultural production teams.

The study has used systematizing the person–group relationship (SPGR) survey methodology, supported by interviews, to study mental models in six South Korean teams that also includes Norwegian engineers (52 individuals). In so doing, the study uses the theoretical framework of Healey et al. (2015), where X-mental representations involve actions that are automated and subconscious and C-mental representations involve actions that are verbalized reasonings and conscious. People may share mental models on the X-level without sharing on the C-level, depicting a situation where teams are coordinated without understanding why (surface discordance).

The findings of the study are that people with different cultural backgrounds in an intercultural team may learn to adapt to each other when the context is standardized, without necessarily understanding underlying meanings and intentions behind actions (surface discordance). This may create a perception about team members not needing to explicate opinions (sharing at the C-level). This in turn may create challenges in anomalous situations, where deliberate sharing of C-mental models is required to find new solutions and/or admit errors so that they may be adjusted. The findings indicate that the non-sharing of explicated reasonings (C-mental models) between Norwegians and Koreans contributed in sharing C-mental models, despite having an implicit agreement on how to perform standard tasks (sharing X-mental models).

The study is limited to Norwegians and Koreans working in production teams. Future studies could benefit from more cultures and/or different team contexts. The authors’ believe that the findings may also concern other standardized environments and corroborate previous perspectives on intercultural teams needing to both train (develop similar X-mental representations) and reflect together (develop similar C-mental representations).

Based on our findings we suggest the using of cross-cultural training at a deeper level than previously suggested, training in both social interaction patterns as well as verbalizing logical reasoning together. This entails reaching a shared and joint understanding of not only actions but also values, feelings and teamwork functions. This can be enabled by group conversations and training in dynamic team patterns. Important is, however, that standardized contexts may dampen the perception of the need to do both.

The study contributes to current research on intercultural teams by focusing on a dual-mode perspective on shared cognition, relating these to contextual factors. In this, the authors’ answer the call in previous research for more information on contextual matters and a focus on interaction in intercultural teams. The study also shows how the differences between X-mental and C-mental shared mental models play out in a practical setting.