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The purpose of this study is to analyze the determinants that lead REITs to pay out more dividends than the required level to retain their tax-favored status. In particular, the focus is on the effect that information asymmetry has on REITs’ excess dividends distribution.

A sample of 341 REITs from the USA, France, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy has been analyzed for the period 2000–2016. Employing multiple linear regression models, the effects of information asymmetry, cash flow, size, ROA, leverage and treasury shares on excess dividends have been explored.

Results indicate that REITs with greater information asymmetry distribute significantly more excess dividends, with superior evidence in Europe than in the USA. Regarding other determinants, cash flow influences excess dividends the most, whereas ROA and common shares repurchase have an inverse relationship with excess dividends.

The paper explores the effects of excess dividends distribution on the most relevant REITs features. The joint analysis of the European and the US samples allows this study to make a comparison between the two markets and to identify affinities and differences.

The paper tests whether a proxy of asymmetry information plays a role in affecting the excess dividends distribution. In contrast to previous researches, it expands the analysis by comparing the US and European markets to underline any difference in the effect of asymmetry information on excess dividends. The topic has never been investigated before in relation to the European market.

The purpose of this paper is to verify the theoretical assumption about a weaker role of internal governance structures (namely, board and CEO) in determining sporting and financial performances in highly concentrated club ownership environment.

Using data from the Italian and English football clubs playing in their national top divisions, over the period 2006–2015, the authors apply agency theory, property rights theory and win maximization logic to test the absence of a significant impact of internal governance structures on financial performances and clubs’ sporting performance. Ownership structure’s variables are used as control variable.

Empirical findings document an overall poor impact of board structure and CEO features on financial performances, in comparison with the influence of ownership structure; the consolidation of win maximization logic of clubs’ owners has been demonstrated in this specific context. However, the authors found that some internal governance elements have also an impact on performance even if their contribute is limited: board size results negatively associated to club profitability, board independence and CEO tenure are positively related to sporting performance; in addition, CEO tenure also increases profitability.

The originality of the paper lies on the contribution arising from this empirical research, since a scarcity of empirical studies analyzing the correlation between internal governance and performance in European football sector is noticed.

Systemic risk has been one of the most interesting issues in banking and financial literature during the last years, particularly in evaluating its effects on the stability of the whole financial system during crises. Differently from other studies which analyze systemic risk focusing on European countries, we explore the determinant of systemic risk in other regional or continental banking systems, as Latin America. Using the CoVaR approach proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), we study the impact of corporate variables on systemic risk on a sample of 30 Latin American banks belonging to seven countries, continuously listed from 2002Q1 to 2015Q4. We investigate the contribution of the corporate variables over different economic periods: the Subprime crisis (2007Q3–2008Q3), the European Great Financial Depression (2008Q4–2010Q2), and the Sovereign debt crisis (2010Q3–2012Q3).

Alternative corporate governance systems (CGSs) have attracted a significant bulk of research recently. While the connection between the adoption of an alternative system (one tier board or two tier board system) and firms’ performances has not been fully analysed yet, the purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies which have turned into an alternative board system have eventually improved their performance over time.

Using a sample of more than 15,000 Italian unlisted joint stock companies, the authors compare performance outcomes in 2009 of firms adopting alternative systems with performances of firms that maintained the system in force before the 2003 Corporate Law Reform (defined as “traditional”). Because of the choice of an alternative system (one tier or two tier board) instead of a traditional one is not random, the authors reduce selection bias implementing matching methods and comparing firms that are close in terms of propensity score measured in 2003 (the year before the new CGSs have been introduced by a corporate law reform).

The authors do not find evidence of a significant improvement of performances in 2009 concerning those firms that have adopted a one tier or two tier board systems with respect to those which maintained a traditional one.

The novelty of the study concerns the application of propensity score matching for the evaluation of the impact of the change of the CGS that is possible in presence of two conditions that are all verified in our setting: first, to have a country where corporate law allows for choosing among different systems; in this case Italy is a good laboratory, because it allows for the choice among three different systems; and second, to have the opportunity to evaluate the effect of the change in light of a relatively recent “pre-treatment” condition; this is made possible by the fact that before the 2003 Reform of corporate law all the companies had a traditional system.

The latest financial crisis has stressed the need of understanding the world financial system as a network of interconnected institutions, where financial linkages play a fundamental role in the spread of systemic risks. In this paper we propose to enrich the topological perspective of network models with a more structured statistical framework, that of Bayesian Gaussian graphical models. From a statistical viewpoint, we propose a new class of hierarchical Bayesian graphical models that can split correlations between institutions into country specific and idiosyncratic ones, in a way that parallels the decomposition of returns in the well-known Capital Asset Pricing Model. From a financial economics viewpoint, we suggest a way to model systemic risk that can explicitly take into account frictions between different financial markets, particularly suited to study the ongoing banking union process in Europe. From a computational viewpoint, we develop a novel Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm based on Bayes factor thresholding.

It is widely believed that deviating from the “one share-one vote” principle leads to corporate inefficiencies. To measure the market appraisal of this potential inefficiency, this study aims to analyse the market reaction to a change from the “one head-one vote” to the “one share-one vote” mechanism by means of a quasi-natural experiment: a 2015 Italian reform forcing all listed cooperative banks to transform into joint-stock companies.

To investigate the market reaction around the regulatory change, this study uses both a traditional event study and a novel methodology based on the synthetic control method as well as on Bayesian statistical techniques.

This study estimates the market valuation of the effects of the governance change around the event date being equal to a cumulative average increase in market value of about 14 per cent using an event study methodology, and of about 13 per cent using Bayesian techniques.

This study provides evidence on the fact that the voting mechanism significantly affects the market values of companies. The study also introduces a novel statistical technique that can be extremely useful in analysing single-firm event studies.