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Rulers from as long ago as ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia have tried to control various aspects of their economies, whether to ensure adequate supplies of basic commodities in times of war or famine, or to protect the power and incomes of the rulers themselves. There have been various ancient price edicts, which have had some effectiveness, at least during the lifetimes of their promulgators, principally because they referred to products which were largely produced under the direct control of the state. It was obvious even to the most ancient observers that radical changes in the equilibrium between buyers and sellers, such as those caused by sudden shortages in times of war or natural disaster and their attendant famines, gave opportunities to those in possession of goods necessary for the maintenance of life itself, to raise their prices and “profiteer” thereby. The same phenomenon was the reason for the frequent attempts to set ceilings on interest rates, which, in an era when almost all loans were for personal consumption rather than for commercial or investment purposes, had the effect of wiping out financially the borrowers who could not repay their loans in time, which in turn led to serfdom and slavery. Such crises were frequently the occasions for appeals to rulers to protect the population from such exploitation. It was undoubtedly against such a background that the Jews of Talmudic times interpreted the biblical rules against “oppression” to mean a total prohibition of the taking of interest, and limits on “overcharging”, as will be discussed below. In the Greco‐Roman world the idea of control of prices was a result partly of philosophical inquiry into general economic theory, and partly the desire of moralists to prevent the “injustice” of some people gaining “immoderate” profits at the expense of others. Plato saw the desire of merchants for “unbounded” gain rather than “reasonable” profit as a dangerous social evil resulting from the acquisitive nature of man. In his ideal conception, the state ought to set prices in accordance with the cost of production plus fair reward for the seller's efforts (i.e., profit), and to have these standards enforced by market overseers. Such officials, generally called agoranomoi, actually existed in a number of Greek states, but were more often concerned with regulating weights and measures and maintaining orderliness in the market place rather than with controlling prices.

I. The Background: Theories of Property The institution of property is one of the oldest in human experience. Because of the many approaches to the study of the origins of society and the functions of its various structures, the idea of property has been investigated from numerous points of view. In this subject, many disciplines of modern scholarship converge, each beginning with a consideration of some aspect of existent society, and then, to a greater or lesser degree, looking back into the origins of the institution in question.

Despite the existence of a variety of approaches to the understanding of behavioral and managerial ethics in organizations and business relationships generally, knowledge of organizing systems for fidelity remains in its infancy. We use halakha, or Jewish law, as a model, together with the literature in sociology, economic anthropology, and economics on what it termed “middleman minorities,” and on what we have termed the Landa Problem, the problem of identifying a trustworthy economic exchange partner, to explore this issue.

The article contrasts the differing explanations for trustworthy behavior in these literatures, focusing on the widely referenced work of Avner Greif on the Jewish Maghribi merchants of the eleventh century. We challenge Greif’s argument that cheating among the Magribi was managed chiefly via a rational, self-interested reputational sanctioning system in the closed group of traders. Greif largely ignores a more compelling if potentially complementary argument, which we believe also finds support among the documentary evidence of the Cairo Geniza as reported by Goitein: that the behavior of the Maghribi reflected their deep beliefs and commitment to Jewish law, halakha.

Applying insights from this analysis, we present an explicit theory of heroic marginality, the production of extreme precautionary behaviors to ensure service to the principal.

Generalizing from the case of halakha, the article proposes the construct of a deep code, identifying five defining characteristics of such a code, and suggests that deep codes may act as facilitators of compliance. We also offer speculation on design features employing deep codes that may increase the likelihood of production of behaviors consistent with terminal values of the community.