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This paper uses the capital asset pricing model to show that, in realistic circumstances, double taxation and differential tax rates on personal and capital-gains income affect corporate stock values and financial policies in non-neutral ways. This non-neutrality holds whenever inflation is uncertain and tax-avoidance activity is neither costless nor riskless. The model also allows us to explore how a series of frequently proposed changes in the interplay of corporate and personal taxes would affect corporate dividend payouts and debt usage. Our analysis clarifies that conscientious efforts to integrate corporate and personal tax rates must make supporting changes in the size and character of capital-gains tax preferences built into the tax code.

Traditionally, individual states have shared responsibility for regulating the US insurance industry. The Dodd–Frank Act changes this by tasking the Federal Reserve with regulating the systemic risks that particularly large insurance organizations might pose and assigning the regulation of swap-based substitutes for insurance and reinsurance products to the SEC and CFTC. This paper argues that prudential regulation of large insurance firms and weaknesses in federal swaps regulation could reduce the effectiveness of state-based systems in protecting policyholders and taxpayers from nonperformance in the insurance industry. Swap-based substitutes for traditional insurance and reinsurance contracts offer protection sellers a way to transfer responsibility for guarding against nonperformance into potentially less-effective hands. The CFTC and SEC lack the focus, expertise, experience, and resources to adequately manage the ways that swap transactions can affect US taxpayers’ equity position in global safety nets, while regulators at the Fed refuse to recognize that conscientiously monitoring accounting capital at financial holding companies will not adequately protect taxpayers and policyholders until and unless it is accompanied by severe penalties for managers that willfully hide their firm’s exposure to destructive tail risks.

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the structure of banking in the nineteen separate countries comprising these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit‐insurance environment in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the regulatory environment that may help explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance is investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulations in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. Hence, an exploratory empirical analysis based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different “regulatory regimes” on the performance of individual banks, controlling for various bank‐specific and country‐specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compete prudently and profitability in a competitive and global financial marketplace. In the process of conducting such an assessment, the paper necessarily provides information as to whether the U.S. is “out‐of‐step” with banking developments in other industrial countries.

This chapter explores correspondences between the costs and benefits of financial and circus safety nets. The author stresses the idea that the character of a country's net cannot be static. It must adapt promptly to changes in the market, legal, bureaucratic, and ethical problems it is intended to alleviate.

Safety nets expand over time for two reasons. First, large firms whose operations lie formally outside the net have strong incentives to make themselves too difficult for authorities to fail and unwind in crisis circumstances. Second, in good times, safety-net managers underinvest in crisis planning. As a result, crisis-generated changes in the ordering of regulatory norms dispose them to rescue firms that are difficult to fail and unwind without holding themselves closely accountable for either the costs or the distributional effects of the subsidies the rescue engenders.

This study employs a multivariate GARCH model to investigate the relative sensitivities of the first and the second moment of bank stock return distribution to the short‐term and long‐term interest rates and their respective volatilities. Three portfolios are formed representing the money center banks, large banks, and small banks, respectively. Estimation and testing of hypotheses are carried out for each of the three portfolios separately. The sample includes daily data over the 1988‐2000 period. Several hypotheses are tested within the multivariate GARCH specification. These include the hypotheses of: (i) insensitivity of bank stock return to the changes in the short‐term and long‐term interest rates, (ii) insensitivity of bank stock returns to the changes in the volatilities of short‐term and long‐term interest rates, and (iii) insensitivity of bank stock return volatility to the changes in the short‐term and long‐term interest rate volatilities. The findings indicate that short‐term and long‐term interest rates and their volatilities do exert significant and differential impacts on the return generation process of the three bank portfolios. The magnitudes and the direction of the effect are model‐specific namely that they depend on whether the short‐term or the long‐term interest rate level is included in the mean return equation. These findings have implications on bank hedging strategies against the interest rate risk, regulatory decisions concerning risk‐based capital requirement, and investor’s choice of a portfolio mix.

By “political economy” I mean both the method of thought and the body of knowledge which refer to human economising behaviour. The body of knowledge includes both theory — theorems, laws, empirical generalisations, etc., and “facts” — history, description of institution, statistical data, etc. By “Christian theology” I mean both the method of thought and the body of knowledge which refer to the human religious understanding of Jesus of Nazareth. “Religious” here implies awareness of, or belief in, God. The body of knowledge may include pre‐Christian religion (such as that reported in the Old Testament), and the results of independent inquiry (such as natural theology) in so far as these are interpreted by, or “refracted” through what theologians call the “Christ event”.

This study examines whether investors take into consideration the balance sheet numbers when determining the market value of companies. Specifically, an investigation is made of the association between the book value of equity and the value placed on the firm by the stock market. An equity valuation model first mentioned by Landsman (1986), based on the balance sheet identity, is used to permit assets and liabilities to have separate empirical coefficient values. In scope, the study covers Malaysian main board companies from years 1990 to 1997. Evidence is provided which is consistent with the notion that the market incorporates information on accounting numbers in the valuation of a firm. As a general conclusion, the results indicate that investors do use information in the balance sheet.

Prospects for banking regulation are a central issue in planning by firms that provide financial services or are considering offering such services. Because there has been deregulation in the past, further deregulation is often assumed for the future. Indeed, sometimes de‐regulation seems to be taken for granted.