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1 – 2 of 2Svetlana Golovanova and Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro
Explore the effects of competition policy on an important competitive dimension of digital platforms, namely quality.
Abstract
Purpose
Explore the effects of competition policy on an important competitive dimension of digital platforms, namely quality.
Design/methodology/approach
The deterrence effect of competition policy should induce firms to compete on merits, with lower prices and higher quality for consumers. Deterrence, or the inducement not to infringe competition law, may depend on the harshness of penalties and/or the likelihood of conviction. We use competition policy indicators that are associated with these deterrence dimensions, allowing for non-linearities and interactions of the indicators. We use a unique data survey of digital gig platform users, that covers at least two dozen platforms and more than 50 countries. Quality is measured using multidimensional indicators of the level of satisfaction of platform users with different platform services. We control for platform user and country characteristics, including other regulatory indicators such as labor laws, to recover different effects.
Findings
Results suggest that competition policy is relevant for differences in product quality across platforms and countries. Important non-linearities are uncovered, where substantive rules of competition policy interact with competition authority power. The effects depend on either level of the indicators, suggesting that deterrence effects depend upon a combination of both law in the books and competition policy practice.
Practical implications
The estimates suggest a need to balance both dimension of deterrence, namely, strictness and effectiveness to expand the effects of competition policy on competition.
Originality/value
This is the first paper that explores the effect of competition policy on non-price or non-margin competition dimension. It is the first to study the effect on a sample of digital platforms. It contributes to the literature of deterrence effects of competition policy.
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Paulo de Andrade Jacinto, Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro and Tulio Cravo
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate skilled labor demand determinants in Brazil, considering alternatives explanations: changes in relative wages, non-homothetic technology…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate skilled labor demand determinants in Brazil, considering alternatives explanations: changes in relative wages, non-homothetic technology output growth and skill-biased technical change.
Design/methodology/approach
This study relies on a rich and unique matched employer-employee data set for manufacturing sector, from 1996 to 2003. The analysis considers a translog functional form labor demand system estimated using seemingly unrelated regression and instrumental variables to control for possible measurement errors and wages and output endogeneity.
Findings
The demand function estimates suggest that: labor demand underlying technology is non-homothetic, research and development investment is biased toward skilled workers, the non-homothetic technology is not skill biased so output changes contributed positively for skilled labor increase, relative wages played a significant role and international trade has little explanatory power explaining labor demand shifts.
Originality/value
This is the first paper that considers alternative explanations for the increase in the demand of skilled workers for manufacturing in Brazil simultaneously: changes in relative wages, output changes with non-homothetic technology, skill-biased technical change and, to a lesser extent, international trade. The study challenges current empirical evidence that considers trade and trade liberalization as the main factor explaining labor demand shifts.
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