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In preparing this report, the compliance sub‐group has set out to (a) summarise the current compliance regime as a matter of law and practice, (b) identify particular problem areas within that regime concerning public sector officials (PSOs), and (c) suggest recommendations for change. The result may be seen as providing features of a ‘model’ compliance structure designed to cause difficulties for corrupt PSOs seeking to launder the proceeds of their corruption; UK law and practice has formed the springboard for the model, but it should be stressed that in order to be of any utility any suggested changes would have to be adopted (effectively) universally throughout the financial world. Piecemeal adoption by one or a few states would merely be likely to drive the tainted monies elsewhere, and would not serve the desired purpose of reducing the extent/profitability of corruption.

At a recent meeting of government officials in Trinidad to discuss regional security and in particular the threat of regional and, indeed, international dcstabilisation presented by the illicit drug trade, considerable attention was focused on the role of offshore financial centres in facilitating the financial activities of organised crime groups. Of course, over the years offshore financial centres, typically on small tropical islands in the Caribbean and more recently the Pacific, have attracted a certain amount of criticism. As governments have increasingly recognised the practical importance of taking the profit out of serious crime, thus attacking both the motivation for much criminal activity and undermining liquidity within criminal financial structures, attention has inevitably been focused on the attempts of those involved in protecting the profits of crime to launder it. Ironically when the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provided the courts with powers to deprive convicted criminals of the proceeds of profitable criminal activity in Britain, this gave to organised criminals a clear incentive to launder their ill‐gotten gains. It must be remembered that the laundering of money is an expensive and potentially high risk activity. Therefore, criminals would not normally bother to go to the expense and trouble of laundering the proceeds of their illicit activities unless there was a pressing reason to do so. The prospect of confiscation on conviction is a real risk and, thus, a compelling justification for attempting to obscure the source of such funds. Of course, the 1988 Act did not contain provisions outlawing money laundering, which was unfortunate given the incentive that it gave to the practice.

The Second African Conference on Economic Crime took place in Johannesburg from 17th to 19th July, 1996. The Conference was organised under the auspices of the Centre for International Documentation on Organised Crime (CIDOEC) by the Police Science Sub‐department of the University of South Africa, the Centre for Business Law of the University of the Orange Free State, the Office for Serious Economic Offences of the Department of Justice of the Republic of South Africa, the Commercial Crime Branch of the South African Police Service and Business Against Crime.

Gone are the days when a bank could concentrate on providing a reliable service to its customer, and maintain that as part of that service it could guard the confidentiality of all information learnt in the course of the customer's banking. Formerly, a customer could be relatively confident that information about his or her business affairs would not be disclosed save in fairly limited circumstances, and the bank would not trouble itself as to how these affairs were conducted. Current legislation and regulation requires a bank to be aware of the commercial background to its clients' dealings and, in certain circumstances, to take steps to report criminal conduct or to account to third parties.

Enforcement of regulatory controls has traditionally been left to the criminal law. In the last 15 years there has been an increasing interest in using civil remedies for this purpose. Most of the attention has been on financial services, but there have been recent developments in the UK planning system, which provide interesting parallels.

In recent times, there has been some disquiet within certain sectors of the Singapore business community over the role of auditors in detecting corporate fraud. The cause of this concern can perhaps be attributed partly to the Barings collapse in February 1995 and the subsequent suggestions that the auditors of the Barings subsidiary in Singapore, Barings Futures Singapore Pte Ltd (BFS), may have been negligent in their audit work. More recently, in mid‐1996, a substantial locally listed company, Amcol Holdings Ltd (Amcol), was placed under judicial management amid rumours alleging possible misdeeds by senior executives and directors. The Amcol saga has, once again, focused some attention on the role of auditors and their duty to detect fraud in company accounts.