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The purpose of this study is to examine the unique effect that shared metacognition has on negotiation – over and above the effect of simply having similar views.

An experiment was conducted where it was systematically varied whether the negotiators explicitly knew or did not know that their opponent had a similar view of the negotiation task.

Results showed that having shared metacognition promoted: cooperative negotiation, accurate insight into the opponent's point values (which was correlated with increased joint gain), and increased satisfaction regarding the negotiation outcome. Moreover, this was the case across different conditions in which negotiators' negotiation task view and motivation were varied.

The paper suggests that negotiators and mediators can benefit by developing a common understanding of the negotiation and explicitly exchanging this understanding with each other (establishing shared metacognition) prior to engaging in the negotiation. Future studies should examine closely the underlying process of shared metacognition in terms of its impact on negotiation.

Prior research suggests that successful, integrative negotiation depends on negotiators' view of the negotiation task and whether they hold similar views of the negotiation task (shared cognition). Implicit in this research is that the negotiating parties not only had similar views of the negotiation task but also may have explicitly known that they did so (shared metacognition).

After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” Until the late 1980s, politics in South Korea was far from democratic. South Korea had five direct presidential elections (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) and six national assembly elections (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) after the democratic transition of 1987. In 1992, a civilian candidate, Young Sam Kim, was elected president. Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) prosecuted and punished former generals turned presidents Doo Hwan Chun (1980–1988) and Tae Woo Roh (1988–1993) for corruption, mutiny and treason in 1995. Dae Jung Kim (1998–2003) was elected president in 1997. For the first time in South Korean political history, regime change occurred between a ruling party and an opposition party.

In this chapter, the change and continuity of civil–military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea is examined. A positive consolidation of democratic reform is one that, while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Civilian supremacy should be institutionalized not only by preventing military intervention in civilian politics but also by ensuring civilian control over the formation and implementation of national defense policy.

In sum, despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized. Although significant changes in civil-military relations did occur after the democratic transition, they were not initiated by elected leaders with the intention of establishing a firm institutional footing for civilian supremacy. South Korea's political leaders have not crafted durable regulations and institutions that will sustain civilian control over the military.

More than six decades, Korea is still divided. The most highly militarized zone in the world lies along the demilitarized zone. How to draw the line prudently between seeking national security and promoting democracy shall be the most delicate task facing all the civilian regimes to come in South Korea. That mission will remain challenging not only for civilian politicians but also for military leaders.

This study aims to focus on inter-firm collaboration, exploring the main capabilities that can make a business more or less open to collaboration; it also considers the role of both firm-specific and relationship-specific capabilities. The paper proposes a model that can be used to study how the combination of the two categories of capabilities determines a firm’s approach to collaboration.

Through a survey of high-end hotels in tourist destinations in Italy and the USA, this paper tests variable connected with firm-specific and relationship-specific aspects, using confirmatory factor analysis.

Firms with greater capabilities are less open to cooperation; weaker firms with fewer resources appear to be more inclined to cooperate, probably to gain access to resources and competencies they do not possess.

From a scientific perspective, this paper suggests an analysis based on both individual and relational capabilities when deciding whether to collaborate, while most studies based on a relational view just consider relational capabilities. The study could be enlarged to other countries and contexts.

From a practical perspective, it indicates the importance of accounting for different and sometimes diverging aspects when deciding to cooperate.

In terms of social implications, it shows that, apart from the relational capabilities they have, potential partners can decide not to collaborate.

The paper suggests a method of analyzing both individual and relational capabilities when deciding whether to engage in a collaboration. It shows that firms’ behavior does not necessarily depend on the firm’s relational capabilities.