Search results

This study aims to explore the structural aspects (roles, responsibilities and reporting) of dyad leadership in one health-care organization (HCO).

The perceptions of 32 leaders (17 physician leaders and 15 dyad co-leaders) in formal leadership positions (six first-level with formal authority limited to teams or divisions, 23 middle-level with wider departmental or program responsibility and three senior-level with institution-wide authority) were obtained through focus groups and surveys. In addition, five senior leaders were interviewed. Descriptive statistics was used for quantitative data, and qualitative data were analyzed for themes by coding and categorization.

There are a large number of shared responsibilities in the hybrid model, as most activities in HCOs bridge administrative and professional spheres. These span the leadership (e.g. global performance and quality improvement) and management (e.g. human resources, budgets and education delivery) domains. The individual responsibilities, except for staff and physician engagement are in the management domain (e.g. operations and patient care). Both partners are responsible for joint decision-making, projecting a united front and joint reporting through a quadrat format. The mutual relationship and joint accountability are key characteristics and are critical to addressing potential conflicts and contradictions and achieving coherence.

Clarity of role will assist development of standardized job descriptions and required competencies, recruitment and leadership development.

This is an original empirical study presenting an integrated view of dyad leaders and senior leadership, meaningful expansion of shared responsibilities including academic functions and developing mutual relationship and emphasizing the central role of stability generating management functions.

In the last decades, many of the most talented and promising young graduates in the developed economies have joined the financial industry. Simultaneously, ill-designed incentives’ schemes have favored the development of a culture in which excessive greed, free-riders’ behavior, unreasonable appetite for risk, and short-term decision making have endangered the economy and, potentially, have laid the foundations for financial, economic, social, and environmental crises.

In this chapter, we review current challenges in the financial industry from the lens of human and social capital. We examine some of the factors that allowed unethical behavior and a short-term financial focus in the financial sector, examining how compensation and an extremely competitive culture became key elements that favored greedy and manipulative behavior and ultimately generated socially harmful human and social capital in the financial sector. Finally, we discuss the emergence of a number of game-changers (namely, Brexit, FinTech, the growing relevance of ethical standards, and the increasing participation of women and millennials in the industry) that might represent potential promotors of change and help restructure and reshape the financial industry.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how executive pay schemes influence managerial efficiency, which the authors measure as the risk-adjusted firm performance.

The authors utilized hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses.

The authors find that as options constitute a higher percentage of total compensation packages, subsequent firm risk-adjusted performance declines. The authors also find an inverse relationship between TMT stock ownership and risk-adjusted performance.

The findings suggest that the firm stakeholders should reconsider the likely influence of option-based incentives and equity holdings on the risk-adjusted performance.

Most executive compensation research focuses on either the pay-to-performance or pay-to-risk links. However, in this paper, the authors combine both the performance and risk dimensions simultaneously.

The purpose of the paper is to assess whether current corporate commitments to serve all stakeholders rather than just shareholders will protect corporate reputation during the coming economic downturn.

This paper reviews recent corporate commitments to corporate purpose and sustainability as well as critiques of these commitments to determine the likely public and governmental responses in the context of declining middle-class purchasing power and record profits.

The author believes that unless corporations make deeper commitments to productivity growth, higher wages and strengthening employment, there will be meaningful restrictions imposed upon their freedom to operate.

This review of corporate commitments and critiques is selective and not comprehensive. To the extent that the findings relate to events in the future, they are, by definition, non-verifiable.

If corporations begin to address the concerns discussed here before the next sharp economic downturn, they may be able to escape significant new obligations imposed by the governments. If not, they are likely to lose both freedom of action and reputation.

Depending on the flow of events, large segments of the population could turn against big corporations, representing a significant shift in the cultural and political environment.

Much has been written about the intersection of stagnation in productivity growth, decline in middle-class purchasing power and income inequality. However, the author believes that there has been little attention given to the possible implications from the perspective of corporate reputation.

In 1979, Galbraith wrote a manuscript titled “The Social Consequences of Inflation and Unemployment and Their Remedies.” The manuscript was found in the John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers at the John F. Kennedy Library. The reasons for Galbraith to write the article might appear at first glance to be purely contextual. At the macroeconomic level, the United States was experiencing stagflation, a situation unseen since 1945, resulting in double-digit inflation rates and high unemployment. A policy debate was going on about the Phillips curve and whether there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Milton Friedman challenged the Keynesian analyses of the Phillips curve in the mid-1960s (Friedman, 1977). Galbraith’s 16-page draft manuscript provides us an incisive summary of Galbraith’s views about the causes of stagflation and what can be done about it. He provides us with an alternative to the neoclassical synthesis of Samuelson and Solow and the neoliberal thinking of Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek.

This paper is a descriptive case study which seeks to outline how leadership development is being utilised across Queensland Health (Queensland Department of Health, Australia) to achieve improvements in workplace culture and ultimately improvements in clinical care and patient outcomes.

Queensland Health has been implementing a comprehensive organisation‐wide suite of leadership development programs since 2006. This includes a range of specific leadership development programs conducted over a period of time for clinical and non‐clinical staff. It also includes specialist leadership development workshops of shorter duration, online leadership modules, web‐based support, executive coaching and 360‐degree feedback. The programs are based upon experiential learning which engages participants in critical thinking and self‐reflection based upon in‐context experiences relevant to themselves. Ongoing leadership program development has been evidence‐based and identified through 360‐degree feedback outcomes, staff opinion survey outcomes and program evaluation outcomes.

The 360‐degree feedback survey results of participants have improved. This demonstrates that the leadership development programs have impacted positively on participants' workplace behaviour. The culture and climate survey results have improved which demonstrates positive cultural change has taken place. The programs have been evaluated very highly by participants.

This is one of the most comprehensive and innovative leadership development initiatives ever undertaken within the Australian health sector, with over 10,000 participants to date.

The financial industry is becoming more intelligent and digital, and the adoption of new technologies is promoting financial innovation while making financial security subject to disruption. Internet finance, as a product of the rapid development of information technology and the financial industry, has ushered in major changes in the development of the financial industry. The application of new technologies in the financial sector will bring about the development of intelligent investment consulting businesses for financial institutions The development of such a business reduces the threshold at which a customer can obtain financial services and improves the convenience and accessibility of financial services. Under the complex domestic and international economic situation, enterprises need to pay attention to financial risks and reasonably control financial risks. Applying blockchain technology to supply chain financial risk management has a natural match for solving the traditional difficulties in supply chain risk. This chapter mainly describes the types, assessment methods and existing problems of financial risks, as well as the prevention and control of network security risk management and Internet financial risk management arising therefrom, and also involves stress testing and scenario planning, blockchain-based financial risk management and risk culture, among which financial risk assessment and Internet financial risk management are mainly the content. With the help of information technology, we can effectively identify and prevent all kinds of risks and effectively promote the sustainable and healthy development of the financial industry.

The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.