Jin‐hui Luo, Di‐fang Wan, Yang Yang and Guang Yang
The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the role of differentiated margin system in leading investors' investing behavior and then optimize investor structure in…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the role of differentiated margin system in leading investors' investing behavior and then optimize investor structure in futures markets.
Design/methodology/approach
Using economic experimental research method, this paper designs and conducts a futures market experiment according to experimental research's basic norms, thus acquiring needed and credible empirical data.
Findings
By analyzing the experimental data, it is found that compared with situations in futures markets that implement uniform margin system, investors' (especially speculators') futures open position and the ratio of their open position and futures turnover are both significantly higher, in futures markets that implement differentiated margin system. On the other hand, differentiated margin system has no effects on hedgers' futures turnover, but significantly reduces speculators' futures turnover.
Research limitations/implications
The findings suggest that compared with uniform margin system, differentiated margin system is beneficial to effectively restrict both speculators' and hedgers' speculating behavior and lead hedgers' market participation.
Practical implications
In order to resolve the problem of unreasonable investor structure in China's futures market, i.e. lack of hedgers and over‐speculating, China's futures market's regulators should reform the margin system and adopt differentiated margin system to lead investors' rational behavior and optimize investor structure.
Originality/value
This paper empirically analyzes and verifies, for the first time, the roles of differentiated margin system in affecting investors' investing behavior. The futures market experiment designed and used in this study is a pioneering and exploratory experiment.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of large shareholdings from the agency problem perspective of overinvestment, and re‐test the role of board independence in the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of large shareholdings from the agency problem perspective of overinvestment, and re‐test the role of board independence in the context of concentrated ownership.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a five‐year panel data of Chinese non‐financial listed companies between 2001 and 2005, the paper estimates both a fixed‐effects model and a random‐effects model.
Findings
The paper finds evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between large shareholdings and firm level overinvestment. It also finds that state‐owned firms and firms with more independent directors experience lower level of overinvestment. However, firms with more frequent meetings experience a higher level of overinvestment.
Research limitations/implications
The paper's findings indicate that concentrated ownership is not always a bad thing. The crux of the matter is how to induce large shareholders' incentive to monitor managers' opportunistic behaviors and restrict their motivation to expropriate minority shareholders.
Practical implications
In the context of concentrated ownership, the key to improve corporate governance is to strengthen board independence.
Originality/value
The paper provides useful information on non‐monotonic governance effects of large shareholdings in Chinese listed companies and overinvestment.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of China's contemporary banking regulatory system, with particular focus on regulatory control of foreign banks trading in…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of China's contemporary banking regulatory system, with particular focus on regulatory control of foreign banks trading in China. The paper addresses three aspects of Chinese banking regulation: what does China regulate; why does China regulate; and how does China regulate. Much of the discussion is concerned with China's regulatory agencies particularly with the role of the CBRC as the principal regulator in China's banking sector.
Design/methodology/approach
In the first instance the paper presents an overview of banking regulatory models gained from a review of theoretical literature in the area. Then through a wide ranging review of Chinese publications, both academic and official, the paper seeks to relate the course of regulatory reform in China, both in terms of compliance with orthodox regulatory theory, and the unique regulatory requirements of the Chinese banking system.
Findings
The paper recognises that China has embraced the need for banking regulation with the establishment of an institutional structure that is responsive to both banking supervision and government policy. Within that structure the role of the CBRC, the pervasive manner in which that agency operates, and the content of its regulatory output have been identified and critically reviewed.
Originality/value
In its review of the modernization of China's banking regulatory system, the paper achieves originality from the author's research into, and critical reflections on Chinese generated literature, both institutional and academic, which is then communicated in a manner that will be understood by readers familiar with Western banking regulatory theory.
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This paper aims to understand the implication of night soil selling at the public toilets for the shared interests between colonial state and business in nineteenth-century Hong…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to understand the implication of night soil selling at the public toilets for the shared interests between colonial state and business in nineteenth-century Hong Kong. More specifically, this paper attempts to look at the ways the toilets were sustained by the sharing interests over night soil profits between state and business sector.
Design/methodology/approach
It is argued from the political economy perspective that the night soil profit determined the public toilet development.
Findings
The successful emergence of the modern state of colonies was generally attributed to colonial modernization, a force that was widely recognized for having introduced hygienic modernity. It was easily assumed that the public toilets would be provided by colonial government. Instead, sanitary problems during the early colonization of this colony were addressed by the privately-owned public pail toilets provided by big Chinese landowners through the selling of night soil. Based on this quasi-commercial mode, these toilets, which served as night soil collection points, were certainly inefficient; they however survived for half a century into the early twentieth century.
Originality/value
The paper challenges the long-established assumptions of binary relations and hierarchical public roles that put them into zero-sum competition of capacity. It rather argues that the interests aligned with each other.