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In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.

The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.

The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.

The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.

Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.

Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.

This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

Researchers, business professionals, and policymakers are now focusing on how disruptive innovations affect markets and business performance in the quickly changing business landscape of today. This study investigates the complexity of disruptive innovations and how they alter established organizational strategies and market structures. The study explores the core traits of disruptive innovations and looks at how they upend established business models and alter the structure of entire industries. This study employs a comprehensive literature review to identify the primary motivators behind disruptive innovations and their diverse impacts on market dynamics. It looks into how disruptive change is sparked by evolving consumer behavior, flexible business models, and emerging technologies. Additionally, research examines how businesses use internal reorganizations and strategic alliances among other tactics to capitalize on and adjust to disruptive innovations. It also examines how market leaders deal with these difficulties in an effort to stay competitive, shedding light on the possible risks and uncertainties related to disruptive innovations. It also highlights how crucial it is for organizations to have innovative cultures and proactive adaptation in order to prosper in a time of swift technological advancements.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the signaling effects of high versus low price discounts by integrating extant literature on price discounts, perceived risks and purchase intentions for products sold online. The study examines the influence of price discounts on perceived risks, and the subsequent influence of these risk perceptions on online purchase intentions.

This study used an experimental design. The manipulated factor was price discount (10, 30, 50, 70 and 90 per cent). Responses were collected via online surveys. Nonlinear regression analysis with the MEDCURVE macro was used for the analysis.

The results show that the discount size increases customers’ perceived risks, and that these perceived risks mediate the relationship between price discount and purchase intentions.

This study provides a better understanding of customers’ risk perceptions for online price discounts, which enables retailers to decide appropriate price discounts to attract customers.

Most previous literature focusing on price discounts takes into consideration the presentation effect on consumers’ positive perceptions, while this study investigates the price discount effect on customers’ negative perceptions. In particular, this study examines the mediating effect of perceived risks on the relationship between price discount and purchase intention, which has not been investigated in previous studies.