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The purpose of this paper is to advance our understanding of the links between the representativeness of the local community by those drafting and elaborating the specification of the geographical indication (GI), the market access and the use of the GI.

The present study followed a comparative research design, building upon primary data from the field works dealing with the elaboration and development of GIs worldwide, from legislations on the protection of GIs and from secondary data, i.e. literature dealing with the elaboration of the GI specifications at case level or national/international level.

The GI is permeable to a multitude of objectives and the management of controversies represent the “price of participatory democracy”, which still needs to be under the umbrella of the justice of peace, the State authority. Representativeness does not necessarily conduct to equity and fairness. It depends on the heterogeneity of the value chain, which might lead to the dilution of the GI specificity. Mandatory membership might not be always the best option Transparency to guarantee the producer’s group works for the common good is essential.

The controversies in the elaboration of the GI product specification are directly induced by the controversies in the management of the GI either by the collective organisation of producers or by the public authority. Issues such as representativeness, mandatory membership, transparency and heterogeneity of the value chain are deeply analysed to understand the functioning of GI producers associations and their limits. The state intervention as justice of the peace appears necessary.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how open, mediatised conflict in geographical indications (GIs) can provide the basis for differentiation strategies for heritage producers based on both functional and symbolic benefits.

Longitudinal case study based on multiple data sources, which reconstructs the history of the Bitto GIs and the conflict between the Protected Designation of Origin Bitto Consortium and a small number of heritage Bitto producers.

The paper highlights how the mediatised narration of conflict can contribute to raise consumer awareness, differentiate products and result in symbolic value creation.

Extreme case study design purposively chosen as characterised by conditions likely to accentuate conflict.

The paper develops a conceptual framework that permits to identify the potential for conflict inside GIs. It also contributes to a better understanding of the image of products protected by GIs and the role played by heritage producers. It also offers practical advice on two promotional tools, namely, trade fair participations and experiential showcases.

The paper offers practical advice on the safeguarding of small producers localised in cultural epicentres inside GIs.

The authors introduce the notions, such as competitive wars and secession, that contribute to a better understanding of centripetal/centrifugal forces inside GIs. The authors also propose a better understanding of image creation of GIs, grounded in cultural work in marketing and consumer research.

Geographical Indications (GI) are complex and multi-purpose institutions. Their objectives include encouraging diversification of agricultural production, improving farmers’ income, countering depopulation of rural areas, satisfying consumer demand for high-quality good, and protecting consumers from food fraud. The authors argue that such objectives are not necessarily aligned as divergence may arise among stakeholders (such as farmers, consumers or rural communities) about the optimal design of the GI. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors developed a simple, static game-theory model describing the basic choices that a planner faces in designing a GI.

The authors conclude that the optimal organization requires finding trade-offs among conflicting but equally desirable objectives. Perfect monitoring is not a sufficient condition to resolve such conflicts. Sub-consortia and flexible production agreements may increase the efficiency of a GI.

The authors described basic trade-offs in GI design using the simplest possible model. To this purpose the authors introduced limiting assumptions that may be relaxed in future research. The representation of the GI agreement focussed on the quality level only, abstracting from all other consideration. Using a static model prevented us from explicit modeling of (loss of) reputation effects. The simplifying assumptions about consumer behavior and cost functions have reduced the generality of the results. Extensions of the model may consider introducing additional elements in the GI agreement such as production areas or governance models, dynamic games and general functional forms.

The authors found that in designing a GI: first, promotion approaches revolving around small groups of local leaders (i.e. efficient, high-quality producers) might overshoot quality, resulting in unsustainable production agreements; second, introducing degrees of flexibility in the production agreement may help achieving a sustainable GI; and finally, sub-consortia/optional labels may help dealing with producers’ heterogeneity.

The authors found that setting a high standard in the production agreement is not sufficient condition for delivering quality food to consumers, as producers might have incentive to commit frauds. A simple command and control approach to quality in GI’s is not always the most efficient strategy, because it may reduce participation. In designing the GI, the goals of identity preservation and food quality must be balanced with consideration of producers’ incentives. The involvement of producers in the design of the GI is a critical success driver. Yet, this practice can be problematic because of producers’ heterogeneity.

The paper provides theoretical foundation for best practices in forming a GI, including: multi-stakeholder involvement, management of farmer heterogeneity and monitoring.

This paper aims to study vertical gender segregation, which persists even in the fields where women are represented at junior levels. Academia is an example. Individual performance and lack of a critical mass do not fully explain the problem. Thus, this paper adopted an intergroup perspective (i.e. social identity and competition theories) to study how a majority (i.e. men) can influence the advancement of a minority (i.e. women).

The paper investigated promotions from associate to full professor in Italy. The original data set included all promotions from 2013 to 2016. To study intergroup dynamics, individual-level variables were analysed together with structural factors, such as gender representation and availability of resources.

The effect of gender representation was significant in that promotions were more likely when full professor ranks within academic institutions were men-dominated and associate professor ranks were women-dominated. Concurrently, the analysis of individual-level variables supported the existence of discrimination against women. The paper argues that the majority grants more promotions under the pressure of change; however, this does not contrast with discrimination at the individual level.

The paper focused only on one country. However, the framework can be applied in other contexts and used to study segregation based on factors other than gender.

This study explored gender segregation from a new perspective, highlighting the importance of the interplay between individual and structural factors. This interplay might be one of the causes of the slow progress of gender equality.