Search results

The purpose of this paper is to expose the failure of the criminal justice system of England and Wales to provide an effective response to widespread fraud and to point to sources from which a new doctrine may be created. The author’s approach draws on public sources, in particular, recent Home Office publications, the work of the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee and studies undertaken by the Mayor of London’s offices in 2014/2015.

The paper uses a critical assessment of the criminal justice system based on the author’s own experience as a fraud prosecutor.

Among the findings is that, while the failings of the current system have been apparent for some years, the extent and depth of the same failings have not been publicly realised, nor sufficiently acknowledged by the authorities. It has become obvious that the traditional response of the criminal justice system, when employed against fraud, will fail for want of anything corresponding to the resources required. A new doctrine will emerge as the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is revised and more flexibly employed. The Criminal Finances Bill also holds much promise, in particular, with its new offences akin to money laundering and the provision of powers of investigation at a significantly lower level of command among investigators. However, there remains an apparent reluctance in law enforcement to explain its methodology or to support reform, which would allow a fuller sharing of intelligence and appreciations of threats posed by fraud derived from intelligence with the financial services sector and the victim public.

The value of the paper is derived from the author’s long experience as a fraud prosecutor and as an adviser to the government, on fraud and organised crime, in a closely related jurisdiction with similar problems, but where greater success has been achieved, namely, Hong Kong.

At the stroke of midnight on 30th June, 1997 Hong Kong was returned to the People's Republic of China. China takes justifiable pride in what has to date been a smooth transition, but the government in Beijing is now confronted by a demanding reality, the need to make detailed arrangements regulating the legal ties between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the sovereign power. Not the least of the problems concern the degree and means by which mutual legal assistance in criminal matters will be made available. The puzzle for the People's Republic is that Hong Kong's dependent status begs a high degree of mutual cooperation with China, but the procedural safeguards that exist to govern Hong Kong's cooperation with third jurisdictions may not easily be used as a model: the safeguards built into the current legislation would operate to exclude the sovereign power! On the other hand, if future cooperation between Hong Kong and China is to take place without safeguards local and international confidence may suffer.

It is to be expected that Hong Kong's population would take strongly to the Internet, if only because there are few competing attractions in the Special Administration Region. Local television is distinctly low‐brow and the great outdoors are poisonously polluted. According to the Office of the Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) there are presently about 300,000 Internet users in Hong Kong (population 6.2 million) and the volume of traffic has increased from 30 million minutes in April 1996 to 1.1 billion minutes in the corresponding month in 1997.

Introduces the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which was set up in February 2004 and aims to reduce the profit incentive on serious crimes, disrupt criminal enterprises and increase the risks to criminals; it will be advised by specialist prosecutors. Outlines the contents of “One Step Ahead”, the Home Office consultation paper, which expects much more from the specialist prosecutors than presently is provided by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Anticipates that the specialist prosecutors advising SOCA will run into problems similar to those currently facing the CPS whenever covert intelligence has been obtained, and recommends measures such as the employment of telephone intercepts as a source of evidence.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (the Act), in particular, the sections of the Act that establish the serious organised crime agency (SOCA) and to anticipate the effectiveness of the Act against organised and serious crime in the UK.

The methodology employed is to examine Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, in light of the response of concerned professionals to the Act's passage through Parliament, concerns expressed both in the press and in legal journals, and to critically examine the novel features of the Act from the perspective of a professional who has worked in this same field (organised and serious crime) in Hong Kong for more than 20 years.

The Act is to be welcomed, in particular, gathering the investigative and intelligence functions of the police, customs and immigration service in one body SOCA, an elite limit to assist other UK police forces and law enforcement agencies. The introduction of statutory mechanisms to promote the co‐operation of defendants as potential witnesses is also to be welcomed. However, it is feared that the investigative powers created will be ineffective as the judiciary are not directly involved and the powers that are given to SOCA will be easily evaded by ruthless or experienced criminals.

It is hoped, the paper will promote interest in SOCA when it is “rolled out” operationally in April 2006. It is also hoped that SOCA will be appreciated from the outset as only a half‐hearted adoption of the US organised crime “model”. The UK has decided not to use telephone taps as a source of evidence, nor has it granted effective investigative powers to SOCA. Furthermore, there has been no comprehensive clean‐up of the present confusion of objectives that is so obvious in the sentencing policy as it concerns offenders who commit serious crime or are involved in organised criminal behaviour in the UK.

This chapter examines the roles and challenges for the Irish economy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Celtic Tiger and the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Specifically, it does review the role that Government, the Central Bank of Ireland, and the Financial Regulator had before, during and after the collapse of both the Irish banking system and property market. This chapter explains the drivers behind the growth of the Celtic Tiger and the sources of leverage that amplified the severity of the subsequent collapse. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the changes that have since been made and provides a review of the lessons that can be obtained from the collapse.

The results presented in this chapter are based on analysis of secondary sources and a literature review to determine conceptual and theoretical frameworks for identifying the specific issues that the Irish economy endured since the 2008 economic crisis and the red flags and signals that were either missed or ignored.

Combined with the subprime collapse of 2007 and the international sovereign debt crisis evident since 2008, Ireland and the actions of its regulators and policy makers undoubtedly generated not only a catalyst to financial ruin, but also an incubator to aid its severity. The precise drivers that created the Celtic Tiger remained unchanged and played a significant role in the subsequent collapse. Banks were leveraged towards the Irish property market and the role of leverage in financial markets created mispricing, to which the basic principles of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) failed. This miscalculation of risk was severe and destructive for the real economy. The reward for this error was a place in history as an ‘I’ in the derogatory term ‘PIIGS’.

This chapter could be used as teaching material for undergraduate and masters programmes in economics and finance. It provides a response to further understand the behaviour of the Irish economy during the development of the Celtic Tiger and the subsequent financial collapse that enveloped the Irish state.

This chapter discusses the role of leverage throughout a financial system and the necessity for financial monitors to promote an environment of sustainability and financial endurance; that which can survive an international financial crisis event.

Gone are the days when a bank could concentrate on providing a reliable service to its customer, and maintain that as part of that service it could guard the confidentiality of all information learnt in the course of the customer's banking. Formerly, a customer could be relatively confident that information about his or her business affairs would not be disclosed save in fairly limited circumstances, and the bank would not trouble itself as to how these affairs were conducted. Current legislation and regulation requires a bank to be aware of the commercial background to its clients' dealings and, in certain circumstances, to take steps to report criminal conduct or to account to third parties.

Enforcement of regulatory controls has traditionally been left to the criminal law. In the last 15 years there has been an increasing interest in using civil remedies for this purpose. Most of the attention has been on financial services, but there have been recent developments in the UK planning system, which provide interesting parallels.