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The principal issue that will be considered in this chapter is how the banking sector facilitates the crimes of money laundering and tax evasion. This will entail asking a series of related questions. Does the assistance of the banking sector in financial crime involve a small number of wayward employees at the periphery of banking? Or are multinational financial institutions willing participants in the systemic evasion of global antifinancial crime standards? In exploring these questions, the theory and practice of money laundering will be explored by focusing on the three stages of the money laundering cycle. The global anti-money laundering standards that apply to the banking sector, and the role of bank secrecy in promoting tax evasion, will be examined through a series of case studies. It will be argued that there is strong empirical evidence that the banking sector is a systemic offender facilitating financial crimes, despite the enactment of international and national antifinancial crime standards and criminal prosecutions of financial institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between commercial corruption and money laundering. The challenge of corruption in the private sector and its relationship with money laundering are neglected subjects. Corruption and money laundering often occur together with the presence of one reinforcing the other. Corruption generates billions of dollars of funds that will need to be concealed through the money laundering process. At the same time, corruption contributes to money laundering activity through payment of bribes to persons who are responsible for the operation of anti‐money laundering (AML) systems.

Primary legal documentation, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the Financial Action Task Force's Recommendations on Money Laundering, and National Legislation, as well as Unpublished Government Commissioned Reports, are analysed in order to assess the links between corruption and money laundering.

Commercial corruption poses a threat to the integrity of the AML system, especially at the placement stage of the money laundering cycle. Private sector reporting entities may be bribed to actively collude in money laundering, refrain from lodging suspicious transaction reports, or tip off clients that they may be subject to a government investigation. The recursive links between corruption and money laundering suggest that policies which are addressed to fighting both corruption and money laundering may have a mutually reinforcing effect.

There is a lack of empirical data concerning private corruption that suggests significant underreporting of this type of crime.

This paper is addressed to policy makers who are concerned with corporate governance and the impact of corruption on AML systems. Future research would deal with the enforcement aspects of anti‐corruption laws.

The paper analyses commercial corruption for the purpose of understanding the corruption/money laundering nexus.

A fundamental element of international anti‐money laundering (AML) systems is the requirement that financial institutions file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) with financial intelligence units. Although the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has established global standards, there is a range of national laws, practices and experiences with STR systems. The purpose of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of national STR systems, by using Switzerland as a case study.

Primary source documentation, complemented by observations at FATF meetings, are relied on to evaluate STR systems.

The FATF ratings of a country's compliance with international standards are objective, expert driven and consistent in application, but are limited as performance measures in that they ignore the costs of AML and STR measures. The effectiveness of the Swiss STR system is questionable because of serious under reporting of suspicious transactions. The Swiss STR system is efficient to the extent that there is a high usage of STRs and that large amounts of money are automatically frozen under the mandatory reporting obligation.

Evaluation of national STR systems is limited because of a lack of reliable statistics on the extent of money laundering.

This paper is addressed to policy makers who are concerned with assessing the effectiveness of STR systems. Future research would deal with STR systems in developing countries and the role of STRs in uncovering the financing of terrorism.

Insider/outsider description of the FATF mutual evaluation process. Compilation and interpretation of statistical data on STR systems, as performance measures.

A unifying theme apparent at this year's Symposium was the need for balance when lifting the veil of bank secrecy: (1) the need to protect civil liberties versus the need to fight crime; (2) the bank's need to balance its role as policeman while furthering its commercial objectives; (3) the necessity of weighing international cooperation against the awareness that individual nations jealously guard their own legislative regime; (4) the dichotomy of technology that serves both to protect and penetrate secrecy; (5) the balance required when investigating crimes.

In recent times, there has been some disquiet within certain sectors of the Singapore business community over the role of auditors in detecting corporate fraud. The cause of this concern can perhaps be attributed partly to the Barings collapse in February 1995 and the subsequent suggestions that the auditors of the Barings subsidiary in Singapore, Barings Futures Singapore Pte Ltd (BFS), may have been negligent in their audit work. More recently, in mid‐1996, a substantial locally listed company, Amcol Holdings Ltd (Amcol), was placed under judicial management amid rumours alleging possible misdeeds by senior executives and directors. The Amcol saga has, once again, focused some attention on the role of auditors and their duty to detect fraud in company accounts.

One cynic has speculated that years hence people will look back and be forced to conclude that ‘money laundering was one of the greatest problems facing mankind towards the end of the second millennium’. This would be true of lawyers, politicians, economists, sociologists and many others who have sought to examine the problem, each from their own viewpoint. Yet, the persis‐tently non‐definable trend of globalisation has seemingly demonstrated that uni‐causal or uni‐disciplinary explanations of change in the international arena tend to yield unilateral perspectives on problems, solutions to which are subsequently limited in scope.