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The purpose of this paper is to analyse five biases in the valuation of financial investments using a mental time travel framework involving thought investments – with no objective time passing.

An investment’s initial value, together with any periodic funding cash-flows, are mentally projected forward (at an expected rate of return) to give the value at the investment horizon; and this projected value is mentally discounted back to the present. If there is a difference between the initial and present values, then this can imply a bias in valuation.

The study identifies (and gives examples of) five real-world valuation biases: biased funding cash-flow estimates (e.g., mega infrastructure projects); biased rate of return projections (e.g., market crises, tech stock carve-outs); biased discount rate estimates (e.g., dual-listed shares, dual-class shares, short-termism, time-risk misperception, and long-termism); time-duration misestimation or perception bias when projecting (e.g., time-contracted projections which lead to short-termism); and time-duration misestimation or perception bias when discounting (e.g., time-extended discounting which also leads to short-termism). More than one bias can be operating at the same time and we give an example of low levels of retirement savings being the result of the biased discounting of biased projections. Finally, we consider the effects of the different biases of different agents operating simultaneously.

The paper examines key systematic misestimation and psychological biases underlying financial investment valuation pricing anomalies.

The purpose of this paper is to portray the valuation of financial investments as mental time travel.

In a series of thought investments, $1 invested in an investment fund is mentally projected forward in time and then discounted back to the present – with no objective time passing. The thought investments feature symmetric valuation (in which discount rates exactly match projection rates) and asymmetric valuation (in which discount rates and projection rates happen to differ). They show how asymmetric valuation can result in differences between the current personal value and market value of an investment and, by way of real-world illustration, between a closed-end investment fund's net asset value and its market value. The authors explore possible reasons for asymmetric valuation.

Thought investments illustrating mental time travel can be used to help understand both financial investment valuation generally and, more specifically, established explanations of the closed-end investment fund puzzle. The authors show how different expectations, different perceptions of time and risk and different risk and time preferences might help determine value.

There are vast literatures on prospection, discounting and future-orientated or intertemporal decision-making. The authors’ innovation is to illustrate how these mental activities might combine to facilitate financial investment valuation. In particular, the authors show that a low personal discount rate could be a consequence of a shortened perception of future time and vice versa.

Presents a critique of the assumptions underlying the Teacher Training Agency (TTA) strategy of defining quality centrally and imposing its view through a power‐coercive change process. An alternative view of effective teacher education is developed, based on the contention that high quality courses result from the thinking and commitment of teacher education professionals, working with their colleagues in schools, in local settings. It is argued that the development of high quality initial teacher training (ITE) results essentially from the engagement of teacher educators with ideas drawn from teacher education practice and research. Centrally‐driven curriculum blue‐prints are unlikely to lead to the same high quality results, rather they will tend to result in mere compliance. The argument is illustrated by an example of teacher education development in one institution leading to a set of propositions about the elements which characterise high quality teacher education more generally.

An improved investment environment and aggressive foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization strategies have enabled Asian countries, such as Korea and Vietnam, to attract sharply increased FDI inflows and multinational corporations (MNCs) during the 1990s. Indonesia, however, has suffered from stagnated FDI inflows and, in particular, continued divestment since late 1998. In this paper, we report the survey results of recent changes in attitudes toward foreign MNCs perceived by government officials and business leaders in these three Asian countries, and investigate the major individual attribute determinants of their assessment of foreign investments using econometric tools. We also discuss policy implications of these findings for host‐country FDI policy makers and the international business community.

The different types of estimators of rational expectations models are surveyed. A key feature is that the model′s solution has to be taken into account when it is estimated. The two ways of doing this, the substitution and errors‐in‐variables methods, give rise to different estimators. In the former case, a generalised least‐squares or maximum‐likelihood type estimator generally gives consistent and efficient estimates. In the latter case, a generalised instrumental variable (GIV) type estimator is needed. Because the substitution method involves more complicated restrictions and because it resolves the solution indeterminacy in a more arbitary fashion, when there are forward‐looking expectations, the errors‐in‐variables solution with the GIV estimator is the recommended combination.

One of the most significant recent developments in the risk measurement and management area has been the emergence of value at risk (VaR). The VaR of a portfolio is the maximum loss that the portfolio will suffer over a defined time horizon, at a specified level of probability known as the VaR confidence level. The VaR has proven to be a very useful measure of market risk, and is widely used in the securities and derivatives sectors: a good example is the RiskMetrics system developed by J.P. Morgan. VaR measures based on systems such as RiskMetrics' sister, CreditMetrics, have also shown their worth as measures of credit risk, and for dealing with credit‐related derivatives. In addition, VaR can be used to measure cashflow risks and even operational risks. However, these areas are mainly concerned with risks over a relatively short time horizon, and VaR has had a more limited impact so far on the insurance and pensions literatures that are mainly concerned with longer‐term risks.

The UK is one of the few countries in Europe that is not facing a serious pensions crisis. The reasons for this are straightforward: state pensions are among the lowest in Europe, the UK has a long‐standing funded private pension sector, its population is ageing less rapidly than elsewhere in Europe and its governments have, since the beginning of the 1980s, taken measures to prevent a pension crisis developing. This article reviews the policies that have been implemented over the last two decades. It describes and analyses the defects in the Thatcher‐Major governments’ reforms that brought us to the current system, examines and assesses the reforms of the Blair government, and then identifies the problems that remain unresolved and how they might be addressed. Concludes with an examination of the implications of these reforms for the future of occupational pension schemes.

We examine the contribution and investment decisions made by members of a large UK‐based DC pension plan. We find that many employees appear to be relatively financially sophisticated and follow approaches consistent with economic and financial theory in terms of savings rates and investment strategies. However, there are also many less sophisticated employees who stick with plan default arrangements and/or follow simple rules of thumb in saving and investing. The challenge for corporate sponsors of pension plans is in designing arrangements and communication strategies that reduce the chances of these less sophisticated plan members making mistakes – in the sense of systematic deviations from optimal behaviour.