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This study aims to explore the role of rebel group legitimacy and ideology in durable peace (DP) following peace agreements to end civil wars. It builds on earlier research showing that justice and civil society involvement are critical in achieving DP. This study adds the impacts of rebel group activities and support on DP. Activities include service delivery and mobilization. Support is gauged with outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections held following peace agreements.

Five data sets were used to measure the key variables: DP, inclusive commissions (IC), legitimacy symmetry (electoral outcomes), service delivery and ideological mobilization. A measure of rebel group integration in the political system was also constructed. Impacts of the integration, legitimacy and ideology variables were assessed with a hierarchical regression model (HRM). This study begins with a base model drawn from earlier research showing the key predictors were procedural justice (PJ) and IC. The authors ask about the extent to which the rebel group variables contribute additional variance to the prediction of DP.

The main contributors to the prediction of DP were PJ, IC and integration in the political system. None of the legitimacy or mobilization variables added significant variance to the prediction. Only one of the mobilization variables, forced recruitment, was significant. The decision to integrate into the political system following the agreement did not mediate the relationship between PJ in the negotiation process and DP. Results of a factor analysis showed that DP, PJ, IC and integration formed a cluster with strong loadings on the first factor.

The negative results for the legitimacy and mobilization variables may not be the last word on rebel group influences. Lack of support for the key hypotheses spurs attempts to discover other sources that contribute to the survival of rebel group actors in the political system and, in turn, to DP.

The issues raised by this study contribute to debates about ways to attain peaceful relations among competing groups following a civil war. It appears that attention to factors inside and around the negotiation process (PJ, ICs and conversion) may be more important than rebel group activities outside of these processes. The results call attention, in particular, to the important role played by political integration. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to develop levers for encouraging rebel groups to emerge as political actors in the post-agreement environment.

Developing measures of the symmetry of rebel group legitimacy and integration in the context of a comparative case study are the primary original contributions of this study. Furthermore, the mode of analysis (HRM) is novel in this literature. This approach builds on and extends the earlier research on factors influencing DP.

This study aims to conduct two experiments to provide insight into the impacts of Congressional party loyalty on negotiating flexibility. Constituent support, term limits and bipartisan roles were explored as possible moderators of polarization in American political negotiations.

Experiment 1 used a 2 (party loyalty: loyal/thoughtful) × 2 (constituent support: consistent/mixed districts) experimental design. In experiment 2, party loyalty was constant, and participants were assigned to one of four conditions created by a 2 (term limits: restricted/not restricted) × 2 (role: coordinator/whip) design. In both experiments, flexibility was measured as the percentage of movement on four key budget allocation issues. Participants were recruited using Prolific.

Experiment 1 demonstrated that loyalty produced less flexibility, particularly with regard to one’s own preferred issues. Constituent support did not influence flexibility. The second experiment found that absence of term limits and presence of bipartisan roles resulted in more movement on the other’s preferred issues.

While the authors’ manipulations have experimental validity, further field research is suggested to assess the fidelity of the authors’ simulation and the ecological validity of the experimental findings.

These findings extend the list of situational levers that impact negotiation flexibility. In particular, based on the authors’ findings, embedding bipartisan roles into traditional Congressional processes could help increase negotiating flexibility and cooperation.

Both the experimental task and variables manipulated in these experiments are embedded in a US Congressional context.

The purpose of this study was to determine the relative impact of positive and negative face threats in conflict scenarios on the relational quality between disputants. This study also sought to determine whether the contextual variables of relational distance and power differential mediated this relationship as predicted by politeness theory.

To test the hypotheses, a 2 × 2 × 2 design was implemented manipulating the variables face (positive and negative), relational distance (business and personal) and power differential (high and low power differential). Participants read one of the eight scenarios, then responded to the dependent variables which focused on the impact of the face threats on relational quality between the participants. Subjects were recruited using the M-Turk, Amazon platform. Manipulation checks were carefully constructed to ensure subjects understood them.

The results of this study indicated that positive face threats have significantly more impact on relational quality between disputants than negative face threats. Moreover, context did not mediate these results. Neither relational distance nor power differential impacted the extent to which positive face threats compromised the relationship between the disputants.

This is the first study to explore the impact of face threats on relational outcomes in conflict. Prior studies focused only on the extent to which contextual variables would impact the choice of face threats that disputants might make in response to power and relational distance differences. This result suggests that face threats play a significant role in determining relational outcomes in conflict settings.

This study suggests that practitioners, such as mediators or group facilitators, should take steps to limit the kinds of positive face threats that disputants exchange during conflict. If positive face threats are allowed to escalate, then they can severely compromise the willingness of disputants to trust and continue to work toward an integrative solution.

Political divisions often appear to widen in the context of positive face threats as individuals seek to belittle the identities of their opponents. As these face threats escalate, they can result in polarizing language that disempowers these individuals from wanting to work together in a trusting relationship to accomplish important social goals.

This is the first study to explore the relative impact of positive and negative face threats on the relational quality of disputants in conflict. It is also the first to explore the extent to which context mediates the impact of face threats.

The theme of this keynote address is conceptual puzzles raised by empirical research on conflict management and resolution. Three types of puzzles are highlighted: those that deal with processes, identities, and situations. The process puzzles include some counter‐intuitive implications of negotiating strategies and interaction process dynamics. The identity puzzles include the ways in which identity is negotiated, perceptions of ingroups and outgroups, and the connection between loyalty to groups and collective action. The situation puzzles address attribution issues, the distinction between passive actors and active agents, and the role of history. An attempt is then made to juxtapose the puzzles toward a larger conception of a field that emphasizes change in the phenomena we analyze in research and shape through practice. A number of these ideas are found also in the research of previous IACM lifetime award recipients, with whom connections are made.

In this article, I address connections between processes at the micro (e.g., negotiation) and macro or contextual levels of analysis. The discussion situates process analysis in the broader settings in which the interactions take place. The first major section shows how various contextual factors may influence micro‐level processes. These factors include events, structures or institutions, and cultures. In the second major section, I consider the ways that small‐group processes may influence the macro‐level context. Societal (organizational, international) changes may result from such processes as those that occur in problem‐solving workshops, educational exchanges, and formal negotiations, including the objectives sought and strategies used, the tone and content of rhetoric displayed, and the formats and procedures devised. The article concludes with a way to conceptualize the linkages between processes and structures at the different levels.

In this issue, IJCM begins what we hope will become a regular practice: publishing an article based on the address given by the recipient of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) Lifetime Achievement Award. This award is currently given every other year to someone whose work over many years achieves scope and impact of the first order. In a year when the lifetime award is to be given, a committee consisting of IACM's current president, past president, and president‐elect solicits and evaluates nominees, and recommends a recipient to the association's board of directors. Although IACM is a relatively young professional society (it was founded in 1984), the roster of past Lifetime Achievement Award recipients is an outstanding group of thinkers and scholars in the field of conflict.

The following report on political risk in the Phillippines is an abbreviated version of a detailed study. The full report presents the theoretical underpinnings for the model, as well as a detailed rationale for all measurement decisions. The model's estimate of regime stability prior to and following the Aquino assassination has been borne out by subsequent events. While increasing his vulnerability somewhat, the assassination has not reduced Marcos' effective power to a level where regime stability is threatened. The report is distributed by Booz Allen & Hamilton, Bethesda, Maryland, to its political risk group clients.

Conventional wisdom tells us that mediation without ripeness is a fool’s errand (Zartman and Touval, 1985). What, then, is Türkiye’s motivation for mediating the war in Ukraine in lieu of ripeness – and what can its behavior as a mediator tell us about that motivation? In pursuit of this question, this paper inductively analyzes Turkish mediation in the Ukraine war to unpack the relationship between a contextual (ripeness) and actor-level (motivation) variable. Of particular interest is the decision-making and behavior of third parties (like Türkiye in Ukraine) who elect to mediate highly complex conflicts in which ripeness is indiscernible. The purpose of this research is not to propose or test a causal relationship between obscured ripeness and mediation, but rather to examine mediation behavior in situations where ripeness is obscured.

The impact of weaponized information on ripeness and third-party mediation is evaluated through an original, systematic and inductive case study analysis of Turkish mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war. As an intense theater of operations for information warfare for well over a decade, the war in Ukraine serves as an especially apt choice for an analysis of “obscured ripeness.” Likewise, Türkiye’s anomalous position as the only substantive source of mediation in the conflict lends significance to an empirical examination of its motivation and behavior as a mediator.

This research reveals that the pervasive use of weaponized information in the Russia–Ukraine war has distorted and disordered the information environment, thereby obscuring the ability of third parties to determine if the conflict is or could be ripe for mediation. However, the condition of obscured ripeness that prevails in the conflict has not proven a deterrent for mediation by Türkiye, which, as the only mediator in the conflict, has used a transactional approach to mediation motivated by self-regarding interests and animated by a manipulative mediation strategy. In sum, this inductive analysis of Turkish mediation in Ukraine reveals that the use of weaponized information in a conflict indirectly selects on transactional mediation (and mediators). The significance of this finding is magnified by the widespread use of weaponized information in contemporary conflicts as well as the declining frequency of third-party mediation.

There have been few, if any, systematic assessments in Turkish mediation of the Russia–Ukraine war, and none specifically concerned with the effects of weaponized information. Additionally, the paper proposes a typology of mediator motivation that is used to structure that assessment, while also introducing a new concept (“obscured ripeness”) and linking that concept both to the existing literature on ripeness and to the use of weaponized information in contemporary armed conflicts. As such, this manuscript represents an important contribution both to the empirical and theoretical landscape with respect to the study of mediation and international conflict management.

Multinationals operate in a setting where the rules of the game are ambiguous, contradictory, and subject to rapid change. The consequences of such conflict for the firm can be serious, ranging from nationalization and expropriation to increased operating costs and losses of market share, managerial control, and valuable executive time. Here are five ways of coping management may try.