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Intractable conflicts are characterized as protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero‐sum nature, total, and central. They are demanding, stressful, exhausting, and costly both in human and material terms. Societies involved in this type of conflict develop appropriate psychological conditions which enable them to cope successfully with the conflictual situation. The present paper proposes the following societal beliefs which are conducive to the development of these psychological conditions: beliefs about the justness of one's own goals, beliefs about security, beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent, beliefs of positive self‐image, beliefs about patriotism, beliefs about unity and beliefs about peace. These beliefs constitute a kind of ideology which supports the continuation of the conflict. The paper analyzes as an example one such intractable conflict, namely the one between Israel and Arabs, concentrating on the Israeli society. Specifically, it demonstrates the reflection of the discussed societal beliefs in the Israeli school textbooks. Finally, implications of the presented framework for peaceful conflict resolution are discussed.

This paper aims to explore if and how changes in social representations of conflict are designed and constructed in the formal political discourse.

Taking a psycho‐sociological approach and by relying on discourse analysis, it explores the discursive patterns used by the political leadership in order to legitimize either war or peace actions. Through the analysis of speeches that were given by Israeli prime ministers in the Knesset and in the context of warfare or peace processes, the paper traces changes in the historical narratives that frame Israel's cluster of societal beliefs in regards to the conflict, and further explores how these are being re‐narrated in light of the process of transition to peace.

The paper argues that both warfare and peace processes, representing the extreme options available in conflict, require broad public recruitment and immense rhetorical efforts on behalf of the political leadership to reason and legitimatize actions through the formal political discourse. The findings highlight the ways through which the political leadership in Israel justifies its actions and attempts to enlist public support as a prism to trace how societal beliefs have been narrated for the purpose of justifying warfare, and how the same beliefs are re‐narrated to justify conflict resolution.

The paper strives to shed light on the role played by the interplay between political discourse and societal beliefs in the context of transition to peace, and thus advances understandings of the linkage between internal processes and external circumstances, as mitigated by political discourse, in the context of conflict and conflict resolution.

This study aims to explore intergroup relations between two Jewish religious groups in Israel, namely, ultra-Orthodox and national-religious communities, by using an integrated model that combines two psychosocial concepts: perceptions of collective narratives and identity strategies.

Data were collected from a representative sample of 402 ultra-Orthodox and 388 national-religious Jews living in Israel, of age 18 and over. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to examine group differences in perceiving in-group and out-group collective narratives and in patterns of identity strategies. Further, partial correlations and hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the relative contribution of perceptions of collective narratives and patterns of identity strategies.

Willingness to compete with and to separate from the out-group was related to the tendency to reject its collective narrative while endorsing the in-group one. In the same vein, the opposite pattern was found in the relations between willingness to integrate and unite with the out-group and the perceptions of collective narratives. The results also indicate group differences: the ultra-Orthodox exhibited stronger tendencies to preserve their in-group collective narratives and to reject the out-group, as well as stronger endorsement of identity strategies of competition and separation compared to national-religious.

The results suggest that it might be useful to encourage dialogue between both groups to clarify each side’s narratives and rationale underlying the endorsement of specific identity strategies. Such an open dialogue could help each group understand the other group’s needs and might also reduce their sense of threat as well as anxiety about losing their religious and social uniqueness. One possible opportunity for such dialogue is workplaces in which members of each group can gradually uncover stereotypes, enhancing reconciliation and willingness to accept the “other’s” collective narrative and choose to adhere more to the similar than dissimilar characteristics.

This is the first study, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to examine collective narratives and identity strategies as powerful indicators of intergroup relations between two minority groups of the same religion. Within such a unique context, the power struggle exists and the separation and competition strategies are apparent, but the main conflictual issue is related to similarities and discrepancies of religious ideologies, values, norms and worldviews that shape one’s daily life and his/her encounter with the similar but different “other”.

The socializing of hate and its saturation on platforms as a resonant and emotional connection online reveal the networked nature of convergent platforms which pump hate as a mechanism of connection and fracture in society in the post-digital age. The violence of hate and negative sentiments online morph to appropriate a multitude of manifestations from cyberbullying and revenge porn to trolling and memes as subversive, denigrative humour. Social media, designed through an architecture for sharing and transaction, distributes hate as a popular sentiment, building connections with disparate communities through the articulation of hate for fellow humans and humanity at large. Trauma induced through hatred and bullying as an active aspect of social media platforms and interactivity distribute sentiments through its excess and disproportionality. This chapter interrogates the sentiment of hate and its workings on social media as a technology of trauma in distributing hate as a form of communion.

Conflict understandings of lay people mirror society in miniature. Although lay people and their conflict understandings in society may shape the course of an ongoing conflict, little scholarly attention is so far given to the understandings of everyday discourse in Turkey’s ongoing Kurdish conflict. The present research aims to examine the views of lay Kurds and Turks in two politically polarized cities in Turkey, Mersin and Diyarbakır.

To examine these views, the authors used focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires with a total of 64 lay people from Mersin and Diyarbakır.

Qualitative content analysis revealed more conflict understandings than presented in the existing academic literature. Furthermore, multiple correspondence analysis suggested that both ethnic identity and the city in which people live are important factors influencing how people perceive the conflict.

The meaning of novel themes, differences and similarities within and between ethnic groups and two cities, and the usefulness of qualitative methods to examine lay people’s viewpoints are discussed.

This chapter theorizes, and provides field-based illustrations, about new ways to foster intergroup collaboration beginning first with intragroup conflict engagement. While the author has been experimenting with these ideas and practices for many years, this chapter represents still early efforts to lay out an agenda for systematic research and experimentation.

I hypothesize that by successfully engaging internal conflicts about outgroups within ingroups, sides may separately become more willing and able to successfully and interactively solve shared problems and achieve superordinate goals between them. History is filled with attempts at cooperation between antagonistic groups – whether through negotiated agreement, functional cooperation, promoting positive contact and attitudes, and so forth – that have led instead to worsening attitudes and renewed confrontation. Even when polarized groups decide to cooperate to achieve superordinate goals (Sherif, 1966) they are often unable to make this leap from conflict to collaboration. I posit that this may be in part because inadequate attention is paid first to intragroup conflict dynamics vis-à-vis outgroups.

Based on their size, disposable income, and purchasing power, generation Y (Gen Y) consumers are viewed as the Holy Grail for marketers. Conversely, some of this group's behavior disturbs public policy officials, particularly when dealing with issues such as poor financial planning, bulimia and anorexia nervosa. The key question for both marketers and policy makers is what is the best way to understand the Gen Y segment? The vanity concept is used in this study as a way to understand the Gen Y consumer segment. The purpose of this paper is to examine vanity perceptions (cross‐nationally and by gender) as well as social and business implications with vanity.

Key research expectations are proposed that are related to cross‐cultural and gender differences on vanity perceptions. A sample of approximately 125 Gen Y consumers in two eastern and two western cultures was used to find support for the research expectations. Statistical results are reported.

The results clearly show that both gender and country have an impact on vanity perceptions. Concern for both physical appearance and professional achievement are higher in eastern cultures as compared to western cultures. Both males and females are highly concerned about physical appearance and professional achievements. However, self‐assessment of physical appearance and professional achievement are significantly lower among females as compared to males.

In future studies it would be interesting to study differences among other countries and consumer groups.

The results of this study provide evidence to marketers that vanity appeals can resonate well with Gen Y especially those in China and India. For consumer protection advocates, results offer insights about the extent to which importance of vanity is likely to increase, especially in countries that embrace globalization.

So far, no study has applied the vanity scale to understand the Gen Y segment, despite the financial power of this group in purchasing both desirable and undesirable products; nor has any study examined whether vanity perceptions vary cross‐nationally, especially between economically developed western cultures and developing economies with large populations representing eastern cultures.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a typological framework of approaches to the study of the Rwandan Tutsi genocide, in a comparative perspective. Based on the assertion that no single theoretical approach can account for so complex and totalizing a phenomenon, the paper targets different aspects of causality, drawing from three key publications by contemporary genocide scholars: Vern N. Redekop, Christopher Taylor and Mahmood Mamdani. It argues for their significant complementary contribution to a better understanding of the last genocide of the twentieth century. By offering different analytical angles, as demonstrated from each perspective, the paper enriches the conceptualisation of genocides in general, and the Rwandan Tutsi genocide in particular.

This paper focuses on the Rwandan Tutsi genocide. Drawing from three key contemporary authors, it identifies and analyses three theoretical approaches in a comparative perspective, namely, the human identity needs approach (Redekop, 2002), the politico-anthropological approach (Taylor, 2000) and the colonialist approach (Mamdani, 2002) which, if unified, would go a long way in providing a clearer picture and a better understanding of Rwandan Tutsi genocide.

Of course this does not mean that the three approaches account for every aspect of the phenomenon under study. It is a work in progress, reflecting the complex nature of genocide and the concomitant need to approach its analysis from different angles and perspectives. The selected authors address different key areas of scientific enquiry from different perspectives that complement each other, leading to a better understanding of the reality under investigation.

The authors learn from these approaches the constructed nature of ethnicity, what Benedict Anderson (1983, p. 211) calls the “imagined communities”. The Rwandese community was imagined by the colonial power, codifying the distinctions on the basis of such ridiculous criteria as cattle ownership and physical measurements, and issuing identity cards accordingly. In the final analysis, the choice of the most appropriate approaches to the study of genocide is a function of multiple factors: cultural, historical, political, anthropological, psychological, ethnographical, each genocide case being contextually different. The combination of the three approaches above seems to go a long way in confronting the complexity of the Rwandan Tutsi genocide.

As the authors have already mentioned, the theoretical approaches are not exhaustive. Yet, they have significant implications in terms of research processes.

Practically, these approaches lead to a deeper and broader understanding of genocide causality.

By tackling research issues from multiple angles, the product captures more elements that enable the shift from the structures of violence towards the structures of blessing.

It is the first time that such a research tool is made available to researchers wishing to deepen the understanding of the Rwandan Tutsi genocide.