This chapter focuses on transforming cross-cultural conflict and misunderstanding into a learning opportunity, using a case study to illustrate an approach that has proven…
Abstract
This chapter focuses on transforming cross-cultural conflict and misunderstanding into a learning opportunity, using a case study to illustrate an approach that has proven effective in tens of thousands of conflicts. This approach surfaces cultural values and approaches to work, toward improving intercultural management practices. It also supports employees to resolve their issues themselves, toward more sustainable solutions.
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Alvaro Sandroni and Farhad Aspy Fatakia
Three months into his first job as an IT consultant, newly minted MBA Phil Lee was wondering whether he had made a horrible mistake. Initially, he had been thrilled with his…
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Three months into his first job as an IT consultant, newly minted MBA Phil Lee was wondering whether he had made a horrible mistake. Initially, he had been thrilled with his employer, Orion Information Technology Consulting, and the prospects for his professional future. He had specifically requested to work on projects in emerging markets, and his bosses had responded by flying him halfway around the world to New Delhi to meet with the head of procurement of a luxury property developer, Kirat Housing Development Society (KHDS). Lee thought the reason for the meeting was slightly unusual: Orion was planning to make a bid to supply building management software for KHDS's newest luxury tower, and this meeting would be the “pre-bid” negotiation. Lee wasn't totally sure what they'd even be discussing, as the tender already provided full details on exactly what modules would be required and even included specific penalty clauses for delays.
The meeting at KHDS seemed ordinary at first, but quickly took a turn when the assistant to the head of procurement explained that Orion would win the bid if it offered him a $200,000 contract as an “independent consultant.” Lee was stunned. To make matters worse, when he returned to his hotel room he found a gift waiting for him: an expensive-looking diamond pendant.
On his sleepless flight home, Lee's mind raced. Had his bosses known this would happen? Were bribes standard operating procedure? Now that he'd accepted a gift, was he complicit in wrongdoing? Lee didn't want to get fired, but he wasn't sure he could go along with this.
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Benny Barak, Anil Mathur, Yong Zhang, Keun Lee and Emmanuel Erondu
Field survey studies undertaken in Nigeria, Korea, China and India explored the way inner‐age satisfaction is experienced in those culturally diverse societies. Chronologically 20…
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Field survey studies undertaken in Nigeria, Korea, China and India explored the way inner‐age satisfaction is experienced in those culturally diverse societies. Chronologically 20 to 59 year old respondents’ inner‐age satisfaction was gauged as the average difference between feel, look, do, and interest cognitive (self‐perceived) and desired (ideal) inner‐age dimensions. Analyses of covariance (with chronological age factored out) across the four nations showed Nigeria to differ significantly in terms of inner‐age satisfaction from each Asian population, contrary to the Asian societies where no differences were found across samples (except between Korea and India where inner‐age satisfaction differed at a p .05). High levels of satisfaction with inner‐age (coming about when cognitive and desired ages are equal) commonly transpired: 31.4 per cent of Indian, 36.9 per cent of Nigerian, 44.3 per cent of Chinese, and 44.9 per cent of Korean respondents. Age dissatisfaction in an elder direction (ideal age older than self‐perceived age) was atypical and happened most often among Nigerian (23.4 per cent) and least among Korean subjects (10.7 per cent). In contrast, wishing for a younger innerage was a commonplace phenomenon in India (50.6 per cent of the sample), as well as in China where it occurred the least (36.6 per cent). The study’s findings imply the universal nature of the way human beings (irrespective of culture) perceive and feel about inner‐age, as well as the potential of an inner‐age satisfaction psychographic as a relevant consumer behavior segmentation trait for marketing planners of age‐sensitive products and services who seek to standardize their global branding and distribution.
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Janice Huber, M. Shaun Murphy and D. Jean Clandinin
As we gradually awakened to Loyla's, Ji-Sook's, and Brent's familial curriculum making, described in earlier chapters, we grew increasingly aware of tensions shaped by their…
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As we gradually awakened to Loyla's, Ji-Sook's, and Brent's familial curriculum making, described in earlier chapters, we grew increasingly aware of tensions shaped by their experiences in their familial and school curriculum making. Our earlier chapters show something of these tensions. In this chapter we return to a focus on tensions by exploring the tensions embodied by Loyla, Brent, and Ji-Sook as they lived in these two curriculum-making places. As we inquire into the children's embodied tensions, we do so with a sense of wanting to restory the potential of tensions on school landscapes and in composing lives. We also want to show something of ways in which attention to children's embodied tensions makes visible the gaps and silences they experienced in living in these two curriculum-making places.
The glitter of techtransfer agreements often tends to be a camouflage and the number of trainees is no substitute for genuine techtransfer: the self‐sustained duplication of…
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The glitter of techtransfer agreements often tends to be a camouflage and the number of trainees is no substitute for genuine techtransfer: the self‐sustained duplication of foreign technology. We study techtransfer in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore to develop the ethos of successful IT techtransfer. (1) Taiwan: In 1976 a US technology company, RCA, transferred CMOS technology which is foundational to semiconductors, not to a private company in Taiwan, but a public government agency. RCA could not trust Taiwan to honor Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) because of its piracy image. At home, RCA was accustomed to America's respect of its public institutions to do the honorable thing. So, RCA opted for a private‐to‐public techtransfer. Even after 16 years, another private company would not trust Taiwan private sector; General Physics of Columbia, Maryland, would transfer nuclear reactor simulation technology not to a private company, but to a government support organization, Institute for Information Industry. (2) South Korea: In the mid‐60s, US firms (Motorola, Signetics, Fairchild) began to assemble chips, followed by Japanese firms and 27 Japanese‐Korean Joint ventures (Samsung‐Sanyo; Crown Radio; Toshiba and Goldstar‐Alps Electronics). In 1975, Samsung acquired the only locally‐owned chip company (Korea Semiconductor) which manu‐factured CMOS chips for watches. (We recall that Taiwan imported CMOS technology from RCA in 1976). During 1983–84 Samsung ac‐quired DRAM technology and the ethnic Korean and Chinese employees succeeded in producing 64 and 256 k‐bit chips. CEO Lee took significant risks, time and again, to let Samsung join the race to design and manufacture successive generations of semiconductor technology. Much of the cumulative US$800 million investment in semiconductors was recouped in 1987 with the market upturn, and higher prices for 256 k‐bit chips. From 1989 onwards, Samsung pushed ahead to achieve design leadership by aggressively involving engineers in all phases of technology transfer and application, as well as by forging new joint ventures with foreign industry leaders which gave Samsung a more dominant role. 3. Singapore: Contrary to the leapfrogging advanced in the litera‐ture since 1982, suggesting that NICs leap over technology generations, Singapore electronics industry supports a model of incremental learning under which TNCs [Trans‐National Corporations] transferred technology gradually. Much of the advance was in pre‐electronic activities such as mechanical, electro‐mechanical and precision engineering, rather than in software or R&D, as would be expected under leapfrogging. As the subsidiaries advanced technologically, they formed forward links with customers, and backward links with local suppliers of capital goods. The government built up the appropriate infrastructure. We develop three Desiderata (desired conditions) for techtransfer: (1) A Pre‐determined Sequence of Technology by Type and Level, (2) A Pre‐determined Sequence of Intellectual Property Rights Protection, and (3) A Pre‐determined Sequence of Upgrading of Transferee's Technical Skills. Why should the transferor engage in any techtransfer? Because leading US corporations use only about 5 percent of their process inventions (Rank 100, 99,…,96) to improve/invent products. To protect the market of these five products, process inventions with Ranks 95, 94,…, 1 have to be denied to competition; they have to be literally locked up. If any NIC is at technology level say, 15, techtransfer of technology level 45 would instantaneously increase the transferee's technology level by (45–15÷15 =) 200% with no risks of R&D, no investment in facilities, no investment in personnel. That transfer would not threaten the transferor's latest products embodying Ranks 100, 99,…, 96. However, it would threaten the transferor's products embodying Rank 45. New technology leadtime is 6–18 months. If the transferee stays out of the main markets of the transferor (e.g. USA, Europe) for that leadtime, the transferee can sell in say, Asia and the Middle East, Africa and Australia. The transferee could offer the transferor two types of revenue: (1) licensing fee which is usually about 1–3% of gross revenue generated from products which could not have been produced without the transferred technology; and (2) 1% of revenue from new markets created by the technology. If the transferee observes the letter and the spirit of techtransfer for six months, a higher level technology, say level 60 could be transferred, instantly raising the transferee's technology level by (60–15÷15 =) 300%. This pre‐determined sequence of techtransfer is a win‐win situation. The transferor receives revenue from what is currently frozen assets; the transferee systematically raises its level of technology by 200%, 300%, etc. without having to risk a single dollar on uncertain R&D.
Kisha Chantelle Krishna and Habibul Haque Khondker
Argues taht the idea of global and national/international categories being inherently opposed, is a fallacy of the globalization debate. Seeks to illustrate how “international”…
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Argues taht the idea of global and national/international categories being inherently opposed, is a fallacy of the globalization debate. Seeks to illustrate how “international” co‐operation can have favourable national consdequences. Explores the implications of international volunteerism for nation‐building in Singapore.
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Tae-Ho Lee, Jung Ung Min and Jung-Soo Park
The main streams of the supply chain are defined as material, information and financial flow. There have been many studies and practical cases regarding the flow of material and…
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The main streams of the supply chain are defined as material, information and financial flow. There have been many studies and practical cases regarding the flow of material and information including information sharing. However, financial flow related studies have not been widely examined relatively, compared with their importance.
The information sharing is recognized as the method that can reduce the Bullwhip effect in supply chain management. The author intends to analyze the impact of financial information sharing on the results of the supply chain.
In the point of supply chain risk management view, the author examined the impact of financial flow among the various factors that can impede the stability of the supply chain.
In this study, the author embodied the simulation regarding the impact of financial information flow on supply chain performance and stability based on the system dynamics methodology and analyzed the performance.
Assuming the supply chain, composed of supplying company, manufacturing company and sales company , the author embodied the simulation model and assumed that working capital and cash information sharing were achieved. The author embodied the model to affect the settlement conditions according to the results of financial information sharing.