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Prior research has argued that management has an advantage in many grievance cases largely because it enjoys the discretion to pursue these cases or otherwise as it chooses. Conversely, organized labor has far less discretion inasmuch as it must pursue serious grievances for which positive outcomes cannot reasonably be expected It was recently demonstrated that grievances “filed in the name of the union” may provide an important exception to this principle. This empirical assessment of arbitration cases (N = 520) extends these arguments from the context of the grievance to that of arbitration, an arguably more valid and generalizable context for such an assessment. The results indicate that “filing in the name of the union” does provide a substantive edge in arbitration outcomes, even while controlling for the various types of arbitration cases.

Prior work has demonstrated that management enjoys a substantive edge in many grievance cases largely as a function of its discretion to pursue or dismiss these cases as it chooses. Conversely, organized labor has far less discretion in as much as it must pursue serious grievances which may be less viable. It is argued here that grievances “filed in the name of the union” may provide an important exception to this principle. This field assessment of format grievances (N = 538) indicates robust differences in the outcomes of grievances between those “filed in the name of the union” and those filed in the more traditional manner. This tendency may provide some countervailing influence for the grievant to the advantages posited for management.

While Dalton and Radtke (2013) examine the effects of Machiavellianism and an organization's ethical environment within a low moral intensity setting, I examine the effects of Machiavellianism and an organization's ethical environment across both low and high moral intensity settings. Using a sample of 192 MTurk workers (i.e., online labor pool participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk) and 127 undergraduate accounting students, the results using the full-sample of participants indicate the following: (1) Machiavellianism is negatively associated with whistle-blowing intentions across both low and high moral intensity scenarios; (2) an organization's ethical environment is positively associated with whistle-blowing intentions across both low and high moral intensity scenarios; and (3) in the low moral intensity scenario (but not the high moral intensity scenario), I find an interaction between Machiavellianism and the strength of the ethical environment. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Research relying on laboratory protocol and case studies has demonstrated positive effects from cognitive conflict and controversy. Reported benefits have included better judgments, improved strategic decisions and a better understanding of others' positions. This study develops and assesses the psychometric properties of an instrument designed to examine decision conflict in field settings. This instrument was administered on site to 63 managers. Factors identified in the instrument were disagreement, openness, and control. Interestingly, the openness dimension was positively associated with job commitment. The control factor was inversely associated with job satisfaction.

Recently, there has been an increase in the number and type of studies in the organizational sciences that examine curvilinear relationships. These studies are important because some relationships have context-specific inflection points that alter their magnitude and/or direction. Although some scholars have utilized basic techniques to make meta-analytic inferences about curvilinear effects with the limited information available about them, there is still a tremendous opportunity to advance our knowledge by utilizing rigorous techniques to meta-analytically examine curvilinear effects. In a recent study, we used a novel meta-analytic approach in an effort to comprehensively examine curvilinear relationships between destructive leadership and followers' workplace outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an actionable guide for conducting curvilinear meta-analyses by describing the meta-analytic techniques we used in our recent study. Our contributions include a detailed guide for conducting curvilinear meta-analyses, the useful context we provide to facilitate its implementation, and our identification of opportunities for scholars to leverage our technique in future studies to generate nuanced knowledge that can advance their fields.

This paper aims to provide a twofold empirical comparison: first, a comparison between the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs proxies and firm performance measures, and second, this comparison was used before and after the 2008 financial crisis, capturing two different economic states.

Panel regression methods were applied to two data sets of non-financial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005-2011.

The results provide evidence that not all mechanisms lead to lower agency conflicts and/or higher firm performance. Ownership identity has a significant impact and the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes in the economic conditions surrounding the firm.

The results lend support to the notion that forcing a certain code of practice on firms to follow could compel them to move away from conflict reduction governance structures.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparison of empirical evidence for the impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance by using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms. This comparison challenges the prior studies that use performance as an indirect proxy for lower agency costs. Additionally, it compares the impact of the governance mechanisms during two different economic conditions.

We thank Carpenter and Dalton and Dalton for their insights on our earlier chapter, and on the promise (and perils) of upper-echelons research in general. We set out to closely examine the levels issues in Hambrick and Mason's ((1984). Academy of Management Review, 9, 193–206.) original upper-echelons model, and the research initiatives that have applied this theoretical framework. We are encouraged by the initial reception that we have received from these authors. We continue to believe that top management teams (TMTs) are an important level of analysis for strategic leadership research, though the original upper-echelons model proposed by Hambrick and Mason cannot be directly applied at the team level. Our reply highlights several joint and individual concerns raised by the articles. We close by reiterating our call for continued analysis of the upper-echelons model.

Managing conflicts between employees and supervisors is a critical issue in maintaining productive labor‐management relations. This study uses the theory of cooperation and competition to specify the nature of the relationship and the flexible strategies that facilitate mutually beneficial solutions to employee complaints. Results based on interviews of supervisors and union employees in a remote site in British Columbia support the hypotheses that cooperative, compared to competitive and independent, goals promote open‐minded discussions of complaints that result in efficient resolutions which benefit both supervisors and employees. Results suggested that developing cooperative goals and open‐minded negotiation skills can help supervisors and employees to create integrative solutions to shopfloor conflicts.

The effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is not clear. By integrating resource dependence and agency theories, this paper aims to focus on how prestigious CEOs affect firm performance and how informal relations between the CEO and outside directors affect agency costs and resource benefits associated with prestigious CEOs.

The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze their data set, which is conducted by a sample of 4,226 Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2013. The authors also use OLS regression to assess the sensitivity and robustness of their findings.

The findings indicate that prestigious CEOs are significantly and positively associated with firm performance. Moreover, the authors find the effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is more pronounced when prestigious outside directors interact with prestigious CEOs. Guanxi – a Chinese concept similar to camaraderie – attenuates this association, particularly when the CEO and outside directors share the same surname.

Future research should consider whether there is a mediating link between prestigious affiliates (i.e. CEOs) and firm performance.

This paper provides two practical implications. First, China Securities Regulatory Commission policymakers should pay more attention to outside directors’ quality and ability and their informal guanxi with the CEO. Second, prestigious CEOs may also have potential costs.

This study contributes to corporate governance literature and CEO-board relations literature by shedding light on how resource dependence and agency theories apply to corporate governance.