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The purpose of this paper is to propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis.

The authors propose a set of five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed.

The authors find that the current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – is inadequate and not credible, and that their proposed framework would constitute a credible balancing of costs and benefits.

Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision.

This framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.

Puts the decline of the euro’s value following its introduction down to rapid US economic growth and the expansionary policies of the European Central Bank. Contrasts popular UK opposition to joining the euro with business pressure to do so, and suggests that the five stated conditions for entry have almost been met. Looks at economic conditions in other European countries and compares growth rates, unemployment, inflation and capital movements in the UK, USA and the eurozone. Outlines some views on the likely future of the euro and its effects on other currencies; and concludes that the macroeconomy of the eurozone “will bear continued watching”.

The banking industry has adopted an approach to managing financial risk based on economic capital, the amount of capital necessary to achieve a specified level of protection against financial ruin. In the New Basel Capital Accord, regulators have recently proposed capital regulation to reduce operational risk. In this article, the author challenges the rationale for employing a capital charge to mitigate operational risk.

How can laboratory experiments help us understand banking crises, including the usefulness of various policy responses? After giving a concise introduction to the field of experimental economics more generally, the author attempts to provide answers. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

The author discusses methodology and surveys relevant work.

History is often too complicated to be meaningfully revamped or modified in the lab, for purposes of insight-by-analogy. But as people argue about how to understand financial history, they bring ideas to the table. It is possible and useful to test the empirical relevance of these ideas in lab experiments.

The paper pioneers broad discussion of how lab experiments may shed light on banking crises.

We find evidence that the runs on banks and trust companies in the Panic of 1907 were linked to the Bank of England’s contractionary monetary policy actions taken in 1906 and 1907 through the medium of copper prices. Results from our vector autoregressive models and copper stockpile data support our argument that a copper commodity price channel may have been active in transmitting the Bank’s policy to the New York markets. Archival evidence suggests that the plunge in copper prices may have partially triggered both the initiation and the failure of an attempt to corner the shares of United Copper, and in turn, the bank and trust company runs related to that transaction’s failure. We suggest that the substantial short-term uncertainties accompanying the development of the copper-intensive electrical and telecommunications industries likely played a role in the plunge in copper prices. Additionally, we find evidence that the copper price transmission mechanism was also likely active in five other countries that year. While we do not argue that copper caused the 1907 crisis, we suggest that it was an active policy transmission channel amplifying the classic effect that was already spreading through the money market channel. If the bust in copper prices partially triggered the 1907 panic, then it provides additional evidence that contractionary monetary policy may have had an unintended, adverse consequence of contributing to a bank panic and, therefore, supports other recent findings that monetary policy deliberations might benefit from considering the policy impact on asset prices.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the key regulatory, market, and political failures that led to the 2008‐2009 US financial crisis and to suggest appropriate recommendations for reform.

The approach is to examine the underlying incentives that led to the crisis and to provide supporting data to support the hypotheses.

While Congress was fixing the savings and loan crisis, it failed to give the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac normal bank supervisory power. This was a political failure as Congress was using government sponsored enterprise (GSE) resources and the resources of narrow constituencies for their own advantage at the expense of the public interest. Second, in the mid‐1990s, to encourage home ownership, the Administration changed enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, effectively requiring banks to use flexible and innovative methods to lower bank mortgage standards to underserved areas. Crucially, this disarmed regulators and the risky mortgage standards then spread to other sectors of the market. Market failure problems ensued as banks, mortgage brokers, securitizers, credit rating agencies, and asset managers were all plagued by problems such as moral hazard or conflicts of interest.

The paper focuses on the political economy reasons for why Congress and US administrations provided these perverse incentives to the GSEs and banks to lower mortgage standards. It also proposes some innovative methods of improving bank regulation that address the regulatory capture problem.

I trace and explain how the ratcheting of corporate mergers and deregulation transformed the structure of elite relations in the United States from 1960 to 2010. Prior to the 1970s there was a high degree of elite unity and consensus, enforced by Federal regulation and molded by structure of U.S. government, around a set of policies and practices: interventionism abroad, progressive tax rates, heavy state investment in infrastructure and education, and a rising level of social spending. I find that economic decline, the loss of geopolitical hegemony, and mobilization from the left and right are unable to account for the specific policies that both Democratic and Republican Administrations furthered since the 1970s or for the uneven decline in state capacity that were intended and unintended consequences of the post-1960s political realignment and policy changes. Instead, the realignment and restructuring of elites and classes that first transformed politics and degraded government in the 1970s in turn made possible further shifts in the capacities of American political actors in both the state and civil society. I explain how that process operated and how it produced specific policy outcomes and created new limits on mass political mobilization while creating opportunities for autarkic elites to appropriate state powers and resources for themselves.

Having been hailed as the most important contribution to stabilising the US financial system after the 1929—33 crash, deposit insurance is now being blamed for financial destabilisation, particularly in emerging markets. This paper focuses on the relationship between deposit insurance and systemic stability in the banking system, drawing on recent experience in the USA, Europe and Japan. The conclusion is that if there is an embedded perception that in the last resort depositors will be protected beyond insurance limits then market‐orientated solution to the problems of ‘moral hazard’ and excessive risk taking cannot work.