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Audit negotiations are impacted by many factors. This study aims to investigate how two such factors, communication of the National Office Accounting Consultation Unit (ACU) and the auditor’s approach, affect chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) willingness to adjust the financial statements and satisfaction with the auditor.

This study uses a 2 × 3 between-subjects experimental design. Participants are 169 highly experienced CFOs and financial officers. The experimental design crosses the two multi-dimensional auditor approaches found in the literature with two influence tactics used to communicate ACU involvement, as well as a control condition, with no communication of the ACU involvement.

Communicating the ACU’s involvement as a higher authority (similar to a boss) results in greater willingness to record an adjustment to the financial statements when auditors use a hands-off “compliance-officer” auditor approach, but lower willingness by CFOs to adjust the financial statements when auditors use an expert-advisor auditor approach as compared to when coalition tactics are used. Results also show that communicating the ACU as a higher authority negatively impacts a CFO’s satisfaction with the audit partner. Overall, these results highlight the importance of the auditor’s approach and communication of ACU involvement within the auditor–client relationship. The outcomes of this study are limited to situations where unexpected audit adjustments are found during the year-end process and thus cannot be discussed pre-emptively with clients.

This paper advances the understanding of how the multi-dimensional auditor’s approach can shape and limit the effectiveness of influence tactics. These factors are important, as auditors are tasked with maintaining not only quality audits but also client relationships. However, although rich in detail, factors other than auditor approach may have inadvertently been manipulated and are driving results.

The approach taken by the auditor with a client throughout the audit sets the stage during the auditor–client negotiations. Therefore, audit partners must consider their own approach with the client before communicating the ACU’s involvement as the auditor approach shapes and limits the tactics available for use. Using ill-suited tactics may undermine the client’s willingness to record an adjustment to the financial statements and cause undue harm to the auditor–client relationship.

This paper uses highly experienced CFOs and financial officers to examine how two common elements in the audit negotiation context can significantly affect the outcome to the financial statements and the relationship between the client and audit partner.

The purpose of this paper is to further the understanding of the determinants of audit report lag, which is the number of days from a company’s fiscal year-end to the date of its auditor’s report, by synthesizing extant literature. Audit report lag has been a variable of interest in many studies due to its use as a proxy for the occurrence of auditor-client management negotiations and audit efficiency and because long audit report lags delay the release of earnings information to the market.

The author uses meta-analysis to examine commonly identified predictors of audit report lag to determine if the prior research provides a consistent portrayal of audit report lag drivers.

The author finds that a number of variables relating to client profitability and financial condition, client complexity and audit opinion modifications increase audit report lag. In addition, audit report lag decreases with client size, when clients have positive earnings news to report and when the auditor has long tenure and provides non-audit services. Several variables, such as those relating to corporate governance and various auditor characteristics, have been little explored and would benefit from future research.

These results will be useful to researchers when selecting control variables for future audit report lag studies and provide insights into the key factors that contribute to the delay in audit reporting.