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This study aims to examine the effect on audit efficiency of outsourced internal audit function (IAF) providers with industry and/or firm-specific expertise. Drawing on relevant studies from external and internal audit literature, the authors assume that such IAF providers are associated with greater audit efficiency as proxied by audit report lag and audit fees.

Based on a sample of firms listed on the Omani capital market during 2005–2019, the pooled regressions are used to test the developed hypotheses. The authors use the market share approach to identify outsourced IAF industry expertise providers and tenure to measure the firm-specific expertise of outsourced IAF providers.

The authors find that industry outsourced IAF providers are not associated with shorter audit report lag and lower audit fees. The authors also find that firm-specific expertise outsourced IAF providers are associated with a greater reduction in audit report lag and audit fees. These conclusions are robust under a battery of analyses. The significant contribution of firm-specific expertise outsourced IAF providers to audit efficiency is incremental when abnormal audit report lag and audit fees analysis is conducted.

The results are the first to attest to the contribution of outsourced IAF with firm-specific expertise. They also show that industry expertise held by outsourced IAF providers does not contribute to audit efficiency.

Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the costs to audit firms in terms of lost revenues of losing small clients due to auditor switching or client bankruptcy after issuing first-time going concern modified opinions.

A population of small Swedish companies receiving first-time going concern modified opinions in 2009 was examined to determine the effects two years later compared with a matched sample of financially stressed companies that had not received going concern modified opinions.

The results indicate that both auditor switching and client bankruptcy are positively related to receipt of going concern modified opinions. Furthermore, the authors find empirical evidence that auditors issuing first-time going concern modified opinions lose proportionately more fees through auditor switching and client bankruptcy than do auditors not issuing such opinions to financially stressed clients. Finally, the authors found that the going concern modified opinions issued by Big 4 firms are no more harmful to clients than are those issued by other audit firms.

The authors recognize a limitation of this study regarding the choice of control companies. Although the authors attempted to find similarly sized and similarly financially stressed companies from the same industries as those companies in the test group, the authors may have missed other variables relevant to auditor switching or client bankruptcy.

A practical implication for the audit profession is the increased awareness of the fact that the financial dependence issues reported in this study extend to auditors with small client companies.

This is the first study to examine fees lost due to auditor switching and client bankruptcy caused by going concern modified opinions in a population of small companies. It contributes to the mixed evidence presented in previous research as to the extent to which going concern modified audit opinions are self-fulfilling prophecies.