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The purpose of this paper is to explain how family firm ownership and management control affect corporate capital structure strategy after controlling for other significant variables. The authors argue that, although family ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s leverage, family control through the CEO position and equity performance moderate its impact.

Using a stratified random sample of 200 US public firms in the S & P Small-Cap 600 index from 1999 to 2007, this study uses random effect panel regressions to test the impact of family ownership on market value and book value debt ratios and the moderating effects of family control and equity performance after controlling for firm, industry, and macroeconomic variables.

The initial panel regression suggests that family ownership is not related to debt ratios. However, further examination with controls for family CEO and equity performance shows that family ownership is positively related to market and book value debt ratios, but its effect is offset by family control through the CEO position and equity performance.

This study’s methodology can be extended to examine how family firm governance factors affect other firm behaviors such as investment, risk management, and CEO compensation.

Practitioners should consider family ownership and management control factors when establishing financing strategy. The Small Business Administration and other government agencies should make similar considerations when setting policies.

This paper separates ownership and management control factors to explain why family firms use more or less leverage. This study, thus, reconciles the mixed results of prior studies, which do not differentiate between these two governance factors.

In family business studies, inconsistent findings exist regarding the relationship between family involvement and firm innovation. The purpose of this paper is to understand the heterogeneity of family firm innovation.

The authors draw on governance literature and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective to examine how the extent of family governance and the type of SEW objectives jointly influence innovation strategies in family firms.

The authors develop a typology of family firm innovation strategies, positing that the family firm’s risk orientation, innovation goal, and knowledge diversity vary depending on the degree of family involvement in governance and the type of SEW objective. The authors propose that four family firm innovation strategies (e.g. Limited Innovators, Intended Innovators, Potential Innovators, and Active Innovators) emerge when family involvement in the dominant coalition (high or low) is contrasted with the SEW objective (restricted or extended) pursued by the family.

Understanding how governance and SEW goals work together to influence the firm’s innovation strategies is potentially valuable for managers of family firms. The authors offer practical suggestions for how to strategically reposition the firm to pursue innovation strategies more in line with those of the Active Innovator.

This study contributes to the family business literature by using a multi-dimensional approach to examine family firm heterogeneity. In addition, by articulating various family firm innovation strategies, the authors offer insight into the previously inconsistent findings concerning firm innovation behavior and outcomes in family business studies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how founders of family-controlled Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) under bounded rationality implement internal governance mechanisms that may affect the long-term performance once the founder retires. These actions create a hurdle for successors to follow the founder’s success.

The authors collected data on secondary sources of 36 family and 22 professionally managed REITs from 1999 to 2012 that resulted in an unbalanced panel data of 726 REIT-year observations. The authors use a series of multi-variate analyses to test the hypotheses.

The findings confirm that founders of family-controlled REITs focus more on developing internal governance mechanisms to satisfy their personal goals. Long-term performance is negatively affected once the successor takes over especially when the successor is a family member.

The authors have data limitations about family involvement. The authors suggest future avenues of investigation such as combining perceptual with archival data.

The authors expect that REIT managers and families can use the findings to develop viable and sustainable governance practices. Especially, being a publicly traded REIT implies to conform to the market expectations so there is a need to balance socio emotional wealth preservation with financial goals.

The authors frame the paper on transaction cost economics and contribute to the literature by stating that the dominance of founders of family-controlled REITs are more aligned to keep the business under family control once the founder retires.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the tax aggressiveness among family firms considering their different levels of family involvement. Based on the family influence on power, experience, and culture approach proposed by Astrachan et al. (2002), this study examines to what extent the heterogeneity among family firms generates distinctive (and unique resource) combinations of family involvement that explain different levels of tax aggressiveness.

A sample of 282 small and medium-sized family enterprises and a structural equation modeling approach have been used to study simultaneously the effects of family influence through the power, experience, and culture dimensions of tax aggressiveness in family firms.

The family influences the business’ tax aggressiveness in different ways. As such, the greater the family experience, by the incorporation of second and subsequent generations, the greater the tax aggressiveness; in contrast, greater family power in terms of firm ownership and management negatively affects tax aggressiveness. Additionally, greater alignment of the family and business culture does not exert a significant effect on tax behaviors of family firms.

Tax aggressiveness is a complex activity that should be managed from a global point of view in family firms. Managers should compensate for the negative influence of family governance on tax aggressiveness with the positive effect of the family generations in order to obtain proper and balanced tax management that contributes to the sustainability of family firms.

This study contributes to the understanding of tax behavior heterogeneities among family firms by going further than most research (usually based mainly on comparative ownership aspects between large, publicly quoted family and non-family firms), considering some other more representative factors of family small and medium-sized enterprises, where the influence of characteristics of family management, family generation, and family values can be the main determinants of the firm taxation policies.

The political behavior of founders, families and their firms in the form of campaign contributions has not been explored by family business scholars. Yet partisan and ideological campaign contributions raise a range of governance issues and hold implications for myriad stakeholders, including investors, employees, customers and the public. The purpose of this paper compares and contrasts the campaign contributions of founder- and family-controlled firms relative to managerially governed firms and develops theoretical explanations for observed differences.

This paper develops a “principal owner” hypothesis based upon a typology of firm ownership characteristics (founder/family control or not; publicly traded or privately held). This hypothesis is tested by multivariate empirical analyses of the campaign contributions of 251 firms across 14 industries with four types of ownership structures.

Founder- and family-controlled firms are more partisan and ideological relative to other firms in their industry and this finding is consistent across industries. Founders and family members influence political behavior, including in publicly traded firms.

Given potential controversies raised by ideological and partisan campaign contributions and the unpredictable returns on political investment, it behooves founders and their family members to assess the impact of their political behavior on the business and on key stakeholders.

This paper is the first to raise governance issues related to founders’ and families’ political spending and develops original insights into the ideological and political behavior of these businesses.