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This paper aims to show that market power exists in financial markets and analyze how spoofing is used by a high-frequency trader to build market power by taking advantage of both behavioral weaknesses of individual investors and microstructural loopholes of trading venues.

After showing that market power exists in the financial market, this paper centers around the question of how market power is constructed in the financial market. To sharpen the answer to the question, the paper compares the conditions needed for market power construction in the financial market with those needed in the goods market. The paper selects spoofing, the frequently used order-based tactic in high-frequency trading strategies, to analyze in detail how spoof orders can ignite herding with market power building as the essence. The Flash Crash that occurred in the New York Stock Exchange on May 6, 2010 provides an excellent case of market power construction exhibited in spoofing.

The behavioral mechanism of market power construction in the case of spoofing is perception alignment. It becomes effective when two necessary conditions are met: the spoof trader takes advantage of the incomplete order display set up by the exchange; and the behavioral weaknesses exhibited by numerous individual investors. In addition to these key conditions, this paper finds other ones for market power to be created in the financial market. They are easier, quicker, more secret, more flexible and less risky relative to the conditions for market power building in the goods market.

The detailed analysis points to the behavioral mechanism, i.e. perception alignment, and microstructural mechanism, i.e. incomplete order display, that could be responsive to regulation.

The originality of the findings is to uncover the mechanism of spoofing in taking advantage of behavioral biases of individual investors. The value is to gain more complete understanding of the essence of herding caused by spoofing.

By modelling China’s property price changes and their effect on GDP, this study aims to develop a more general model of the costs and benefits driving price bubbles.

The authors develop a five-sector dynamic model (using data from China and seven other comparator jurisdictions), resulting in a bubble risk factor. The authors then correlate this risk factor with changes in property prices and resulting changes in GDP.

The authors find that economic structures (the way GDP, property prices and other variables change relative to each other) can change during/after a financial crisis. The authors also find that price disequilibria can help predict the risk of a property price fall – which thus reverberates into GDP change.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no dynamic models of price bubbles exist (though many exist of financial bubbles). The authors provide both theoretical novelties (such as providing a model of risk using non-linear differential equations) and practical ones (showing when we can expect Chinese GDP to fall).

The purpose of this paper is to understand why managers, internal auditors and compliance staff (in financial firms specifically and using Malaysia as a concrete example) can want to ignore compliance-related legislation (a law on anticompetitive behaviour in this case).

The authors review, discuss and critique the literature on compliance and institutions in the light of existing data from Malaysia’s financial industry (literally confronting theory with data).

Legislative design can actually encourage managers and their auditors disobey/ignore the law for reasons which previous theories cannot explain.

This research does not use the regression techniques in vogue now. The findings, nevertheless, imply that attempts to explain phenomenon in management auditing should start with the laws governing managerial activity.

Auditors may use the methods used in this study to assess the extent to which financial services firms’ managers have incentives to comply with laws. Similarly, this research can quantify the extent to which internal auditors in these firms have incentives to find untoward conduct.

Poorly designed laws affecting managerial auditing derive from pre-existing social relationships, as well as help shape them (as shown using data). Identifying areas of non-compliance may actually signal deeper problems in the way businessmen and lawmakers make and enforce laws requiring compliance and self-assessment.

The authors know of no study looking at the economic incentives driving internal auditors’ behaviour – particularly in the area of antitrust. They show how law shapes management and auditors’ incentives, quantify these incentives and show how/why previous research fails to explain these incentives.

This paper aims to derive the conditions under which a financial services firm will want to hire a compliance services company and show how much money they should spend.

This paper uses a mathematical model to show the intuition behind many of the compliance decisions that cost financial services firms billions every year.

This paper finds that hiring compliance firms may save banks and brokerages money. However, their advice may lead to an embarrass de riches – whereby the lower compliance costs and higher profit advantages they confer may lead to more regulation. Regulators may furthermore tighten regulation – with the expectation that financial service firms will adapt somehow. This paper presents a fresh perspective on the Menon hypothesis, deriving conditions under which financial regulations help the competitiveness of an international financial centre.

The paper represents one of the first and only models of compliance spending by financial services firms.

This paper provides five potential policy responses for dealing with ever ratcheting financial regulations.

The paper hopefully launches literature on the compliance service industry – and the buy-or-do decision to engage in financial services compliance. This paper finds that efficient compliance can hurt firms, by encouraging regulation. This paper shows how firms can forestall the extra regulation that comes with easier internet and computerised monitoring.

The authors aim to look at the conditions under which central bank easing – and specifically the purchase of private sector securities – can/should contribute to growth, rather than fiscal policy and also ask when can the central bank’s purchase of private sector securities help supplant traditional monetary policy.

After surveying the existing literature, the authors use simple correlation of central bank private asset (stocks, bonds, etc.), interest rates, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation and the extent of the functioning of domestic banking sectors (among others) to classify countries in which these purchases promote pro-growth investment.

Under the typical conditions for unconventional monetary policy, central bank purchases of private companies’ securities can promote growth in some places (like Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Georgia and Greece at the time of our writing) while hurting it in others (like in parts of Latin America and Africa in the mid-2010s). The authors find how such purchases effectively “bypass” dysfunctional banking systems and central/government local bodies fiscal spending, making the central bank the “funder of last resort” in many middle and lower income countries.

This paper tells specific central banks to ramp up – or reduce – their purchases of private sector securities. The authors identify exact jurisdictions where such “helicopter money” has led to investment in the past economic growth.

All previous work on conventional and unconventional monetary policy has looked at the way monetary policy affects investment and growth through the banking system and holding companies’ reactions constant. The authors do the opposite – looking at how companies respond, holding banking system responses constant. No one has ever looked at these private purchases (taken from a special IMF database), much less tried to argue that central banks can sometimes target investment growth much better than fiscal policy. No one has ever considered them as a funder (rather than lender) of last resort.

Principal‐agent problems are largely responsible for poor corporate governance. Much work on private sector corporate governance reform seeks to address transparency, accountability and responsiveness to stakeholder interests under the new category of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Yet, these issues are not new. The public sector has been working on these issues for many years – especially in looking at ways of reducing malfeasance and also optimizing use of resources for the benefit of principals. Some lessons from public sector reform include promoting information dissemination, participation, and balancing powers between a corporation’s executive and supervisory entities. While firms should not necessarily be administered like governmental bodies, there are many lessons from public sector organizational reform and institutional governance that may be applicable to large‐scale public corporations.

Macedonian municipalities should pass anti‐corruption ordinances in order to reduce corruption. The purpose of this paper is to review the legal issues involved in drafting such ordinances and provide legal advisors to local councils with the legal and economic analysis needed to tackle some of the more difficult and detailed questions.

The most important issue revolves around the creation of a model ordinance which Macedonian municipalities (or the Association of Units of Local Self‐Government of the Republic of Macedonia) could adopt in order to set‐up and run municipal‐level anti‐corruption agencies. The location of such agencies as well as their competencies (to monitor conflicts of interests, oversee asset declarations, and conduct corruption risk‐audits among others) are analysed. The paper also provides legal interpretations of Macedonian legislation and their likely impact on municipal council ordinance design in the area of anti‐corruption – providing the legal basis for positive administrative silence, the splitting of municipal procurement contracts, and (most controversially) qui tam rewards at the municipal level.

A brief regulatory impact analysis of the ordinance shows a gain of €162,900 in social welfare if such a programme were rolled‐out in Macedonia.

The present paper provides some of the legal analysis which previous papers lack.

The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which Hong Kong’s laws deter its companies from engaging in corruption and bribery abroad.

A mix of economics, public administration, management and legal analysis was used to assess weaknesses in Hong Kong’s laws governing the prohibition of bribe payments abroad.

Hong Kong does not explicitly criminalise corporate bribery abroad. Companies – as legal persons – can not be found guilty of corruption. It is argued that Hong Kong’s Legislative Council should amend various laws to modernise Hong Kong’s approach to tackling corruption committed by its companies abroad. The various approaches lawmakers can take towards assigning responsibility for corruption to companies are presented. The approaches that prosecutors at the Department of Justice can take to adopt prosecutorial methods like those used in other upper-income jurisdictions and the ways that Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) can assist in this work are also described.

This research has practical findings for Hong Kong’s policymakers, law firms and companies which operate in Hong Kong. For policymakers, we describe legal changes Hong Kong’s legislators will likely make in the years ahead and the preferred ways of engaging in such change. For law firms, we describe the legal changes coming to Hong Kong which legal advisors will need to advise their clients on. For companies, we describe changes that companies operating in Hong Kong will likely need to comply with in the future.

This paper shows that when Hong Kong adopts best practice in the field of corporate criminalisation, Hong Kong’s role in “exporting” corruption will likely fall.

This article describes a set of legal changes which will change the way Hong Kong treats corruption. The literature tends to glamorise Hong Kong’s anti-corruption work. It is shown that its law falls far behind other jurisdictions, as well as how “treating companies like people” in the case of Hong Kong will likely change the way Hong Kong’s prosecutors think about crime and criminal perpetrators.

The purpose of this paper was to determine to what extent Hong Kong’s experience proves (or disproves) theories from corporate governance in the areas of family ownership, concentration, self-dealing in Hong, executive compensation and other issues. This paper – written in the comparative corporate governance tradition – uses data from Hong Kong to discuss wider trends and issues in the corporate governance literature.

The authors use the comparative corporate governance approach – exposing a range of corporate governance theories to the light of Hong Kong data. The authors purposely avoid over-theorising – leaving the data to speak for themselves for other researchers interested in such theorising.

The authors find that Hong Kong presents corporate challenges that are unique among upper-income jurisdictions – in terms of potentially harmful (shareholder value diminishing) family relationships, shareholder concentration and self-dealing by insiders. The authors also show that excessive executive compensation, accounting and audit weaknesses do not pose the same kinds of problems they do in other countries. The authors provide numerous comments on theoretical papers throughout the presentation in this paper.

The authors chose a relatively unused research approach that eschews theory building – instead, the authors use data from a range of sectors to build an overall picture of corporate governance in Hong Kong. The authors subsequently affirm or critique the theories of others in this paper.

The original analysis conducted by the authors provided 22 recommendations for revising listing rules for Hong Kong’s stock exchange. Others – particularly Asian officials – should consider Hong Kong’s experience when revising their own corporate governance listing rules and regulations.

This paper offers new and original insights in four directions. First, the authors use the empiricist’s method – presenting data from a wide range of corporate governance areas to comment on and critique existing studies. Second, the authors provide a system-wide view of corporate governance – showing how different parts of corporate governance rules work together using concrete data. Third, the authors provide a new study in the comparative corporate governance tradition – another brick in the wall that is “normal scientific progress”. Fourth, the authors pose tentative resolutions to highly debated questions in corporate governance for the specific time and place of Hong Kong in the early 2010s.

The penetration of foreign banks into emerging markets has been linked with financial sector deepening and expansion of credit. However, there is little research into the interaction of financial sector institutions with broader transition and development dynamics. The purpose of this paper is to examine if the presence of foreign financial institutions helped to shape a better business environment over the long-run in emerging markets.

The authors use aggregate, country-level annual data for 107 developed and emerging market countries over a shifting 30-year time span (1983-2012). The authors use Prais-Winsten and System-GMM techniques on stationary variables to highlight linkages between foreign banks and the overall business environment. Where data were found to be non-stationary, the authors applied panel cointegration approaches, including Granger Causality and full-modified OLS, to research the same relationship.

The results show that foreign bank entry in emerging markets has had a positive effect in the broader business environment, with the biggest effects on legal protection, competitiveness, and time to import/export.

This paper does not consider the broader effects of foreign bank entry on competition within emerging markets, an area that the authors are considering as fruitful for future research.

The issue of financial sector impact on broader business environment issues has not been studied in the extant literature. Moreover, this study makes an important contribution for policymakers who are grappling with issues related to financial sector regulation in the post-global financial crisis world.