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Previous empirical evidence scrutinizing the impact of the institutional ownership on the firm performance has produced inconclusive results and mostly concentrated in the developed market. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the ownership engagement by pressure-resistant, pressure-sensitive and foreign institutions on the corporate financial performance in a developing market like India post US financial crisis.

This study considers a panel data set of 361 Indian listed firms from National Stock Exchange (NSE) 500 index for a period of eight years from financial year (FY) 2008-2009 to FY 2015-2016. The panel data regression (pooled ordinary least square [OLS], fixed-effect [FE] and random-effect [RE]) and simultaneous equation modeling are used by considering the institutional ownership engagement as both exogenous and endogenous variable.

The test results show that institutional ownership engagement by the pressure-resistant and foreign institution have a robust and positive effect, while ownership engagement by the pressure sensitive institution has an adverse impact on the financial performance of the Indian listed firms.

The findings will boost the monitoring activities of the institutional owners in the developing markets. The investment from pressure-resistant and foreign institutions needs to be augmented in Indian firms to improvise their governance functions and performance.

This research will enrich the governance literature of the developing economies as the studies on institutional ownership engagement are limited in the developing world. Further, this study adds value by capturing two emerging institutional ownership category such as the pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive, which are still untouched in the Indian context. Next, the consideration of the institutional ownership as both exogenous and endogenous is also novel to the Indian literature.

This paper aims to investigate and compare the impact of foreign and domestic institutional investors on the market value of family and non-family companies. Subsequently, it examines how different degrees of family ownership influence foreign and domestic institutional investors and their value impacts.

The sample of this study includes 339 non-financial firms from NIFTY-500 for 11 years from 2011 to 2020, which contains 128 family and 211 non-family companies. Both static (fixed-effect model) and dynamic (two-step system generalized method of moments) models are employed to test the hypotheses.

Findings suggest that foreign institutional investors outshine domestic institutions regarding value creation. Meanwhile, higher (>50%) family holdings are detrimental to foreign institutional investors, while moderate holdings (26–49%) improve domestic institutional investments. The favorable effect of foreign players gets diluted with the higher (>50%) family holdings, while the adverse impact of domestic players improves with the moderate (26–49%) family holdings. Overall, partial family control is beneficial, while low and absolute family control is detrimental to market value. These findings indicate that institutional investors are family control-dependent, where the family control effect is not static.

This paper offers a novel perspective by addressing the effect of costs and benefits realized at three distinctive levels of family holdings on foreign and domestic institutional investors and their value impacts to witness differences caused by varying family control, which is not done earlier as per the best of our knowledge.

The purpose of this paper is to ascertain determining factors of ownership concentration and institutional portfolio ownership in the listed firms of an emerging market during pre-crisis and post-crisis periods and find variations in determining factors between the two varying market conditions.

This paper considers 316 listed firms for the pre-crisis period and 408 firms for the post-crisis period, from the NIFTY-500. Pre-crisis period ranges from FY2000-01 to FY2007-08 and post-crisis period ranges from FY2009-10 to FY2016-17. Two-step GMM is utilized to test the hypotheses by controlling the unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues.

Higher investment and stock market growth leads to ownership dispersion in both the market conditions. Industry information asymmetry leads to dispersion in pre-crisis, while improves concentration in post-crisis phase. Firm size, legal environment and economic growth are found to be a positive determinant of institutional ownership irrespective of market conditions. Institutional investment proliferates with higher stock liquidity and PE ratio, while declines with augmented firm risk, current ratio and stock market turnover during post-crisis phase.

Policymakers should construct a robust legal environment and focus to improve economic conditions to boost institutional ownership. Corporate executives should concentrate to increase stock liquidity and earnings of the firms, and lower market risk to draw more institutional portfolio investments.

This study would enrich emerging governance literature since studies on the determining factors of ownership holdings are limited in the emerging world. It adds novelty by capturing two different market conditions such as pre-crisis and post-crisis phases to obtain the time-dependent and time-independent determinants. It adds uniqueness by considering the determinants of institutional ownership, which is scarce in ownership studies.