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Responding to the Supreme Court’s decision in R (on the application of Mott) v. Environment Agency, the purpose of this study is to explore the interface between property, environment and human rights. It examines the space within human rights jurisprudence for a richer notion of property that can accommodate social and environmental obligation and non-anthropocentric values.

In this study, a theoretical lens is applied to human rights doctrine. A central question is the extent to which there is room within the discourse on Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) to the European Convention on Human Rights for a more relational and ecocentric approach. The paper engages with the jurisprudence of the UK courts and that of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the works of scholars such as Jennifer Nedelsky and Nicole Graham.

It is concluded that although the judgment in Mott demonstrates the potential for A1P1 to function as a means for rights-holders to obtain a voice in environmental decision-making processes, it highlights the tendency of property to preserve existing structures and arrangements. When assessing whether an individual is asked to bear an excessive burden, great weight was given in Mott to values associated with livelihood. What did not feature in the (brief) judgment was the consideration of the ecological context in which Mr Mott’s rights were embedded and the extent to which this context might have inherently restricted his ability to enjoy his property. The dispute demonstrates the limitations of existing property institutions and discourses in managing ecological conflict and fostering positive relationships and management practices.

This study contributes to the doctrinal literature on A1P1, providing a new perspective on the role of human rights jurisprudence in managing environmental conflict. It is original in its examination of human rights discourse in light of relational and ecocentric theories of property, providing a critique of existing values and paradigms. Evaluating the doctrinal reasoning in Mott with reference to this theoretical framework, it provides fresh insight into the limitations of the Supreme Court’s approach. It points to the need for more explicit incorporation of environmental values and contexts in human rights reasoning.