Blanche Segrestin, Andrew Johnston and Armand Hatchuel
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the historical rise of the managerial function and its reception in law. It thus contributes to the debates on the separation of ownership…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the historical rise of the managerial function and its reception in law. It thus contributes to the debates on the separation of ownership and control, by showing that managers were never recognized in law. As a result, the managerial function was not protected in law.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper brings together management history and the history of UK company law to study the emergence of management in the early twentieth century and the law’s response. The authors bring new historical evidence to bear on the company law reforms of the second half of the twentieth century and, in particular, on the changes inspired by the Cohen Committee report of 1945.
Findings
Scientific progress and innovation were important rationales for the emergence of managerial authority. They implied new economic models, new competencies and wider social responsibilities. The analysis of this paper shows that these rationales have been overlooked by company law. The lack of conceptualization of the management in law allowed reforms after 1945 that gave shareholders greater influence over corporate strategy, reducing managerial discretion and the scope for innovation.
Research limitations/implications
This paper focuses on the UK. Further research is needed to confirm whether other countries followed a similar path, both in terms of the emergence of management and in terms of the law’s approach.
Originality/value
This paper is the first, to the authors’ knowledge, to examine the law’s historical approach to management. It calls for a reappraisal of the status of managers and the way corporate governance organizes the separation of ownership and control.
Details
Keywords
Marine Agogué, Elsa Berthet, Tobias Fredberg, Pascal Le Masson, Blanche Segrestin, Martin Stoetzel, Martin Wiener and Anna Yström
Innovation intermediaries have become key actors in open innovation (OI) contexts. Research has improved the understanding of the managerial challenges inherent to intermediation…
Abstract
Purpose
Innovation intermediaries have become key actors in open innovation (OI) contexts. Research has improved the understanding of the managerial challenges inherent to intermediation in situations in which problems are rather well defined. Yet, in some OI situations, the relevant actor networks may not be known, there may be no clear common interest, or severe problems may exist with no legitimate common place where they can be discussed. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the research on innovation intermediaries by showing how intermediaries address managerial challenges related to a high degree of unknown.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors draw upon the extant literature to highlight the common core functions of different types of intermediaries. The authors then introduce the “degree of unknown” as a new contingency variable for the analysis of the role of intermediaries for each of these core functions. The authors illustrate the importance of this new variable with four empirical case studies in different industries and countries in which intermediaries are experiencing situations of high level of unknown.
Findings
The authors highlight the specific managerial principles that the four intermediaries applied in creating an environment for collective innovation.
Originality/value
Thereby, the authors clarify what intermediation in the unknown may entail.
Details
Keywords
Blanche Segrestin, Armand Hatchuel and Kevin Levillain
In this paper, we propose a new conceptualization of the purpose of the corporation in relation to its activities. This conceptualization builds upon the existing distinction…
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new conceptualization of the purpose of the corporation in relation to its activities. This conceptualization builds upon the existing distinction between the corporation as a legal vehicle and the enterprise as an economic organization, but renews the approach of the enterprise. We argue that the enterprise is a peculiar historical form of economic organization that emerged in the late nineteenth century to not only produce but also create new goods and technologies. This creative purpose involved a new type of managerial authority, not grounded in corporate law, but institutionalized in other branches of law, such as labor law. The legitimacy of the managers relied on the premise that the enterprise’s creative power would be harnessed for collective progress. However, this new view of the enterprise was insufficiently conceptualized in the twentieth century and continued to be governed by standard corporate law. This allowed managers to be seen as agents of shareholders, and the purpose of collective progress to be replaced by the interests of shareholders. Our analysis has important implications for the purpose of the corporation. As enterprises become more innovative and impactful, we argue that they can no longer be governed by traditional corporate law. If the corporation remains the legal cloth for business activities, then its purpose must consider the nature and impacts of these activities. We therefore interpret the new legal forms of purpose-driven corporation as an appropriate framework to restore the enterprise and a collective purpose within corporate law.
Details
Keywords
Renate E. Meyer, Stephan Leixnering and Jeroen Veldman
For more than a century, the corporation has shaped our thinking of organizations. This deeply institutionalized form is still regarded as both the iconic business organization…
Abstract
For more than a century, the corporation has shaped our thinking of organizations. This deeply institutionalized form is still regarded as both the iconic business organization and the core structural unit of our economic order. Today, however, it stands at a crossroads. Economic, social, and environmental failures of the recent past as well as misconduct and scandals are widely linked to inadequacies in this corporate form and its governance. The aim of this volume is to spark a debate within the field. In this introduction, we provide an outline of the current crisis and an overview of the interdisciplinary set of articles presented in this volume. We conclude with a view ahead and a plea for the acknowledgement of “alternatives.”
Details
Keywords
The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory.
Findings
While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory.
Practical implications
The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach.
Originality/value
While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.