C.S. Agnes Cheng and Austin Reitenga
The purpose of this paper is to examine the differential effects of institutional non‐blockholders (NONB) and active institutional blockholders (ACTB) on earnings management…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the differential effects of institutional non‐blockholders (NONB) and active institutional blockholders (ACTB) on earnings management behavior, as measured by discretionary accruals.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper also proposes that the hypothesized influence of NONB and ACTB on earnings management behavior is affected by earnings pressure (EP) (i.e. the gap between target earnings and pre‐managed earnings). In particular, it believes that the stimulating effect of NONB on earnings management may not manifest when the stimulating effect of EPs is already strong and the mitigating effect of ACTB may manifest only when the stimulating effect of EP is there. The sample into three EP conditions: pressure to increase earnings, neutral pressure and pressure to decrease earnings is grouped. Consistent with the expectations, the paper finds that NONB stimulates earnings management, but only when EP is not strong and that ACTB mitigates earnings management, but only when there is pressure to increase earnings.
Findings
This paper also predicts that ACTB will need to exercise their monitoring power only when EP is strong. The results confirm this prediction, but only when there is strong pressure to increase earnings. When there is strong pressure to decrease earnings, inconclusive evidence regarding the effect of ACTB is found. This may imply that ACTB are conservative since they appear to be more likely to limit income‐increasing accruals than they are to limit income‐decreasing accruals.
Originality/value
This paper's contributions to the literature are twofold: the paper shows that the characteristics of institutional investors (INSTs) should be considered when examining the relationship between INSTs and earnings management; the paper shows that the direction and level of EP should be considered when evaluating the relationship between INSTs and earnings management.
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George W. Ruch and Gary Taylor
We review and analyze the accounting literature that examines the effects of accounting conservatism on financial statements and financial statement users. We begin by analyzing…
Abstract
We review and analyze the accounting literature that examines the effects of accounting conservatism on financial statements and financial statement users. We begin by analyzing how conservatism affects the reported numbers on the financial statements. These studies primarily evaluate how conservatism affects earnings quality, including earnings persistence and the presence of earnings management. Next, we assess the effect of accounting conservatism on the users of the financial statements. We identify three primary users of the financial statements: (1) equity market users (2) debt market users and (3) corporate governance users. Within each of these categories, we analyze the findings of prior research and explore unanswered research questions. By analyzing the effects of accounting conservatism from a diverse range of research topics, we inform the discussion on the costs and benefits of accounting conservatism.
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Charles H. Cho and Dennis M. Patten
This investigation/report/reflection was motivated largely by the occasion of the first Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR) “Summer School” in North…
Abstract
This investigation/report/reflection was motivated largely by the occasion of the first Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR) “Summer School” in North America.1 But its roots reach down as well to other recent reflection/investigation pieces, in particular, Mathews (1997), Gray (2002, 2006), and Deegan and Soltys (2007). The last of these authors note (p. 82) that CSEAR Summer Schools were initiated in Australasia, at least partly as a means to spur interest and activity in social and environmental accounting (SEA) research. So, too, was the first North American CSEAR Summer School.2 We believe, therefore, that it is worthwhile to attempt in some way to identify where SEA currently stands as a field of interest within the broader academic accounting domain in Canada and the United States.3 As well, however, we believe this is a meaningful time for integrating our views on the future of our chosen academic sub-discipline with those of Gray (2002), Deegan and Soltys (2007), and others. Thus, as the title suggests, we seek to identify (1) who the SEA researchers in North America are; (2) the degree to which North American–based accounting research journals publish SEA-related research; and (3) where we, the SEA sub-discipline within North America, might be headed. We begin with the who.
Given the well-reported concerns over cost containment in public higher education, we believe performance should be measured based on cost efficiency and spending choices. This…
Abstract
Given the well-reported concerns over cost containment in public higher education, we believe performance should be measured based on cost efficiency and spending choices. This study develops three regression models linking presidential pay and public university performance with data for public universities that have no president change for fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010. Analysis finds a statistically significant inverse relationship between presidential pay and resources devoted to instruction, the primary mission of most universities. A relationship for presidential compensation and enrollment is found for the individual fiscal years examined but not over time. Presidential compensation over time is positively related to spending on areas other than instruction.
This study examines the rarely investigated association between institutional ownership and income smoothing. The results support the predicted positive association between…
Abstract
This study examines the rarely investigated association between institutional ownership and income smoothing. The results support the predicted positive association between institutional ownership and the likelihood of firms smoothing earnings towards their earnings trend in general. However, this association is not systematic across all firms. The positive association is most evident among profit firms with pre‐managed earnings above their earnings trend. No significant association is found for profit firms with pre‐managed earnings below their earnings trend and loss firms in general. This study also finds that, in Australia, while institutional ownership has a non‐linear association with income increasing earnings management (Koh, 2003), such association manifests itself within the income smoothing framework. The results of this study highlight the complexities in the association between institutional ownership and earnings management strategies, and future research can benefit by explicitly examining the trade‐offs between alternative earnings management incentives and the factors that affect the relative strength of these incentive trade‐offs.
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In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives…
Abstract
In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.
Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.
Jose G. Vega, Jan Smolarski and Jennifer Yin
The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions placed by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on executive compensation during the financial crisis. Since it remains…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions placed by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on executive compensation during the financial crisis. Since it remains unclear if TARP restored public confidence in financial institutions, the authors also analyze what effect such regulations had on investors’ confidence in the information provided by earning with respect to executive compensation during this critical period.
Design/methodology/approach
To test the assertions, the authors employ an Earnings Response Coefficient model, which captures the association between firms’ earnings surprise (ES) and perceived earnings informativeness. The authors implement both a long- and short-window test to obtain a better understanding of the effects of TARP on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The authors use the long-window approach to gather evidence about whether and how financial institutions’ ES are absorbed into security prices conditional on both their participation in TARP and their compliance with TARP’s compensation restrictions. The authors attempt to establish a stronger causal link by also using a short-window approach.
Findings
The authors find that firms paying their CEOs above the TARP threshold show higher earnings informativeness. Financial institutions that paid their CEOs above the TARP threshold achieved better performance during their participation in TARP. The authors also find that a decrease in total compensation while participating in TARP is associated with improved earnings informativeness. Lastly, separating total compensation into its cash and stock-based components, the authors find that firms improve earnings informativeness when they increase (decrease) cash (performance) compensation during TARP. However, overall earnings informativeness decreases during and after TARP relative to the pre-TARP period.
Practical implications
The research suggests that executive compensation incentives affect earnings informativeness and that tradeoffs are made between direct and indirect costs in retaining executives. The results have implications for policy makers, investors and researchers because the results allow policy makers and regulators to improve on how they design and implement accounting, market and finance regulations and reforms. Investors may potentially use the results when evaluating firm experiencing financial and, in some case, political distress. It also helps firms and offering optimal compensation contracts to create proper incentives for executives and ensure that managerial actions result in successful firm performance.
Social implications
The study shows how firms react to changing regulations that affect executive compensation and earning informativeness. The results of the study allow regulators to potentially design more effective regulations by targeting certain aspects of firms’ operation such excessive risk-taking behavior and rent extraction opportunities.
Originality/value
There are very few studies that deal with how firms react to regulation that affect executive compensation. The authors provide evidence regarding what effect TARP and its compensation restrictions had on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The evidence in the study will further regulators’ understanding of whether TARP improved investors’ confidence in financial institutions. The paper also contributes to the understanding in how changes in executive compensation in times of high political scrutiny affect investors’ perceptions of firm performance.