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Recognizing the severity of COVID-19 on the US economy, the authors investigate the behavior of US-listed firms towards leverage speed of adjustment (SOA) during the pandemic. While prior evidence (based on an international study) shows that firm leverage increased during the pandemic leading to a higher SOA toward leverage ratios, leverage for US firms during the same period reduced drastically. Yet there is a dearth of empirical studies on the behavior of US-listed firms' SOA during the pandemic. The authors fill this void.

The study includes US-listed non-financial and non-utility firms for the period 2015Q1-2021Q4, covering a total sample of 45,213 firm-quarter observations. The authors’ empirical strategy is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) and firm-fixed effect methodology, controlling for firm- and quarter-fixed effects.

Three main findings are established: (1) while the SOA toward book target increased during the pandemic, SOA toward market target increased significantly only for less valued and cash-constrained firms; (2) firms in states most impacted by the pandemic adjusted faster towards target ratio; and (3) while the emergence of the pandemic and the overall firm-level risk increased (decreased) the deviation from book (market) target, firm-level risk partially mediated the effect of the pandemic on how far firms deviated from target ratio.

This study enhances our understanding of leverage adjustment during the crisis and shows that risk avoidance motive and the market value of firms are key determinants of convergence rate during the crisis and further demonstrates that market leverage is more sensitive to market dynamics. As such, caution must be taken when dealing with and interpreting market leverage SOA.

Although prior evidence based on international study provides insights into how firms behave toward their leverage ratios because of the pandemic, little is known about how US firms react to the pandemic in terms of the target ratios, particularly (1) since the USA is one of the severely affected countries and (2) firms in the USA reduced their leverage ratios as against what prior evidence shows. The authors provide evidence to explain how and why US firms reacted toward their SOA during the pandemic.

Talented managers arguably remain quintessential to firm value and performance. While the literature offers evidence for the long-term orientation of talented managers, there is a paucity of evidence on the short-term performance of managers. Here, we examine the relationship between managerial talent and working capital management (WCM).

This study primarily employs a panel fixed-effect method controlling for firm-year and firm-industry for non-financial and non-utility firms for the years 1980 through 2016. Also, the authors control of potential bias that may impact the result. These controls include social capital, financial constraints and tests for endogeneity and spurious correlation.

The authors find the association between managerial talent and WCM to be positive and significant. The results indicate that talented managers have a higher cash conversion cycle. The empirical evidence still holds after controlling for social capital, religiosity and financial constraints. Also, the evidence still holds by employing an interaction term between Tobin's Q as a proxy for investment opportunities and talented managers.

The finding may lend credence to executive contracts. Human nature, by default, is only vested on a net benefit for self-aggrandization. Self-aggrandization can be evident through structures in managerial contracts. These contracts usually tie consequences to long-term growths. If a benefit is offered based on short-term operational goals, talented managers may do more to the management of working capital.

In the managerial talent literature, talents reflect a holistic picture of one that can succeed in both the short-term and long-term goals of a company. Here, the authors show that talented managers are inefficient in meeting short-term goal – working capital management. Thus, the authors add to the research by providing evidence that talented managers are myopic.